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It is indeed a pleasure to write the preface to a book celebrating 20 years of the 
“Swiss Household Panel (SHP).” For about 20 years, I was responsible for one of 
SHP’s twins: the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP), which is also a 
household panel. With each additional comparable household panel, like SHP and 
SOEP, researchers are able to improve their studies by making international com-
parisons that advance our understanding of the world.
In order to facilitate international comparative analyses, SHP was one of the first 
Cross-National Equivalent File (CNEF) partners. The CNEF – which originated at 
Syracuse University, later at Cornell University, and now based at the Ohio State 
University – provides access to harmonized data from a number of panel data stud-
ies. These include SHP, the Household Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia 
Study (HILDA), the German SOEP, the UK Household Longitudinal Study (UK 
HLS), and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) in the USA. Data from the 
Korea Labor and Income Panel Study (KLIPS) and the Russia Longitudinal 
Monitoring Survey (RLMS) are also available.
The CNEF continues to expand access to data. Interesting household panel stud-
ies or cohort studies are underway in Africa and Asia, including, to name a few, the 
“Cape Area Panel Study (CAPS),” panel household surveys in Thailand and Vietnam 
(which are financed by the German Science Foundation, DFG), the “Coping with 
Shocks in Mongolia Household Panel Survey,” and the World Bank’s “LSMS Panel 
Surveys.”
The fact that the panels in CNEF are comparable is not a lucky accident, but 
rather an important feature of the worldwide social and behavioral sciences research 
infrastructure. A concerted effort ensures that these panel studies are comparable in 
terms of the basic setups and the questionnaires.
The one outlier is the oldest study, the PSID, which is less comparable to the 
other studies. This is a surprise because, without any doubt whatsoever, the PSID 
was the role model for all household panel studies that followed. However, the 
newer studies learned from the experience of PSID.  Thus, while the PSID only 
interviews the head of the household, all of the younger studies interview all adult 
household members.
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The book at hand is an excellent example not just of SHP’s inherent research 
power, but also the power of international comparisons. In this book, readers will 
find articles about “health, well-being, and life satisfaction,” “resources, work, and 
living conditions,” as well as “politics and attitudes.” Three articles exploit interna-
tional comparisons: a longitudinal analysis of cohabitation and marriage in 
Switzerland and Australia; an analysis of wealth, savings, and children among 
Swiss, German, and Australian families; and a study on home ownership and wealth 
in Germany and Switzerland.
Scientists use SHP’s excellent data to carry out research: both local and foreign 
researchers focusing solely on Switzerland as well as teams of authors from multi-
ple countries making comparative analyses. Thus, in the book at hand, readers will 
find papers written by authors from Australia (The University of Queensland and 
Queensland University of Technology), Germany (University of Mannheim and 
German Institute for Economic Research  – DIW Berlin), Italy (Università degli 
Studi di Milano-Bicocca), the Netherlands (University of Amsterdam and Utrecht 
University), and the USA (Ohio State University and University of Colorado, 
Boulder).
SHP is part of a growing worldwide community of excellent researchers who 
analyze household panel data. These analyses make a difference in the scientific 
community. Many of these analyses also make a difference in  local and national 
societies. In the future, the results of these studies will also make a difference to 
global society. As a member, if not a hub, of the global network of panel studies, 
SHP is poised to contribute significantly to science and to society.
Fellow, Max Planck Institute for Human Development Gert G. Wagner 






Longitudinal data are indispensable for life course research. By observing individu-
als over time we gain insight into their life course trajectories, the events they expe-
rience, and the outcomes thereof. This edited volume bundles studies based on the 
Swiss Household Panel (SHP). The SHP is a longitudinal study that follows house-
holds in Switzerland on an annual basis over time since 1999. Nearly twenty years 
of observing Swiss households has generated a wealth of insights into the lives of 
people in Switzerland. Whereas a first edited volume (Zimmermann & Tillmann 
2004) provided a snapshot of Swiss society at the time, this second edited volume 
scrutinizes changes in peoples’ life courses and in society over a prolonged period, 
fine-tuning our conceptions and analyses of social dynamics and changes across 
time. In addition to the temporal dimension, also interdependencies between house-
hold members, as well as cross-country comparisons come to the foreground in this 
book. Longitudinal household data such as the SHP allow the study of the life 
course linking different life domains, and examining the interdependency of life 
courses within households.
This chapter first gives a more detailed description of the history and the design 
of the SHP, followed by a brief introduction to the studies included in this volume. 
A concluding paragraph shows how the studies in this book can provide insights for 
social policy.
 The History and Design of the Swiss Household Panel
The Swiss Priority Program “Demain la Suisse” implemented the SHP as one of its 
key structural measures in 1999 (Budowski et al. 1998; Budowski et al. 2001; Joye 
& Scherpenzeel 1997). Experiences made from existing European panel surveys 
informed the SHP’s design, notably the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) 
(Schupp & Wagner 2007) and the British Household Panel Study (BHPS), which is 
now integrated into the UK Household Longitudinal Survey (UKHLS) (Buck & 
McFall 2011). Initially, the SHP was funded by the Swiss National Science 
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Foundation and hosted by the University of Neuchâtel; the Swiss Federal Statistical 
Office contributed matching funds. Since 2008, still mainly funded by the Swiss 
National Science Foundation, the SHP has been integrated into the Swiss Centre of 
Expertise in the Social Sciences FORS hosted by the University of Lausanne.
Two main aims guide the SHP (Farago 1996; Joye & Scherpenzeel 1997): to 
ensure a solid longitudinal database for social reporting on stability and changes in 
living arrangements and well-being in Switzerland, and to promote opportunities 
for quantitative social science research by making high-quality data available to 
Swiss social scientists and to the international social science research community.
At present, the SHP comprises three samples: the SHP_I (5,074 households and 
7,799 individuals interviewed first in 1999), the SHP_II (2,538 households and 
3,654 individuals interviewed first in 2004) and the SHP_III (3,989 households and 
6,090 individuals interviewed first in 2013) (Voorpostel et al. 2016). All three are 
purely probabilistic random samples made available by the Swiss Federal Statistical 
Office. They are stratified by the seven major statistical regions of Switzerland. 
Within each major geographic region, each household (SHP_I and SHP_II) or indi-
vidual (SHP_III) had the same inclusion probability, independent of the size of the 
household. The SHP’s reference population includes all private households whose 
members represent the non-institutional resident population in Switzerland.
Response rates on the household level in the first wave were 64% for the first 
sample (1999), 65% for the second sample (2004), and 60% for the third sample 
(2013). On the individual level, initial response rates (conditional upon household 
participation) were 85%, 76%, and 81% respectively. Sample sizes in the SHP, as in 
most panel studies, declined over time. After eighteen waves of data collection, the 
number of households and individuals interviewed for the SHP_I corresponds to 
52% of the initial number of households and 55% of the initial number of individu-
als interviewed. For the SHP_II, these figures are 49% and 51%, respectively, after 
thirteenth waves. SHP_III has, so far, only four waves, after which 60% of original 
households and 63% of original individuals remain. See Tillmann et al. (2016) for a 
full description of the current state of the project.
There are three types of questionnaires in the SHP: a household grid question-
naire to assess household composition, a household questionnaire, and an individual 
questionnaire. All household members aged 14 or older are eligible to answer the 
individual questionnaire. Each household has a reference person who completes the 
household grid and the household questionnaire. The household questionnaire 
includes in addition a proxy questionnaire on household members younger than 14 
years, or absent for the time of the field work or unable to respond themselves due 
to illness or disability. The household and individual questionnaires cover a broad 
range of topics.1 They are also designed to collect both objective data, such as finan-
cial resources, social position, and participation, and subjective data, such as satis-
faction scores, values, and attitudes. The questionnaires constitute an 
operationalisation of different elements on the micro-social level: living conditions, 
life events, attitudes, perceptions, and lifestyles (Budowski et al. 1998).
1 Questionnaires can be searched online, and are also available in pdf format.
Introduction
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The SHP allows for cross-national comparisons with other household panel stud-
ies.2 The SHP contains measures in various domains that are comparable to those in 
other panels. Several contributions in this book make use of this opportunity by 
comparing Switzerland to Germany and Australia (chapters 1.3, 2.5 and 2.6).
 The Contributions
The chapters are grouped into three topics. The first part of the book contains chap-
ters on health, wellbeing and life satisfaction. Lillard’s chapter on smoking behav-
iour of different cohorts, linked to the context of changing regulations, the 
industry-government collaboration and efforts for tobacco control bring the societal 
context into view in which individuals shape their behaviour. Lucchini and Della 
Bella advance our understanding of the relationship between overweight and health 
by looking at satisfaction with health. Hewitt, Voorpostel and Turrell analyse the 
links between relationship dissolution, health and wellbeing for cohabiting and 
married couples in Switzerland and Australia. Ryser and Le Goff look into differ-
ences in attitudes and satisfaction of married and cohabiting couples and explore 
whether cohabiting couples who transition into marriage change their views on the 
family and their levels of satisfaction. The chapter by Wernli and Zella shows the 
impact of several life course events in the family domain on men and women’s life 
satisfaction. Finally, Potarca and Bernardi examine whether the phenomenon of the 
“healthy migrant”, meaning that migrants tend to report better health than the host 
population exists in Switzerland, and whether naturalization is of importance.
The second part of the book addresses research questions on resources, work and 
living conditions. Masia, Budowski and Tillmann focus on the relationship between 
individual health and financial effects on the household. Their study addresses the 
concept of linked lives, which is central in the life course perspective. Gazareth, 
Iglesias, Crettaz and Suter analyse trajectories of material deprivation and life 
course transitions. Bühlmann’s chapter also deals with trajectories of material pov-
erty and vulnerability using a historical and a biographical approach to vulnerabil-
ity. Zangger, Glauser and Becker analyse cohort differences in labour market entry 
and the influence of social origin on the status of the first job. The contribution by 
Ravazzini and Kuhn studies families’ wealth accumulation in Switzerland, Germany 
and Australia, focusing especially on whether children stimulate or discourage sav-
ing and the implication for families’ wealth. A second contribution on wealth, by 
2 In 2008 the SHP was included in the Cross-National Equivalent File (CNEF), which provides 
harmonized data from several household panel studies. To date the CNEF comprises the German 
SOEP, the British Understanding Society (including the former BHPS), the US Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID), the Canadian Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID), the 
Household Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA), the Korean Labor and Income 




Kuhn and Grabka, compares Germany and Switzerland on the role homeownership 
plays for wealth accumulation.
The third part of the book contains studies on politics and attitudes. Whereas 
most research on political party preferences to date looked at attitudes shaping party 
preferences, Fitzgerald and Jorde show that partisanship also shapes people’s 
stances on key political issues in Switzerland. Sarrasin, Kuhn and Lancee examine 
the declining support for the European Union among Swiss citizens. Pekari, Rosset 
and Schmid analyse support for the Swiss welfare state. Finally, Monsch and Passy 
look at changes in general trust in people, views on gender, taxation, foreigners and 
environmental protection, in relation to membership in a political or civic 
organisation.
 Outlook
With increasing diversity in life course trajectories new economic and social risks 
have emerged, posing important challenges for policy makers (D’Addio & Whiteford 
2008). Whereas many social policies were developed to cover well-defined risks 
such as financial difficulties in childhood or old age or short-term unemployment, 
departures from the “standardized” life course require a re-evaluation of social pol-
icy in the light of new social risks. This book contributes to a better understanding 
of our changing society, in particular in areas that could be subject to political 
action. It shows trends over time as well as over the life course, and includes a mul-
titude of life domains.
Changing life courses and new social risks are also evident in Switzerland. The 
contributions in this book show trends such as increasing levels of job insecurity 
among the youngest cohorts, the impact of life events on wellbeing and financial 
security, social groups facing long-term material deprivation and lower wellbeing, 
current levels of wealth inequality and health disparities in society, and how such 
group differences and life trajectories affect how individuals view the role of the 
welfare state. This wealth of information gathered from nearly twenty years of 
observing households in Switzerland provides a strong empirical basis from which 
fruitful directions for social policies can be developed.
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Chapter 1
The Evolution of Smoking in Switzerland
Dean R. Lillard
 Introduction
This chapter reviews the long history of tobacco in Switzerland and describes the 
smoking behavior of seven cohorts of Swiss men and women over the course of the 
20th and early 21st centuries. It presents a unique window on smoking in Switzerland 
because it describes, for each cohort, the smoking behavior in each and every year. 
Most studies describe average smoking behavior for the whole population at a given 
point in time. The life-course perspective offers insights that are otherwise masked 
when researchers use population aggregates. The rest of the chapter briefly reviews 
some of the history of tobacco, describes the industry-government collaboration 
that developed during the twentieth century, and the more recent efforts at tobacco 
control. I describe the main sources of the data I use to construct life-course smok-
ing histories and present those data in several innovative ways. More detailed 
descriptions of the data are available on request.
 A Brief History of Tobacco in Switzerland
While many people know that one of the world’s largest tobacco firms, Philip Morris 
International, has its corporate headquarters in Switzerland, fewer people know that 
the Swiss have cultivated and consumed tobacco since the late sixteenth century. 
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Rumors suggest that tobacco arrived in Switzerland about 60 years after Christopher 
Columbus brought seeds from the New World. In 1559 when Hernandez de Toledo 
returned from Santo Domingo in the New World to Spain and Portugal, he brought 
tobacco with him. The same year Jean Nicot, the French ambassador to Portugal, 
sent tobacco to friends in France, encouraging them to partake. Hearsay accounts 
suggest that shortly after, in 1560, Benedictus Aretius (Marti) von Batterkinden 
(1505–1574) began to grow tobacco in his garden in the Berne Canton (Pignat 
1981).
It is clear that, by the mid-1600s, many residents in the Swiss lands consumed 
tobacco because secular and religious authorities began to discourage and some-
times ban tobacco consumption. For example, Swiss Mennonites and Anabaptists 
adopted a set of ethical rules developed and distributed at a 1639 Mennonite council 
in Holland. One of the rules proclaimed that, “No one should use tobacco unneces-
sarily, or make it a habit, for time and money are wasted by it; and it is offensive to 
others….” (Eschleman 1917, p. 91). Swiss canton councils not only forbade people 
from consuming tobacco, they also fined and sometimes physically punished 
tobacco consumers.1 In Appenzell (in  1653) and in the “Republic of the Seven 
Tithings” in Valais (in 1675) consumers had to pay three books when authorities 
caught them consuming tobacco (Grenat and de Lavallaz 1904). From 1661 through 
the mid-1700s authorities in Berne prohibited smoking (treating it as “adultery”) 
and from 1670–1672 authorities in the canton of Glarus fined smokers 1 Swiss 
crown if they were caught smoking (MacGregor 1847).
Since the start of tobacco cultivation and until today, the lure of jobs and tobacco 
tax revenue has guided government policies. By 1590 the Berne Canton government 
protected the rights of farmers to cultivate tobacco (presumably only for trade as 
they continued to punish smokers) and tobacco cultivation spread during the 1600s 
to residents of Ticino (Pignat 1981). In 1675, the lure of state revenue led rulers of 
Monthey, Valais to grant one man, a gunsmith named Jacques Robert, the right to be 
the sole supplier of tobacco to foreigners (Grenat and de Lavallaz 1904). In 1812, 
domestic tobacco farmers convinced the central government to improve transporta-
tion systems to lower their costs (Grellet 1954). By 1814, when the Congress of 
Vienna and European powers established the boundaries of modern Switzerland, 
tobacco trade, cultivation, and consumption were firmly and legally part of the 
Swiss landscape.
1 Authorities issued similar edicts in England, Persia, the Vatican (Macgregor 1847), Russia 
(Macgregor 1847; Lillard and Dorofeeva 2015), and Turkey (Önder 2015).
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 The Domestic Swiss Tobacco Industry - A Child of State 
Protection
The political economy of Switzerland’s domestic tobacco industry survived, even 
thrived well into the middle of the twentieth century primarily because the Swiss 
government intervened.
In the first few decades of the twentieth century, competition from foreign 
tobacco producers almost destroyed Swiss tobacco farming. The yield in the tobacco 
producing cantons of Fribourg, Vaud, Ticino, Valais, and Grisons fell from an annual 
average of 432,200 kg in the period 1910–1914 to 150,700 kg in 1926 (Pignat 1981; 
Burrus 1972). In 1926, the industry almost shut down.
Two main factors allowed Swiss tobacco farming and manufacturing to survive 
until the 1960s. First, Swiss tobacco manufacturers and farmers formed a tightly- 
knit and well-organized interest group that not only acted as a cartel but that also 
convinced the Swiss government to protect it. The government levied lower taxes on 
products containing at least 50 percent domestically-grown tobacco, taxed imported 
tobacco and favored the domestic industry in many other ways. For example, the 
Swiss government issued a decree in 1938 decree that “protected” retail tobacco 
prices. In 1951, Swiss cigarette manufacturers agreed to limit the amount each firm 
could spend to advertise. They monitored and punished transgressors (Burrus 1972).
During World War II demand for Swiss tobacco increased because the war dis-
rupted markets and trade routes of foreign suppliers. The associated chaos raised the 
cost of imported tobacco. Insurance premiums on shipments of imported tobacco 
rose during the war by 500 percent (Burrus 1972). Domestic tobacco farmers 
responded to the increased demand. In 1944, Swiss farmers produced almost 2 mil-
lion kilos of tobacco.
The Swiss government began to eliminate its protectionist policies in the mid- 
1950s. In 1955, the Federal Court ruled the price regulation of tobacco to be illegal 
(Burrus 1972). The Swiss cigarette firms advertising restrictions slowly broke down 
as foreign companies entered the Swiss market (through acquisition of Swiss firms 
or by establishing operations in Switzerland) and advertised as they pleased.
That pressure and the Swiss government’s embrace of free trade in 1960 and 
1972 doomed all efforts to continue the government’s interference in the tobacco 
industry. In 1960, Switzerland and Norway founded the European Free Trade 
Association and in 1972 Switzerland signed a free-trade agreement with the 
European Economic Community. Under the onslaught of market forces and these 
changes in the government’s stance on free trade, the Swiss cigarette industry’s 
agreement to limit advertising expenditures died in 1964 (Burrus 1972). Essentially, 
Swiss tobacco farming ended on January 1, 1965 when, as part of the free-trade 
agreements, Switzerland ended all differential tax treatment that had protected 
domestic tobacco. Today approximately 200 farmers still grow tobacco in 
Switzerland (Jaberg and Kern 2016).
1 The Evolution of Smoking in Switzerland
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 Tobacco Control
Although the government stopped protecting the domestic tobacco industry, it 
continued to support the tobacco industry through its tobacco control policies. 
Switzerland did not enact modern tobacco control policies until the closing decades 
of the twentieth century - much later than most developed countries. Swiss politi-
cians delayed enacting such policies because they feared losing the jobs, tax reve-
nue, and benefits local economies enjoy because three major international tobacco 
firms, Philip Morris, British American Tobacco and Japan Tobacco International, 
operate in Switzerland. In 2013, those firms and the Swiss tobacco industry 
employed 2500 Swiss in relatively high paying jobs and generated revenues of more 
than 579.3 million dollars (ILO 2014). Those jobs and the taxes the firms pay, 
together with the lobbying efforts of various Swiss interest groups (e.g. the Swiss 
association representing hotels, restaurants, and cafés), help explain why the Swiss 
federal and canton governments have been slow to regulate tobacco (Lee and Glantz 
2001).
Switzerland limits where and to whom firms can advertise tobacco products. In 
1976, 1979, and 1993 Swiss interest groups tried and failed to pass initiatives that 
would have completely banned tobacco advertising (Isenring 1976; Swiss Federal 
Office of Health 2009). The industry and government agreed to a partial voluntary 
ban in 1978 that prohibited firms from advertising or handing out free samples at 
sports matches or concerts that youth under age 18 were likely to attend (Lee and 
Glantz 2001). Amazingly, Switzerland let firms continue to sell tobacco to youth. 
The 1993 initiative failed partly because the tobacco and publishing industries con-
vinced voters that the ban would increase the price of newspapers and magazines, 
raise the probability that both industries would lay workers off, and restrict citizens’ 
right to free speech (Cornuz et al. 1996).
In 2008, the Swiss prohibited smoking in enclosed public areas and places where 
several people work. That ban took effect on May 1, 2010. This law resembled laws 
that German states were adopting around the same time (Lillard and Christopoulou 
2015). As in Germany, the government let patrons smoke in bars and restaurants 
smaller than 80 square meters and they let patrons of larger establishments smoke if 
owners created separate ventilated rooms for them (Rajkumar et al. 2013). Under 
the law, the government lets cantons impose stricter bans. Sixteen cantons have 
chosen to require that even small establishments ban smoking (or provide a sepa-
rate, ventilated room). In 2012 Swiss voters rejected a federal referendum that 
would have banned smoking even in the smaller establishments previously excluded 
by the 2008 law (Durham et al. 2014).
Finally, the Swiss government increasingly taxes tobacco. A 1999 study esti-
mated how various levels of cigarette taxes would affect both consumption (public 
health) and government revenues (Holly et al. 1999). In 2013, the Swiss government 
raised tobacco taxes. Switzerland levies both a specific excise tax of 118.32 Swiss 
francs per 1000 cigarettes and an ad valorem tax of 25 percent of the retail price. 
Despite the increase, the overall tax burden on tobacco is lower in Switzerland than 
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it is in other neighboring countries. Taxes remain a key policy lever that the Swiss 
government may continue to use.
 Smoking in the Swiss Context
Most previous research uses cross-sectional data to describe patterns of smoking in 
Switzerland. Such data highlight differences in participation, initiation, and cessa-
tion at a moment in time (Morabia et al. 2002) across groups of different ages and 
by sex (Curtin et al. 1997). Most studies find that Swiss tend to smoke at rates simi-
lar to or even lower than men and women in other European countries (WHO 2015). 
One observes similar smoking behavior of Swiss overall and among women who 
smoke before and after getting pregnant (Smedberg et al. 2014). However, a recent 
study compares reported smoking prevalence and aggregate sales data and con-
cludes that true Swiss smoking prevalence may be much higher than indicated by 
survey smoking prevalence rates (Jakob et al. 2017).
Previous research largely relies on cross-sectional data that do not reveal some of 
the nuances of smoking patterns across the life-cycle of different cohorts. Cross- 
sectional data fail to capture how cohort differences dynamically change as social, 
economic and cultural conditions change. Consequently studies using cross- 
sectional data may miss patterns informed by the above historical events and con-
text. Marti (2014) uses retrospectively reported data to follow individuals over 
longer periods but he limits his analysis to a relatively short window of 20 years. 
One observes different patterns when one describes smoking behavior of cohorts of 
men and women over longer time spans (Lillard and Christopoulou 2015). The long 
history of tobacco in Switzerland provides a rich setting in which to do so.
 Data Sources
In what follows I plot data constructed with information from the 2007 wave of the 
Swiss Health Survey (SHS) and the 2011 wave of the Swiss Household Panel Study 
(SHP). Both surveys ask respondents about their lifetime smoking behavior  - 
whether or not they have ever smoked, the age they started, whether they currently 
smoke, and the age they quit (SHP) or the number of years it has been since they 
smoked regularly (SHS).
I restrict the SHP part of the sample to 2011 (wave 12) respondents who provided 
valid responses to the smoking questions. Using the SHP and SHS data, I construct 
an indicator of whether or not a person smoked in each year of his or her life. For 
people who reported they never smoked, the smoking participation measure equals 
zero in every year. When a person said he currently or previously smoked, I assume 
he smoked in every year between the age he said he started until the age he said he 
quit (ex-smokers) or until the survey year (2007 for SHS, 2011 for SHP). I create a 
1 The Evolution of Smoking in Switzerland
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birth year variable by subtracting age from the survey year and assign each person 
a birth cohort. Here I do not construct pseudo-cohorts (a common strategy when 
using cross-sectional data). Instead, I use the retrospective data to construct true 
longitudinal smoking histories of seven different (10 year) birth cohorts of Swiss 
men and women. The data track the actual smoking behavior of members of each 
cohort accurately except for the cohort of men and women who were 70 or older 
when they answered the survey. Christopoulou et al. (2011) show that differences in 
smoking-related mortality of smokers and non-smokers are trivial for cohorts who, 
when surveyed, were younger than 70. Although I do not weight the data, the 
weights will only affect the results for the oldest cohort. Table 1.1 summarizes the 
size of each cohort.
 Cohort-Specific Smoking Prevalence Rates Over Time
Figure 1.1 plots the smoking prevalence rate of Swiss men and women born between 
1909 and 1990. I group people into seven 10-year birth cohorts. On both figures, I 
mark three periods during which tobacco markets or consumption changed. These 
periods include the years of World War II, the period from 1965–1972 when 
Switzerland was meeting legal requirements of the free trade agreement it signed 
with the EEC, and the period 2008–2010 when Switzerland signed and then imple-
mented its first public smoking ban.













byr<1930 313 0.49 18 38 33 20 53
1930≤byr<1940 713 0.54 22 34 32 20 48
1940≤byr<1950 1102 0.52 21 30 26 20 42
1950≤byr<1960 1091 0.49 21 26 25 19 37
1960≤byr<1970 1209 0.43 19 20 25 19 33
1970≤byr<1980 852 0.45 17 13 26 18 29
1980≤byr<1990 571 0.49 13 7 23 17 22
Females
byr<1930 192 0.14 10 36 40 25 56
1930≤byr<1940 475 0.21 14 32 31 23 48
1940≤byr<1950 976 0.35 15 29 32 21 42
1950≤byr<1960 1192 0.43 15 25 25 19 36
1960≤byr<1970 1344 0.40 15 20 26 19 32
1970≤byr<1980 838 0.35 12 13 25 18 27
1980≤byr<1990 569 0.37 10 6 21 17 22
Source: Swiss Health Survey 2007 and Swiss Household Panel 2011
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Fig. 1.1 Smoking prevalence rates over the life course by gender and birth cohort (Source: Swiss 
Health Survey 2007 and Swiss Household Panel 2011, unweighted data (see text))
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Several patterns strike the eye. First, Swiss men in every cohort smoke more than 
the corresponding cohort of Swiss women. Second, at the peak, roughly half of the 
oldest cohort of Swiss men (men born before 1931) were smoking. In the next old-
est cohort - those born in the 1930s - 54 percent smoked at the peak of smoking 
prevalence. Because smokers tend to die faster than non smokers starting around 
age 65, smoking prevalence in the oldest cohort was likely to have been 2–3 per-
centage points higher (see Christopoulou et al. 2011). Over the course of their lives 
men in the oldest cohort smoked at about the same rate as did men in the adjacent 
cohorts. For men the other striking pattern is that smoking prevalence rates first fall 
then rise again in the youngest two cohorts. This pattern of increasing smoking 
prevalence in younger cohorts of men differs from the pattern one observes in 
Germany, Spain, and the UK (see Lillard and Christopoulou 2015).
One observes a similar but less dramatic rise in the smoking prevalence rate 
among the youngest cohort of Swiss women. The bottom panel of Fig. 1.1 plots 
life- course smoking prevalence rates of Swiss women in the same seven birth 
cohorts. The most striking pattern among women is the dramatic rise in the rate of 
smoking across the four oldest cohorts. Among the oldest cohort of Swiss women 
(those born before 1930) smoking prevalence peaked in 1962 at about 14 percent of 
that cohort. The rate of smoking rose steadily in the next three cohorts of Swiss 
women, reading a peak among the cohort of women born in the 1950s.
In that cohort, 43 percent of women were smoking in 1980. Note that rates of 
smoking began to increase most rapidly among the cohort of women who grew up 
while and shortly after Switzerland began to trade more with the rest of Europe. 
Except for the youngest cohort, the rate of smoking prevalence steadily fell in 
successive cohorts. One observes similar patterns of declining rates of smoking in 
all developed countries as information about the health risk of smoking spread 
and as public health authorities convinced governments to enact stricter tobacco 
control laws.
The smoking behavior of both men and women were also subject to changes in 
cigarette prices and overall economic growth. To give historical context, Fig. 1.2 
plots the average price of Swiss brand cigarettes from 1958 to 2015 and per-capita 
GDP from 1920 to 2015. To put these series on a comparable scale, I plot each series 
relative to its level in 1958.
From 1958 until the 1990s relative cigarette prices were either constant or gener-
ally falling while real per capita GDP grew much faster than the price of a pack of 
cigarettes. This period coincides with the increasing smoking rates among Swiss 
women and with their increased labor force participation rate. From 1993 until 
2000, cigarette prices increased faster than per capita GDP. After 2001, cigarette 
prices rose at about the same rate as per capita GDP.
D. R. Lillard
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 Cohort and Gender Differences
Figure 1.3 presents these data in a way that more clearly shows that smoking pat-
terns of men and women have been converging in successively younger cohorts. 
Figure 1.3 lines up each cohort’s smoking prevalence rate by chronological age.
Over the course of their lives, Swiss men of different cohorts smoked in broadly 
similar ways at similar ages but, as noted above, the oldest cohorts of men smoked 
more at almost every age. Figure 1.3 shows the less obvious result that this state-
ment is only true from about age 19 onwards. Up until age 19, the oldest cohorts of 
men smoked less at every age than did the men in cohorts that followed them.
The opening of Switzerland to more competition offers a plausible explanation 
for both the rising rate of female smoking and the increasing rates of smoking at 
younger ages. Recall that the signing of free trade agreements by Switzerland 
caused advertising of cigarettes to increase. While not a causal explanation, 
increased exposure to advertising is a possible factor that might explain both 
changes in observed smoking patterns of these cohorts.
Figure 1.3 also makes more clear the more or less monotonic reduction in smok-
ing at every age for men and the up and down pattern of smoking participation for 
women. Women in the oldest cohort smoked less at every age than did women of 
successive cohorts. As observed above, smoking among Swiss women peaked for 
women in the middle cohorts. Importantly, Fig. 1.3 clearly shows that the middle 






















Fig. 1.2 Average cigarette price (1958–2015) and per-capita GDP (1920–2015), by year
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Fig. 1.3 Smoking prevalence rate by age, gender, and birth cohort (Source: Swiss Health Survey 
2007 and Swiss Household Panel 2011)
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also points to the way in which they differ because the right tail of each cohort’s 
smoking trajectories remain more or less parallel. Because they are roughly parallel, 
women in each cohort were quitting smoking at about the same rate. The perhaps 
surprising conclusion suggests that these middle cohorts of Swiss women faced 
conditions that affected their initiation behavior but not their quitting behavior. 
Certainly, as with men, smoking became more prevalent at younger ages in succes-
sive cohorts.
In Table 1.1, I present six summary measures of smoking behavior that expose 
differences in smoking behavior of different cohorts that are less easy to notice in 
the above plot. For each gender and cohort, I list the peak smoking prevalence rate, 
the number of cigarettes smoked on the average day (during the time a person 
smoked), the number of years smoked, the age the cohort reached its peak smoking 
prevalence, the age current and former smokers started, and the age ex-smokers 
quit. One can directly compare, across gender and cohorts, the peak prevalence rate, 
average cigarette consumption, age at peak smoking prevalence, and the average 
start age. But one cannot directly compare smoking duration and quit age of men 
and women from a given cohort because we observe each cohort from birth until the 
time of interview and not from birth until death.
The comparisons reveal interesting patterns. Not only did more men smoke in 
the older cohorts, those who smoked also smoked more cigarettes on the average 
day. Consumption in the older cohorts averaged about a pack of cigarettes per day. 
And while a high share of men and women in the youngest cohort are smokers, they 
smoke the fewest cigarettes per day of any cohort. In every cohort, women were 
smoking fewer cigarettes per day than did their male counterparts.
One can also characterize a cohort’s smoking behavior by the age at which smok-
ing prevalence reached its peak. Peak rates of smoking occurred at older ages in the 
oldest cohorts (age 33 and 40 for men and women respectively). While men’s age of 
peak smoking prevalence stabilized at around 25 or 26 in all but the youngest cohort, 
women’s age of peak smoking prevalence declined. In the older cohorts, women 
started smoking at older ages than did their male counterparts.
At the same time, women’s smoking patterns increasingly resembled those of 
men. In practically every cohort, men and women quit at similar ages and smoked 
for about the same number of years in every cohort. In the youngest cohort, men and 
women’s smoking patterns are practically indistinguishable from each other.
Figure 1.4 more starkly highlights similarities and differences in smoking behav-
ior of Swiss men and women. In each panel, I use the data reported in Table 1.1. I 
plot the statistic for men relative to the corresponding statistic for women. Figure 1.4 
more clearly shows that men and women in each birth cohort smoked about the 
same number of years and quit at about the same ages. As noted before, women in 
older cohorts started later than their male counterparts and these older cohorts 
reached their peak smoking prevalence rate when they were older.
On each of these six measures of smoking behavior, younger cohorts of Swiss 
women increasingly behave like Swiss men. Only in two dimensions to women still 
differ markedly from men. Even in the younger cohorts it is still the case that more 
men than women smoke and they smoke more cigarettes on the average day. But the 
trends converge.








































































Smoking behavior of Swiss men and women resembles some of the patterns one 
observes in other developed economies but also follows some patterns that differ. As 
in the other countries, smoking patterns of Swiss men and women have converged 
so that smoking behavior of men and women in the youngest cohorts are increas-
ingly the same. But the regulatory environment in Switzerland is in many ways less 
active than in other countries. Switzerland only recently enacted its first public 
smoking bans. Switzerland also has a relatively long history of collaboration 
between a domestic tobacco industry and the government. It may be that the pat-
terns shown above echo some of the legacy of that history. These patterns suggest 
that there are systematic influences on smoking behavior that remain to be modeled 
to explain what caused the behavioral changes discussed in this chapter and when 
and how these changes occurred.
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Chapter 2




According to the World Health Organization (WHO 2016), worldwide the preva-
lence of obesity has more than doubled since 1980 and in 2014 600 million people 
were obese. In many countries, childhood obesity is increasing at an even higher 
rate than adult obesity, what would probably lead to a further increase in the preva-
lence of obesity, given that obese children are more likely to become obese adults 
(Singh et al. 2008; Reilly and Kelly 2011).
In Switzerland obesity rates are low compare to most OECD countries, but they 
have increased significantly in the last twenty years: in 1992, 31.3% of the Swiss 
population was overweight or obese, and this increased to 41,2 % in 2012 (Schneider 
and Venetz 2014). According to the most recent estimates of the Swiss Survey on 
Health, in 2012 41% of the Swiss population aged over 15 years appear to be over-
weight or obese (Federal Office of Public Health (FOPH) 2014).
Obesity, defined as excessive body fat and typically measured using the Body 
Mass Index (BMI) (WHO 2016), can impair health. There is robust evidence sug-
gesting that obesity is an important risk factors for a set of health problems and 
diseases such as diabetes, cardiovascular diseases, hypertension, respiratory prob-
lems, musculoskeletal diseases and some forms of cancer (Hu 2008; WHO 2016; 
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Imai et al. 2008). Interestingly, the link between obesity and health has been con-
firmed in studies using a variety of different health indicators, such as measures of 
health related quality of life (Garner et  al. 2011; Ford et  al. 2001), measures of 
functional health (Ford et al. 2001; Imai et al. 2008) or self-assessed health (Cullinan 
and Gillespie 2016; Imai et al. 2008). Obesity has also been associated with poor 
mental health and depression (Ford et  al. 2001; Imai et  al. 2008; Luppino et  al. 
2010) and this is not surprising given the fact that obese person tend to suffer from 
prejudices and discrimination in several life domains and might suffer from low 
self-esteem (Puhl and Heuer 2009). Weight-related stigma seems to be particularly 
relevant for women, who tend to suffer the most from being obese and are more 
discriminated than their male counterparts (Puhl and Heuer 2009; Puhl and Brownell 
2003; Hebl and Turchin 2005; Wadsworth and Pendergast 2014). These cultural 
reasons, together with possible physiological reasons, might explain why in some 
studies obesity appears to have worse health related consequences for women rather 
than for men (Garner et al. 2012; Wang et al. 2012).
Overweight, concof the Swiss population was overweight or obese,erning around 
1,8 billion adults worldwide (WHO 2016), has also been linked to health-related 
conditions, but the evidence is more mixed and, in the majority of studies, over-
weight does not appear to increase mortality risk (rather, some studies suggested a 
protective role of overweight, at least in men and in the elderly) (Cullinan and 
Gillespie 2016; Garner et al. 2012; Lantz et al. 2010; Berrington de Gonzalez et al 
2010; Flegal et al. 2007; Imai et al. 2008).
The relationship between BMI and health, hence, does not seem to be a strictly 
linear one. This is particularly so because several studies reported underweight to be 
a risk factor for health and premature mortality as well (Garner et al. 2012; Flegal 
et al. 2007; Imai et al. 2008; Ford et al. 2001). Again, this relationship seems to vary 
across age categories and gender: for instance, Garner et al. (2012) found under-
weight to be protective in terms of health related quality of life for young women. 
Despite the great deal of evidence about the link between obesity/BMI and health, 
the causal nature of this relationship is still disputed. There is a huge literature 
-comprising observational, intervention and genetic epidemiological studies using 
mendelian randomization (MR)  - that has investigated this issue (Corbin and 
Timpson 2016). Every approach presents some limits in its ability to assess the 
causal link between obesity (or BMI) and health outcomes (confounding bias, 
reversed causality) and even the instrumental variable approach can be criticized 
because it ultimately relies on assumptions that are difficult to test (Cameron and 
Trivedi 2009). Moreover, results are mixed, though some MR studies (in which 
genetic variation is used as an instrumental variable) have found evidence of causal 
effects of obesity on several physical and mental health outcomes (Corbin and 
Timpson 2016).
This study specifically focuses on the relationship between BMI and satisfaction 
with health. Satisfaction with health belongs to the group of subjective measures of 
health that can encompass aspects of both physical and mental health, reflecting a 
complex process of internalized reckoning. In the health literature subjective mea-
sures of health, such as Self-Assessed Health (SAH), are widely used. Despite being 
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a very simple measure of health, SAH is extremely powerful and appears to be 
related to several objective measures of health, such as morbidity and functional 
limitations, and it is able to predict mortality above and beyond the individual objec-
tive health status (Benyamini 2011; Benjamins et  al. 2004; Idler and Benyamini 
1997; Jylha 2009). The negative association between obesity and SAH has been 
found to hold true for adults as well as for adolescents (Imai et al. 2008; Krause and 
Lampert 2015; Vingilis et  al. 2002), and in several countries, like Switzerland, 
Ireland and the USA (Cullinan and Gillespie 2016; Prosper et al. 2009; Marques- 
Vidal et al. 2012). However, this relationship has not been found in countries such 
as Portugal and Greece (Darviri et  al. 2012; Marques-Vidal et  al. 2012) and in 
specific subpopulations such as Latino immigrants living in the USA (Macmillan 
et al. 2011).
Moreover, the association of BMI with SAH appears to vary significantly across 
ages and sexes (Imai et al. 2008), although not in all studies: for instance, Cullinan 
and Gillespie (2016) did not find substantial differences among genders concerning 
the impact of obesity on SAH.
Variation in results might reflect real differences, due to the specific population 
under study and its cultural specificities. However, methodological shortcomings 
might also be partly responsible for mixed findings. Indeed, previous studies in this 
field have mostly used cross-sectional data and were not able to adequately control 
for potential confounders. One notable exception is the study by Cullinan and 
Gillespie (2016) who adopted the instrumental variable approach to assess the effect 
of obesity and overweight (underweight was not considered) on SAH in a nationally 
representative sample of Irish people. The authors concluded that obesity (and par-
ticularly severe obesity) negatively impacts SAH, whereas overweight does not 
seem to affect SAH.
The present study aimed to investigate the relationship between BMI and satis-
faction with health in Switzerland, using longitudinal studies and applying panel 
data regression models that partly allow to control for unobserved heterogeneity.
 Data and Variables
For our analysis we used data from the Swiss Household Panel (SHP), a representa-
tive longitudinal study of household and individuals, supported by the Swiss 
National Science Foundation, which began in 1999 with a sample of 5074 house-
holds containing 12,931 household members.1 More precisely, we used the eleven 
waves from 2004 to 2014. We selected 103,861 observations nested into 22,815 
individuals, aged 18–75. The dependent variable — satisfaction with health— was 
measured on a scale ranging from 0 (not at all satisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied). 
Despite its ordinal nature, following Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) we con-
sidered satisfaction with health as a cardinal variable in order to facilitate 
1 http://forscenter.ch/en/our-surveys/swiss-household-panel/
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interpretation of the estimated parameters. Our main focus was BMI that was coded 
into five categories, according to the thresholds set by the World Health Organization, 
as follows: underweight (BMI < 18.50), normal weight (BMI > 18.50 to 24.99), 
overweight (BMI >24.99 to 29.99), obesity class I (BMI >29.99 to 34.99), obesity 
class II and III (BMI > 34.99), also called “severe obesity”. In the regression mod-
els, normal weight was the category of reference.
All models included a set of control variables, that have been proven to affect 
health and, in many cases, BMI as well: age, age squared, gender, a set of social 
relationship indicators such as civil status dummies (single, married, separated, 
divorced, widow), number of children in the family, size of household, death of 
closely related person (dummy), termination of close relationship (dummy), con-
flicts with or among related persons (dummy) (Umberson and Karas Montez 2010; 
Umberson et al. 2006); social status indicators such as the logarithm of net total 
annual household income, work status (employed, unemployed, not in labour force), 
and education dummies (less than secondary education, secondary education, ter-
tiary education) (Marmot and Wilkinson 2006; McLaren 2007), physical activity 
(dummy) (Wanner et  al. 2017), regional dummies (Lake Geneva, Middleland, 
North-West Switzerland, Zurich, East Switzerland, Central Switzerland, Ticino) 
(Ogna et al. 2014) and wave dummies (2004–2014). Since previous studies found 
gender differences in the association between self-rated health and BMI, descriptive 
analysis (see Table 2.1) and regression models (see Table 2.2) were carried out sepa-
rately for men and women.
Table 2.1 Descriptive statistics: within and between variance of the main variables of interests 
(male sample: n. 7151, N.29,953; female sample: n.8142, N.35,889)
Male Female
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Self-assessed health Overall 7.916419 1.669599 Overall 7.825406 1.824892
Between 1.524697 Between 1.688332
Within 0.9813426 Within 1.082382
BMI <18.50 Overall 0.0091811 0.0953785 Overall 0.0528853 0.2238076
Between 0.0922419 Between 0.2174079
Within 0.0521687 Within 0.1092517
BMI 18.50–24.99 cat.ref. Overall 0.5115347 0.4998753 Overall 0.6416172 0.479532
Between 0.47195 Between 0.4471349
Within 0.2135785 Within 0.2200133
BMI 25.00–29.99 Overall 0.3804293 0.4855005 Overall 0.2185071 0.413239
Between 0.4457702 Between 0.3687357
Within 0.2413439 Within 0.2241873
BMI 30.00–34.99 Overall 0.0799252 0.2711819 Overall 0.0674023 0.2507209
Between 0.245902 Between 0.224003
Within 0.1424698 Within 0.1383976
BMI > 34.99 Overall 0.0189297 0.1362789 Overall 0.0195882 0.1385822
Between 0.1226754 Between 0.1332532
Within 0.065176 Within 0.066268








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2 Body Mass Index and Satisfaction with Health in Contemporary Switzerland
24
 Analytic Strategies
In order to investigate the existence and the nature of the relationship between 
health and BMI categories, we adopted different analytical strategies, with the aim 
of exploiting the strength of panel data and understanding to which extend unob-
served individual heterogeneity could introduce a bias in the parameter estimates. 
More precisely, we estimated three types of regression models —pooled OLS, ran-
dom effect (RE) and fixed effect (FE) models— as follows:













β γ δ α ψ ε
Where SWHit was the satisfaction with health score of respondent i at time t; Xit 
was a vector of K time-varying BMI dummies; Zit and Wi represented, respectively, 
a vector of Q time-varying and R time-constant characteristics, that we considered 
as control variables. Finally, αi was a time-invariant individual-specific effect; ψ t  
corresponded to wave effects and ε it  was the idiosyncratic error term.
Firstly, we estimated OLS pooled regression models with clustered standard 
errors and subsequently random effect models (RE) that enabled us to study the 
effect of both time-constant and time-varying covariates. These analytical strategies 
allowed us to take into account differences across individuals and to control for time 
invariant variables. It is important to underline that since BMI is an endogenous 
variable, these models would give biased results, as they unrealistically assume the 
causal variable to be uncorrelated with the error term (Cameron and Trivedi 2009).
If variables of interest showed enough intra-individual variation, fixed effect 
models (FE) were also implemented. FE yields an unbiased estimate of the causal 
parameter by erasing the influence of time constant unobserved variables (Cameron 
and Trivedi 2009). This means that this estimation method allowed us to control for 
crucial unobservable differences in time constant individual characteristics like per-
sonality, dispositions or genetic traits that are known to be important determinants 
of satisfaction with health. In order to test if RE was more appropriate than FE, or 
vice versa, we ran a Hausman Test.
 Empirical Results
Effects of BMI on satisfaction with health, obtained by applying OLS, RE and FE 
estimators, are reported in Table 2.2.
Overall, we could see that the sign of the coefficients were consistent and in line 
with the literature, although, as expected, there appeared to be a shrink in the size of 
estimates moving from the OLS to RE and from RE to the FE specifications.
The OLS estimates suggest that individuals with normal weight enjoyed a better 
health status than individuals belonging to others categories. Those with the lowest 
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level of satisfaction with health were severely obese individuals (i.e. obesity class II 
and III), followed by obese individuals (obesity class I) and overweight individuals. 
This appeared to be true for both men and women, though these effects appeared to 
be more pronounced among women. Indeed, among men severe obesity reduced 
satisfaction with health by 0.791 points (on a 10 point-scale), among women the 
reduction reached 1 point.
Overweight also appeared to decrease the level of satisfaction with health, and 
particularly so for women. Being underweight was also associated with lower levels 
of satisfaction with health, but the coefficient for men did not reach statistical sig-
nificance and it was only significant at the 1% level in women.
Looking at the OLS estimates for the chosen control variables, we could see that 
getting married (for women), secondary and tertiary education, family income, 
physical activity, Swiss nationality (for women) and living in Ticino (for men) were 
positively associated with satisfaction with health. On the contrary, ageing, getting 
married (for women) unemployment, inactivity, the death of a closely related per-
son, the termination of a close relationship, the conflicts with or among related 
persons were negatively correlated with satisfaction with health.
RE estimates tell us roughly the same story, even though it is important to empha-
size a remarkable reduction in the size of the parameter estimates. More precisely, 
the negative effect of obesity class II and III decreased from −0.791 to −0.565 in the 
male sample and from −1.002 to −0.865 in the female one. For the obesity class I 
the size of the effect changed from −0.438 to −0.332 for male and from −0.676 to 
−0.497 for female.
Finally, FE parameter estimates tell us a slightly different story. For men, the 
effect of the BMI categories decreased in size and lost statistical significance. For 
women, we observed that the size of the estimates of interest decreased, while main-
taining statistical significance. This means that a change in a woman’s BMI leads to 
a change in satisfaction with health, whereas the same conclusion does not apply to 
men. Women belonging to obesity class II and III showed the lowest level of satis-
faction with health (0.521 point less than normal weight woman), followed by 
women belonging to obesity class I (−0.237), underweight (−0.157) and overweight 
(−0.088) women. These results might reflect the fact that weight related stigma is 
stronger for women and obese women tend to suffer more because of their weight 
status (Puhl and Heuer 2009; Puhl and Brownell 2003; Hebl and Turchin 2005; 
Wadsworth and Pendergast 2014) and are consistent with what has been found in 
some studies (Garner et al. 2012; Wang et al. 2012), albeit not in all.
A Hausman model selection test was run in order to understand whether the FE 
estimator was more efficient than the RE. According to this test, the FE should be 
preferred over the RE model in that time constant unobserved characteristics were 
likely to be associated with our BMI dummies.
Overall, these results suggested that, even after controlling for a range of indi-
vidual, socioeconomic and lifestyle related variables, departures from normal 
weight had statistically significant negative impact on women’s satisfaction with 
health. More precisely, we could see a dose-response relationship, whereby being 
obese had a stronger negative effect than being overweight and being severely obese 
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had a stronger effect than being obese. The effect of underweight on women’s satis-
faction with health was less pronounced but still statistically significant (in line with 
results from Imai et al. 2008). Working on Canadian women, Garner et al. (2012) 
found a protective effect of underweight on women’s self-assessed health, at least at 
younger ages, but this might reflect cultural difference in the value attributed to thin-
ness. This difference could also be due to the fact that FE models applied in this 
study are not fully able to tackle the issue of reversed causality.
 Conclusion
Obesity is an important risk factor for a number of diseases (cardiovascular dis-
eases, type 2 diabetes, hypertension, some cancers, musculoskeletal disorders, etc.) 
and obese individuals often face discrimination and stigmatization in important 
domains of life and tend to report lower level of self-esteem and mental health (Hu 
2008; WHO 2016; Puhl and Heuer 2009; Hebl and Turchin 2005).
Hence, the association between obesity and subjective measures of health is not 
surprising, since this kind of subjective measures are likely to capture aspect of both 
physical and mental health. However, the role of overweight and underweight is less 
clear and studies investigating the relationship between BMI and health have pro-
vided mixed results.
Cultural as well as methodological reasons can explain these differences. The 
strength of the social penalty associated with overweight and obesity can vary over 
population sub-groups and across societies. Moreover, previous studies in this field 
have not generally addressed nor taken into account the issue of endogeneity and 
reverse causality (with the exception of Cullinan and Gillespie 2016).
In this work, we exploited the power of panel data and appropriate analytic strat-
egies to overcome this limitation. Working with data coming from the Swiss 
Household Panel (waves 2004–2015), we modelled the relationship between BMI 
and satisfaction with health using pooled OLS, random effects and fixed effects. 
Since the impact of BMI has been shown to vary between genders, we estimated 
separate models for women and men.
Overall, our results confirmed the non-linearity in the relationship between BMI 
and health.
Estimates from pool OLS and RE models showed that women and men belong-
ing to BMI categories different from normal weight had a significantly lower level 
of satisfaction with health. These effects were more pronounced for women than for 
men.
FE estimates —that allow removing the time constant individual heterogene-
ity— showed that any departures from normal weight appeared to be associated 
with lower levels of satisfaction with health in women, but not in men. These results 
support previous findings showing gender differences in the association between 
BMI and health (Imai et al. 2008; Ford et al. 2001; Garner et al. 2012).
M. Lucchini and S. Della Bella
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In every model, obese and severely obese individuals appeared to be the ones 
with the lowest level of satisfaction with health. Given that the prevalence of obesity 
is rising worldwide, these results calls for action. The pathways through which obe-
sity impacts on health satisfaction need to be further explored. However, gender 
differences in empirical results suggest that stigma plays a crucial role. Interventions 
to tackle the stigma issue are needed together with actions to counteract the obesity 
epidemic.
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Chapter 3
Exploring the Cohabitation Gap 
in Relationship Dissolution and Health 






A long line of research has found that being married improves health and wellbeing 
and that marital dissolution negatively impacts health and wellbeing (Gove and Shin 
1989; Umberson et al. 2010). Yet, the institution of marriage as the bedrock of fam-
ily life has declined over the last few decades. Across developed countries, divorce 
rates remain relatively high and unmarried cohabitation as an alternative or prelude 
to marriage has increased (Cherlin 2009; Kiernan 2002). The rise of cohabitation as 
an alternative to marriage raises questions about whether marriage confers greater 
benefits to health and wellbeing over cohabitation (Musick and Bumpass 2012), 
which also has implications for the health consequences of relationship dissolution 
following cohabitation and marriage. Cohabitation may provide many of the same 
resources as marriage in terms of social support, integration, economies of scale, 
and lifestyle habits and behaviours, although this may partly depend on the stability 
and degree of commitment in the cohabiting relationship (Seltzer 2000). Overall, 
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cohabiting relationships tend to be less stable than marriage (Wiik et  al. 2012; 
Hewitt and Baxter 2015). While a relatively large number of studies examine health 
differences between married and cohabiting people when they form relationships, 
much less attention has been paid to comparing the health impacts of relationship 
dissolution. In this chapter we examine gendered health differences in relationship 
dissolution, using longitudinal panel data from the Swiss Household Panel Study 
and the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia study, enabling a 
comparison between Switzerland and Australia, two countries that differ in health 
policy and outcomes as well as in relationship trajectories.
 Background
 Previous Findings on Union Dissolution and Health
Research consistently shows that married men and women have lower mortality 
rates and better psychological and physical wellbeing compared with unmarried 
individuals, and that health and wellbeing decline after divorce (Hewitt et al. 2011; 
Williams and Umberson 2004). Comparing previously married to married individu-
als, Hughes and Waite (2009) found that the previously married had worse physical 
and mental health. However, in their meta-analysis, Luhmann et al. (2012) found 
little effect of the legal act of divorce itself on positive and negative feelings, but 
were not able to look at the period preceding the divorce, in which wellbeing may 
already have declined.
The majority of studies that compare health in cohabiting and married couples 
have concentrated on health differences as individuals move into or remain in their 
relationships. The findings of these studies are mixed, but often no differences are 
found in physical and mental health (Wu et al. 2003; Horowitz and White 1998) or 
mortality (Lund et al. 2002) of cohabiting versus married people. Gender is at the 
centre of the debate about the health and wellbeing benefits of marriage. While both 
men and women have been found to benefit from marriage, on average men have 
been found to benefit more than women (Williams and Umberson 2004). Some 
studies on cohabitation show that cohabiting men have better health than women 
(Aassve et al. 2007).
Few studies have investigated what happens to health when cohabiting and mari-
tal relationships end and here the evidence is mixed as well. In a Canadian study, 
Wu et al. (2003) found no differences in the health consequences of separation for 
married and cohabiting couples. Other research using data from Britain (Blekesaune 
2008) and Australia (Hewitt and Baxter 2015) suggests that the health consequences 
of relationship dissolution may not be as severe for cohabitants compared to 
married people.
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 Union Dissolution and Health: Why Would Cohabitation 
Be Different from Marriage?
The divorce literature proposes three mechanisms through which union dissolution 
affects health and wellbeing: a decrease in resources, a decrease in social support 
and separation as a stressful event (Johnson and Wu 2002). First, union dissolution 
tends to be accompanied by a decrease in economic resources (Aassve et al. 2007), 
which in turn has negative consequences for health and wellbeing through increased 
stress, cutting back spending on healthcare and a healthy life style and poorer hous-
ing. As couples separate, they lose economies of scale and may face additional 
costs. Whereas this applies to both married and cohabiting couples, the effects may 
be weaker for cohabiting couples as they are less likely to have shared bank accounts 
(Hiekel et al. 2014) or shared home ownership (Mulder and Wagner 2001).
The effect of separation on health and wellbeing may be stronger for women as 
they tend to experience a larger decrease in economic resources after divorce com-
pared with men, mainly due to the fact that they have weaker attachment to the 
labour market and tend to be responsible for children (Bianchi et al. 1999). This 
gender difference may be smaller for separation from cohabitation, because in 
cohabiting relationships women tend to contribute a higher proportion of household 
income, and therefore tend to be less dependent on their partners (Kalmijn et al. 
2007; Hewitt and Baxter 2015). In addition, cohabiting women are less likely to 
have responsibility for dependent children after relationship dissolution as cohabi-
tors are less likely to have shared children than those who are married (Hewitt et al. 
2010). Together this suggests that married women may lose the most economic 
resources after relationship dissolution and therefore have poorer health.
Second, union dissolution may affect health through changes in social networks 
and reduced social support. Marriage provides social support, social integration, 
love and companionship, as well as social status through entry into a recognised, 
socially and legally-supported institution (Gove and Shin 1989). There may be little 
or no difference between marriage and cohabitation for health because many of the 
social support benefits to marriage accrue to cohabitation, although it lacks the sym-
bolic commitment and secure legal institutional status that comes from marriage. In 
terms of broader social networks, however, those in cohabiting relationships have 
been found to have smaller social networks than married people (Nock 1995). Also, 
cohabiting couples tend to have more independent social lives compared with mar-
ried couples (Kalmijn and Bernasco 2001), which means that their social networks 
might be less affected by partnership dissolution. Changes to the social network 
upon divorce appear to be especially strong for men, whereas women may even 
benefit as they tend to increase their social networks following divorce (Kalmijn and 
Broese van Groenou 2005).
Finally, relationship dissolution may affect health because it is a stressful event in 
itself, even if it was desired, and may be accompanied by additional stressors, such 
as raising a child alone, a strained relationship with the former spouse, and possibly 
social stigma (Amato 2000). As cohabiting couples typically have been together less 
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time, are less financially dependent on each other, less likely to have children 
(although there is an increase in births in cohabiting relationships), or to have joint 
bank accounts and homes, we might expect that separating from cohabitation may 
be logistically easier than marriage, and hence less detrimental to health and wellbe-
ing. In addition, cohabiting couples tend to have less interpersonal commitment to 
their relationship, higher expectations that the relationship will end (Wiik et  al. 
2012) and lower levels of relationship quality and satisfaction (Brown 2003).
Together, the evidence on differences between cohabiting and married couples 
suggests that the economic, social and emotional costs of ending cohabiting rela-
tionships are lower than marriages, we therefore might expect that the health effects 
for ending a cohabiting relationship will be less severe.
 Health Selection and Cohabitation
These arguments so far assume that being married or in a cohabiting relationship 
produces certain health outcomes. In addition to arguments that separation may 
negatively affect health, it is important to note that the causality may also go in the 
other direction. With regard to relationship dissolution the selection argument 
asserts that individuals in poorer health are more likely to separate, because poor 
health is associated with less a favourable economic situation, which may put more 
strain on the relationship. Overall, this reversed causality has received a lot less 
attention in the literature. The few studies that test both selection and causal pro-
cesses find evidence for both processes (Monden and Uunk 2013; Johnson and Wu 
2002). However, none of these previous studies consider cohabitation and marriage. 
Much of the prior research comparing health differences between cohabitors and 
married people has been cross-sectional comparing groups at a single point in time. 
Selection, causation and the health impact of transitions cannot be evaluated using 
cross-sectional data, because they do not enable pre-existing health and well-being 
to be accounted for (Johnson and Wu 2002).
 This Study
We build on previous literature in several ways. By examining differences in health 
consequences of relationship dissolution between cohabitors and married couples, 
we contribute to a relatively understudied area. We further advance our understand-
ing of the health effects of relationship dissolution by examining the short-term 
health outcomes when an individual transitions out of a marital or cohabiting rela-
tionship (Blekesaune 2008). We examine a range of health outcomes that capture 
changes in wellbeing with relationship dissolution including global health, and 
measures of negative and positive feelings. Finally, we compare and contrast experi-
ences across two countries, Switzerland and Australia. These two countries offer an 
interesting comparison for two reasons. First, they differ in terms of their health 
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policy, expenditure on health care and the overall health outcomes in each country. 
On average Switzerland enjoys higher levels of overall health, but spends less on 
health care (Shi 1997). In addition, the two countries have different marital and 
cohabiting trajectories. In Switzerland, cohabitations tend to be shorter in duration 
than in Australia and more likely to end in marriage rather than separation than in 
Australia (de Vaus 2004; Heuveline and Timberlake 2005). This suggests that 
cohabitation as a longer term alternative to marriage is less likely in Switzerland, 
which would suggest that separation from cohabiting relationships may have smaller 
health consequences in that country. Alternatively, the Swiss may also be less likely 
to enter into less serious cohabiting relationships, which indicates that there may be 
more severe consequences on average for them. By undertaking this comparison, 
this study will offer some interesting insights into the dynamics of different health 
policy and normative relationship contexts in shaping health outcomes.
 Methods
 Data
To examine the dynamics of health, marriage and cohabitation between Australia 
and Switzerland we use longitudinal data from the Household, Income and Labour 
Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) and the Swiss Household Panel (SHP). The panels 
are relatively well suited for comparison. They have been running about the same 
amount of time, HILDA began in 2000 and SHP in 1999, and have many design 
features in common. Most importantly, these longitudinal surveys that broadly 
cover similar topics, allow us to follow the same individuals over time as they move 
through different relationship statuses.
 Dependent Variables
The SHP and the HILDA have a number of similar, although not identical, health 
and wellbeing measures. We examine three outcomes that capture overall health, 
negative and positive feelings. The first is a self-reported measure of general health. 
The question for SHP asks, Talking about your health, how do you feel right now? 
With responses on a 5 point scale including: “very well”, “well”, “so, so (average)”, 
“not very well”, to “not well at all”. The question for HILDA asks, In general, 
would you say your health is? With responses ranging from “excellent” to “poor” on 
a 5 point scale. A higher score indicates poorer overall health. Self-reported health 
measures based on a single question are used extensively in epidemiological and 
general social surveys, and research has shown that they are a valid and reliable 
indicator of health status encompassing both psychosocial and biological aspects of 
health (Burstrom and Fredlund 2001; Martikainen et  al. 1999). Moreover self- 
reported health is a valid indicator of objectively assessed adverse psychosocial and 
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physiological morbidity, and is a strong and consistent predictor of mortality 
(Burstrom and Fredlund 2001). We also develop an indicator of negative feelings. 
There are no exactly matching measures. For the SHP the question asked was: Do 
you often have negative feelings such as having the blues, being desperate, suffering 
from anxiety or depression, if 0 means “never” and 10 “always”? For inclusion in 
the models this was scaled to range from 0–5. For HILDA, we used 3 questions: 
How much of the time in the past 4 weeks: Have you been a nervous person + Have 
you felt so down in the dumps that nothing could cheer you up + Have you felt down. 
Answers ranged from “all of the time” to “none of the time”. These scores were 
reversed and then summed together and divided by 3 to get a scale ranging from 
0–5. A higher score for both measures reflects more frequent negative feelings. Our 
third indicator captures positive feelings. The SHP measure the question asked: Are 
you often plenty of strength, energy and optimism, if 0 means “never” and 10 
“always”? The HILDA measure combined 2 questions, How much of the time dur-
ing the past 4 weeks: Did you feel full of life? + Did you have a lot of energy? 
Answers ranged from “all of the time” to “none of the time”. These scores were 
summed together. Both scales ranged from 0 to 10, with a higher score reflecting 
more frequent positive feelings.
 Key Independent Variable: Relationship Status and Relationship 
Dissolution
Our main independent measure of interest was relationship status. Each study iden-
tified people who were married, cohabiting, separated, divorced, widowed or never 
married. Because we are interested in relationship dissolution due to separation and 
divorce we exclude those who become widowed from our analyses. In addition, due 
to the relatively low numbers of those becoming either separated or divorced (see 
Table 3.1), we collapse them into one group. To take advantage of the longitudinal 
nature of the data we differentiated between those who remained stable in their 
relationship, either married or cohabiting between waves from those who became 
separated or divorced between waves. This enabled us to capture any changes in 
health and well-being in the lead up to relationship dissolution. Our final measure 
differentiated: married, married-transition (to become separated/divorced in the 
next wave), cohabiting, cohabiting-transition (to become separated/divorced/never 
married in the next wave), separated/divorced, or never married.
 Controls
We want to assess health and wellbeing differences between marital dissolution and 
dissolution of a cohabiting relationship net of characteristics in which the two 
groups differ that are also associated with health. Cohabiting men tend to have 
lower levels of employment and earnings than married men (Xie et al. 2003; Kalmijn 
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et al. 2007), which may in turn improve the wellbeing of both partners. In part the 
better wellbeing of married people compared with those cohabiting is partly 
explained by differences in material resources (Soons and Kalmijn 2009). In our 
models we controlled for: age in years (centred around the mean), employment 
status (working 90–100%, working 1–89%, unemployed, inactive), level of educa-
tion (primary, secondary, tertiary level of education), household income in quartiles, 
whether or not there is a child under 18 years old in the household, and whether the 
household owns or rents the home. Descriptive statistics for dependent variables 
and controls are presented in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1 Descriptive statistics of dependent variables and controls for pooled sample, by men 
and women, Australia (14 waves HILDA) and Switzerland (16 waves SHP)
Australia Switzerland
Men Women Men Women
Mean(SD)/%a Mean(SD)/% Mean(SD)/% Mean(SD)/%
Health measures:
Self-reported general health 
(1–5)
3.43(0.9) 3.48(0.9) 4.10(0.6) 4.05(0.7)
Negative feelings (0–5) 0.84(0.8) 0.96(0.9) 0.81(0.9) 1.09(1.0)
Positive feelings (0–10) 6.07(2.1) 5.78(2.2) 7.44(1.7) 7.32(1.7)
Children:
No dependent child <18 (ref) 55 51 52 53
Dependent child <18 45 49 48 47
Employment status:
Working fulltime, 90–100% 
(ref)
77 36 79 20
Working part-time, 1–89% 9 55 13 41
Unemployed 3 3 1 2
Inactive 11 29 7 23
Education:
Basic schooling (ref) 22 31 5 15
Secondary schooling 52 42 45 60
Tertiary schooling 26 28 50 25
Household (HH) income (quartiles)b:
<25% HH income  
(1st quartile) (ref)
24 26 21 27
25%–50% HH income  
(2nd quartile)
25 25 25 25
50%–75% HH income  
(3rd quartile)
26 25 27 24
75% + HH income (4th quartile) 26 25 27 24
Person observations 55,162 60,195 25,775 31,268
aMean and SD reported for continuous measures and % reported for categorical measures
bHousehold income quartiles were calculated on total household income both countries. The over-
all % of men and women each country vary due to women’s increase likelihood of being in lower 
income households in both countries
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 Analytic Approach
We estimated a series of fixed effects regression models for each dependent vari-
able. In each case the dependent variable is treated continuously. To exploit the 
longitudinal nature of the data and to best capture the effect of relationship dissolu-
tion on health and wellbeing, we also included a 1-year lag for marital status, where 
the reference group were those participants stably married between waves. The 
inclusion of this lagged marital status measure enabled us to estimate the effect of 
transitions from married or cohabiting in the previous wave (t−1) to being separated/
divorced (t) on health and wellbeing in the current wave, compared to those who 
were stably married or cohabiting between waves. Assessing time varying covari-
ates in this way allowed us to determine the extent to which within-person variation 
in a relationship status was associated with within person variation on the health 
outcomes. Because interpretation is not straight forward in that both the lagged and 
main effect for relationship status need to be taken into account, we present our 
results graphically showing the predicted change in health for respondents whose 
relationships ended compared to those who remained married or cohabiting that 
includes the main and lagged effect for relationship status. It should also be noted 
that the use of lagged predictors requires that respondents have complete data for at 
least 2 points in time, therefore our lagged analysis used wave 2 as the baseline 
observation point (Shaw and Liang 2012).
Analysis proceeded in two stages. First, we estimated a baseline model 
(Model 1) which included relationship status, relationship status in the previous 
wave and age. Second, we included the controls to Model 1 (Model 2). While there 
were changes in the magnitude of coefficients with Model 2, there were few changes 
in the overall significance and substantive interpretation of the results and we only 
present the results of the second model.
 Results
 Relationship Transitions
Table 3.2 shows how the respondents transition between relationship states from 
wave-to-wave. Switzerland and Australia are more similar than different with regard 
to relationship dissolution patterns. The most stable group were the married indi-
viduals; in more than 98% of observations respondents were married in both waves. 
We observe that about 1.69% of the HILDA sample and 0.73% of the SHP sample 
transition from married to separated between waves, and 0.10% and 0.18% transi-
tioning from married to divorced. As indicated earlier we collapsed the separated 
and divorced in our analyses. As expected cohabiting relationships were much less 
stable than marriage. Around 81% of cohabiting individuals in both countries 
remained stably cohabiting between waves, 6.41% transition to never married in 
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Australia and 5.59% transition to never married in Switzerland. A relatively large 
proportion of cohabitors also transitioned to divorced 1.65% in Australia and 1.87% 
in Switzerland. Overall, we find that Swiss relationships, both marriage and cohabi-
tation, tend to be more stable than Australian relationships.
Next we discuss the results of the models, while there are a large number of pos-
sible transitions we could focus on (as shown in Table 3.2), we concentrate on the 
most common transitions, from married to separated/divorced and from cohabiting 
to never married.
 Self-Rated Health
Our results for self-rated health are presented in Fig. 3.1, based on the results in the 
first two columns of Appendix Table A.1. Among Australian men there was no indi-
cation that separation from cohabitation or marriage has a negativse effect on 
SRH. Although Graph 1a shows an increase in self-rated health following separa-
tion from cohabitation, this effect is not significant. Australian women (Graph 1c), 
however, show a significant lower level of SRH the year prior to separation from 
cohabitation. No comparable effect was found for separation from marriage. 
Although the figures of the Swiss sample (Graphs 1b and 1d) show a decrease in 
SRH in the year of separation from marriage, these effects were only significant in 
the lagged effect for Swiss women. For SRH we did not find the expected negative 
association with relationship dissolution, neither did we find support for the idea 
that this effect would be different for separation from marriage and stronger in 
Switzerland compared with Australia.
Table 3.2 Separation and divorce transitions from cohabitation and marriage in Switzerland and 
Australia in percentages
Current Relationship Status (t)
Relationship  
status (t-1) Country Married Cohabiting Separated Divorced
Never
Married
Married Australia 98.05 0.16 1.69 0.10 0
Switzerland 98.91 0.18 0.73 0.18 0
Cohabiting Australia 10.94 80.62 0.39 1.65 6.41
Switzerland 10.26 81.89 0.40 1.87 5.59
Separated Australia 6.64 9.72 63.22 20.42 0
Switzerland 3.59 6.03 65.85 24.52 0
Divorced Australia 3.19 10.73 1.42 84.66 0
Switzerland 1.44 6.78 0.22 91.56 0
Never Married Australia 1.66 15.65 0 0 82.58
Switzerland 2.80 15.66 0 0 81.55
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 Negative Feelings
Our second outcome was the frequency of negative feelings, with results shown in 
Fig.  3.2. In the year prior to separation from marriage, there was an increase in 
negative feelings for all groups. Among Swiss men and Australian women this 
increase is still significant the year of and the year after separation. For Swiss 
women, these effects are significant in the lagged effect for married-transition. For 
Swiss men (Fig. 3.2, Graph 2b) we found that separation from cohabitation increased 
negative feelings, both before, during and after separation. There were no signifi-
cant associations for Swiss women. Both Australian men and women were signifi-
cantly more likely to have negative feelings when their cohabiting relationships 
ended. In sum, there is evidence that separation from both marriage and cohabita-
tion increase the frequency of negative feelings, but separation from marriage had a 
stronger effect. This is similar in Switzerland and Australia.
 Positive Feelings
In Fig. 3.3, we present the results of the models in the last columns of Appendix 
Table A.1, assessing the relationship between relationship dissolution and frequency 
of positive feelings. With the exception of the Swiss women, we find a decrease in 
the frequency of positive feelings following separation from marriage for all groups, 
starting the year before separation, and for Swiss men and Australian women con-
tinuing through separation and the year following the event. Whereas the pattern 
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Fig. 3.1 Graphs 1a-1d, relationship dissolution and self-rated health
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for the Swiss men (Fig. 3.3, Graph 3b), the coefficients did not reach significance in 
this group. For the Australian men and women we also found a decrease in positive 
feelings the year before separation from cohabitation. For Australian men this per-
sisted to the year of separation but disappeared the year after. So we find only for 
Australia an effect of separation from cohabitation on positive feelings, with com-
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 Conclusion
In this chapter we wanted to further develop our understanding of the differences in 
the nature and circumstances of marriage and cohabitation by examining the health 
consequences or relationship dissolution. It is extensively documented that marriage 
breakdown negatively impacts on health and wellbeing (Umberson et al. 2010), but 
far less is known about relationship dissolution from cohabitation and whether and 
to what extent that differs from marital separation. Overall, our results suggest that 
relationship dissolution was associated with poorer health and wellbeing. However, 
the balance of evidence indicates that separation from marriage has greater conse-
quences for health and wellbeing than from cohabitation. This is consistent with 
some prior research (Blekesaune 2008; Hewitt and Baxter 2015). This is also consis-
tent with our expectations, based on the broader research literature comparing and 
contrasting marriage and cohabitation that finds overall cohabitors (on average) tend 
to have fewer legal, moral, and structural ties in their relationships, which we argued 
would likely reduce the health impacts of relationship dissolution for them. We also 
found that the patterns of associations were similar for Australia and Switzerland.
Our results also suggest differences in the importance of relationship status and 
relationship transitions for different health outcomes. Where self-reported general 
health shows the fewest significant associations, there were large and often signifi-
cant changes in the frequency of negative and positive feelings. This might suggest 
relationships may be more important for mental well-being rather than physical 
health. It also indicates that examining multiple dimensions of health and well- 
being provides a more nuanced understanding of how intimate relationships are 
associated with health and wellbeing (Bierman et al. 2006).
There are a few notable limitations to our study. First, while the health measures 
available for comparison between HILDA and SHP had some similarities they were 
not directly comparable. Even if the measures had been identical we could not be 
sure that the Australian population would have understood the questions in the same 
way as the Swiss population. Therefore, any conclusions about the comparisons 
between the two countries need to take that into account. Secondly, we examine 
transitions from marriage or cohabitation over time, in some cases the numbers and 
proportions of people transitioning were small. In addition, those whose relation-
ships breakdown have higher rates of attrition than those whose remain intact. These 
two factors increase the standard error and therefore increase the risk of finding 
non-significant results, making our results somewhat conservative.
We examined two countries, Australia and Switzerland that contrast in their fam-
ily and health policy context and relationship formation and dissolution patterns (de 
Vaus 2004; Heuveline and Timberlake 2005; Shi 1997). Overall, our results suggest 
that relationship dissolution had similar associations with health in each country. 
There has been a generalised concern in most developed nations that the rise of 
cohabitation as an alternative or prelude to marriage, and the relationship instability 
of cohabitation, may have negative consequences for a range of life outcomes 
including health (Musick and Bumpass 2012). Our finding that the dissolution of 
cohabiting relationships were less harmful to health than marriage dissolution con-
tributes to a growing body of evidence that cohabitation as an alternative relation-
ship does not always compare less favourably with marriage.
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Chapter 4
The Transition to Marriage for Cohabiting 
Couples: Does it Shape Subjective  




A large body of literature describes differences between married and cohabiting 
couples in terms of attitudes or opinions about family and in terms of well-being, 
and conjugal quality (Brown 2000, 2004; Bumpass et  al. 1991; Clarkberg et  al. 
1995; Diener et al. 2000; Jose et al. 2010; Nock 1995; Ryser and Le Goff 2015; 
Soons and Kalmijn 2009; van der Lippe et al. 2014; Wiik et al. 2009). Cohabitants 
tend to be less traditional in terms of the status and role of each partner in the family 
than married couples, but they also tend to be less happy. It has been argued that the 
lower level of well-being and the relationship instability might come from a lack of 
institutionalization of the cohabiting unions (Nock 1995). This lack of institutional-
ization leads to fewer institutional guidelines and fewer legal responsibilities for 
cohabitants than for married couples. Less traditional family values means that part-
ners must discuss, and negotiate more in the relationship (Wilcox and Nock 2006). 
As a consequence, the relation between both partners is less peaceful than in a tra-
ditional marriage in which roles and status are well attributed (Cherlin 2004) and 
less likely to be objects of discussion.
In Switzerland, cohabiting is very often a prelude to marriage, which means that 
most couples experience the two statuses of cohabitant and spouse during their fam-
ily lifecycles (Le Goff et al. 2005; Ryser and Le Goff 2011). What does it mean in 
regard to the general observations on traditionalism and happiness? Does it mean 
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that the marriage as the marker of the transition from one status to the other is also 
a marker of the transition to more traditionalism and happiness? Or does it mean 
that couples share traditional values before the marriage and that the marriage is the 
result of a complex social mechanism of selection? To answer these questions, we 
will investigate Swiss Household Panel (SHP) data that concern cohabiting couples 
who get married. Our aim is then to compare the levels of traditionalism and life 
satisfaction before and after the marriage. In the following section, we review the 
literature in order to precise our research question and hypotheses. We then describe 
the data and measures we selected. We will then present the results and end with a 
general discussion of those results.
 Married and Cohabiting Couples: To What Extent Do They 
Differ?
The end of the baby boom coincides with the emergence of a new demographic 
regime in most Western countries. This new regime can be schematically character-
ized by a high level of cohabiting unions, a high level of out of wedlock births, and 
a high level of divorces as well as late motherhood and high rates of infertility 
(Esping-Andersen and Billari 2015; Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 1988; van der Kaa 
1987). These demographic trends indicate a context of the pluralization of unions 
that followed the monopoly of romantic marriage during the fifties and sixties. 
Long- or short-term cohabitation (Toulemon 1996), single parents, and couples who 
live apart coexist with the more traditional model of the conjugal couple (Regnier- 
Loilier et al. 2009; Villeneuve-Gokalp 1997). Nevertheless, in this new context of 
lifestyle pluralization, some types of union seem to be much more predominant than 
others, especially married couples and cohabiting couples.
In the specific case of Switzerland, cohabiting unions have quickly diffused since 
the early seventies. For several decades, this form of union served as a prelude to 
marriage (Le Goff et al. 2005; Sobotka and Toulemon 2008). In the early 1990s, 80% 
of union began as non-marital union (Gabadinho 1998) but 5% of children were born 
out of wedlock. At that time, Switzerland’s situation in Europe was rather particular 
since northern European countries were characterized by high rates of cohabitation 
and out-of-wedlock children, whereas southern European countries were character-
ized by low rates of cohabitation and out-of-wedlock children (Le Goff et al. 2005). 
The situation of cohabiting unions predominantly serving as a prelude to marriage 
can be partly explained by the fact that married and cohabiting parents did not have 
the same rights (Perelli-Harris and Sánchez Gassen 2012). In addition, childbearing 
within cohabitation was perceived as leading to the  requirement of complicated 
administrative procedures for men to obtain parental rights, especially by unmarried 
fathers (Le Goff and Ryser 2010; Ryser and Le Goff 2011).1
1 Since 1 July 2014, joint parental right became the rule. Currently data available do not allow 
studying the changes that might be led by this institutional change.
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Trends show that since the end of the nineties, there has been a slow but steady 
increase of non-marital births in Switzerland. In 2014, almost one birth in four was 
out of wedlock. Nearly all out-of-wedlock children were born to women living in 
cohabiting unions. Such an increase shows that cohabiting unions seem to have 
become, at least partly, an alternative to marriage, especially in urban areas. In addi-
tion to this trend, some institutional changes to the law on parental authority intro-
duced in 2014 have made the recognition of parental authority easier for an 
unmarried father.
As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, researchers have highlighted 
the differences between married couples and those living in cohabiting unions. On 
the one hand, cohabiting partners tend to share less traditional values, opinions, 
and attitudes than married partners (Clarkberg et  al. 1995; Le Goff and Ryser 
2013; Ryser and Le Goff 2015). On the other hand, cohabiting individuals 
expressed higher levels of depressive symptoms and less happiness than their 
married counterparts (Brown 2000; Diener et al. 2000; Soons and Kalmijn 2009). 
These differences are often interpreted as poorer relationship quality and lower 
conjugal commitment for cohabiting couples in comparison to married couples 
(Brown 2000; Nock 1995). However it has been shown that the degree to which 
cohabitation is accepted in a defined country plays a key role in the degree of 
well-being differences between cohabitant and married individuals (Diener et al. 
2000; Soons and Kalmijn 2009). In addition Schultz Lee and Ono (2012) demon-
strated that in the most gender- egalitarian countries there was no statistically sig-
nificant gap in the happiness of married and cohabiting women as opposed in 
more traditional countries.
The SHP data show results similar to those observed in other Western countries. 
Less conservative values are associated with a lower level of well-being among 
cohabitants in comparison to married couples (Le Goff and Ryser 2013; Ryser and 
Le Goff 2015).
Cohabiting unions can play different roles in the life course (Manting 1996), 
which we can divide into two main categories. First, a cohabiting union can be a 
prelude to marriage, or a trial period before the couple decides to marry. Second, 
cohabiting unions can be alternatives to marriage due to partners’ ideals or eco-
nomic reasons (Perelli-Harris and Gerber 2011). Cohabitants who report that 
they plan to marry their current partner within two years differ much less from 
married individuals than cohabitants with no marriage plans. Brown (2004) adds 
that cohabitants with marriage plans tend to be happier than cohabitants that do 
not plan to marry. Such results suggest that the level of well-being is related to a 
process of selection of couples among those who plan to marry and those who 
do not. We also expect that this process of selection plays a role in traditional 
values, i.e., that couples who marry already shared traditional values before 
marriage.
The SHP allows us to further investigate this hypothesis of selection in the case 
of Switzerland. Rather than taking into account couples who plan to marry and 
comparing them with those who do not, SHP data allows us to follow cohabiting 
couples who got married in the 2000s and the beginning of the 2010s. Levels of 
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traditionalism and of well-being for each partner are measured using the same pro-
tocol before and after the marriage. If the marriage results of a process of selection 
of conservative partners, levels of traditionalism and parallel the level of well-being 
should not evolve a great deal. The alternative hypothesis is that the marriage has an 
impact on the union and that partners become happier and more traditional. A ratio-
nale for this alternative hypothesis is that marriage might imply a reorganization of 
individual values and could promote conservative gendered norms and standards, 
which could explain the differences identified between married and cohabiting indi-
viduals in terms of beliefs, attitudes and gendered practices. This assumption is 
based on the fact that marriage is perceived by the individuals as the fulfillment of a 
strong symbolic rite that is largely related to belonging to a local community (Bozon 
1992; Bozon and Héran 2006), family, or friend group. This sense of belonging to a 
specific group, consciously or unconsciously, could contribute to traditional norms 
and may subject married individuals to a certain social pressure (Théry 1998). It 
could push them over to traditionalism at the level of individual social representa-
tions as well as at the level of their practices.
 Data, Sample and Method
 Data and Sample Description
Our investigations are based on a subsample of the SHP dataset. As questions of 
interest have only been available since 2002, we used data starting from that year. 
To assess the influence of the transition to marriage, we selected individuals aged 18 
to 75 who declared themselves to be cohabitants at the wave n and who then declared 
themselves to be married at waves n + 1 and n + 2. The analysis was conducted on 
a total of 608 individuals—302 men and 306 women—who declared themselves 
married at some point after they began living with their partners.
Table 4.1 provides not weighted2 information about the sociodemographic char-
acteristics of the sample. Descriptive statistics show that the arrival of children is 
often linked with the transition to marriage. In addition, results demonstrate an 
increase in part-time work after the transition to marriage, mostly for women. This 
result can be explained by the fact that marriage is often linked with the transition 
to parenthood. During this transition, women reduce the amount of time they devote 
to work (Levy et al. 2006).
2 Results have not been weighted because first, the analyses are based on a very peculiar subsam-
ple of SHP; second, because of the “experimental” dimension of our investigations: Variables are 
measured on each individual at two times of their life. As these two times are separated by an event, 
we want to see differences between these two times. In definitive, we do not have any pretention 
for a representative subpopulation of couples originally cohabitant that married during the period 
of investigation.




Our different dependent variables are related on the one hand to the well-being of 
people and on the other hand to their degree of traditionalism in regard to the family. 
We selected in the SHP three repeated measures of well-being and one measure of 
traditionalism. All chosen indicators were initially measured using an 11-point scale 
from 0 to 10. We recoded these dependent variables into dummy variables in order 
to estimate logistic models.
Subjective Well-being We took three domains of satisfaction into account — satis-
faction with life in general, living together, and the relationship. A t-test indicates 
that the transition to marriage seems to negatively impact satisfaction with the rela-
tionship (t(352) = 2.678, p = 0.008).
Family Opinion One item measures the respondent’ opinion of the statement that a 
child suffers if he/she has a working mother on an 11-point scale ranging from 0 
(completely disagree) to 10 (completely agree). A t-test shows that the transition to 
marriage seems to impact this statement. Individuals tend to agree less with this 
statement after the transition to marriage (t(247) = 3.957, p = 0.000).
Table 4.1 Description of the sociodemographic characteristics of the sample before and after the 
transition to marriage (mean or percentage)
Before Marriage After Marriage
Range Men Women Men Women
N 302 306 302 306
Age (mean) 32.8 31.1 34.8 33
Children 0 273 281 154 157
1 14 16 126 129
2 or more 14 9 22 20
Education Low 2.6 2.3 2.3 5.6
Middle 58.3 5.6 56.0 59.2
High 38.4 41.4 41.4 35.3
Occupation Full time 89.1 70.9 87.4 37.9
Part time 5.6 20.3 9.6 41.2
At home 0.7 5.2 1.3 18.6
Training 3.0 1.6 1.0 1.3
Unemployed 1.0 1.3 0.7 0.3
Income (CHF) 
(mean)
Individual 77,693 57,166 75,946 24,259
Household 124,019 123,090 119,243 114,780
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 Sociodemographic and Control Covariates
Education Respondent’ level of education is established with a categorical variable 
that accounts for the highest level of education achieved. It distinguishes between 
low levels (e.g., incomplete compulsory school, compulsory school, elementary 
vocational training, domestic science courses, one-year commerce school, and gen-
eral training school), middle levels (e.g., apprenticeship, technical or vocational 
school, full-time vocational school, vocational high school with a master’s certifi-
cate, and federal certificate), and high levels (e.g., vocational high school, univer-
sity, and academic high school) of education.
Income An indicator accounts for the yearly net household income (for a detailed 
description of the income variables, see Lipps 2010). In the analyses, we introduced 
the log form of the household income. A t-test indicates that the level of household 
income did not change before and after marriage (t(531) = 0.414, p = 0.679).
Number of Children We distinguish between zero, one, two or more children. 
Marriage is associated with more children than cohabiting union, as shown by the 
t-test: t(606) = −19.044, p < 0.000.
Age To determine any differences in the ages of the SHP-participants, we con-
trolled for age.
 Analytical Strategy
The aim of our research was to better understand to what extent the set of dependent 
variables might differ for individuals before and after the transition to marriage. 
This means that the research deals with paired outcomes. In the present case, a pair 
of outcomes (Yt1, Yt2) corresponds to a repeated dichotomized measure for one 
respondent, the first outcome being measured before the marriage (t1) and the sec-
ond after (t2). We can suppose that the observations within pairs are not indepen-
dent, whereas observations from different pairs are independent (Le Cessie and Van 
Houwelingen 1994). The potential dependence between the two outcomes in a pair 
of measures would be especially true for the hypothesis that there is a process of 
selection for the sample of cohabiting persons who marry. In order to capture this 
potential dependence between two outcomes, we estimated a series of bivariate 
logistic models, one for each of the pairs of dependent variables (Palmgren 1989; 
Yee 2010; Yee and Dirnböck 2009). The principle of that kind of model is to simul-
taneously estimate an odds ratio for each independent covariates on each outcome 
as well as a coefficient of association between both outcomes. This last coefficient 
is estimated by a new odds ratio term which corresponds to the product of probabili-
ties to obtain the same outcome for an individual divided by the product of proba-
bilities that the two outcomes are different. The model can be written:
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where Xt1 and Xt2 are vectors of covariates measured before and after the mar-
riage, respectively (level of education, age, etc.); b1, b2 and b3 are intercepts to be 
estimated; and a1 and a2 are vectors of estimated coefficients attached to the covari-
ates Xt1 and Xt2. The outcome b3 = 0 means that the two outcomes are independent, 
whereas b3 > 0 means a positive dependence between them, i.e., the respondent will 
persist in giving a similar response after marriage. A positive association between 
the two outcomes would support the hypothesis of a process of selection of cohabit-
ing couples that get married. We do not expect to observe the case of b3 < 0, which 
would correspond to the case in which the two outcomes are negatively associ-
ated—for example, that a low level of satisfaction before marriage would be associ-
ated with a high rate of satisfaction after or vice versa. Models are estimated for 
each pair of dependent variables using the library VGAM in R-Cran (Yee 2010; Yee 
and Dirnböck 2009).
 Results
Table 4.2 displays the results for the different measures of satisfaction with life in 
general, with the relationship and with living together. In each case, there is a strong 
association between the measure before and after the marriage (as estimated by b3 
coefficients). Such a result indicates a process of selection related to marriage.
The patterns of the results demonstrate that sometimes, covariates that play a key 
role before marriage do not necessarily play the same role afterward and vice versa. 
That means that in certain cases, the transition to the married status contributes to 
attenuating or exacerbating the way people assess their satisfaction according to 
their characteristics. In that sense, these results allow us to say that marriage does to 
some extent shape individuals’ evaluation of their satisfaction.
Women tend to be more satisfied with life in general than men before the transi-
tion to marriage. In addition, highly educated individuals tend to be more satisfied 
with life than individuals with a middle level of education. These differences disap-
pear after marriage.
In terms of satisfaction with the relationship, women are more satisfied with the 
relationship than men before as well as after the transition to marriage. Having two 
or more children before marriage decreases the level of satisfaction with the rela-
tionship. Differences in the level of satisfaction disappear after the marriage.
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After the transition to marriage, older individuals are less likely to express satis-
faction with living together. A high level of education leads to less satisfaction with 
living together in comparison to a middle level of education. Finally, children play 
a key role in shaping the level of satisfaction with living together. Results are not 
significant before marriage, though the estimated coefficients before marriage are 
very similar to those estimated after marriage. We suppose however that this lack of 
significance can be related to the lack of couples having one child or more children 
before marriage. Having two children or more before the transition to marriage 
seems to be associated with a reduction of satisfaction with living together com-
pared to having no children. After the transition to marriage, having one or more 
children is also linked with a decrease in satisfaction with living together. Here 
again, the impact of the children on the satisfaction with the relationship did differ 
after the transition to marriage.
Table 4.3 displays the results of the respondents’ opinion of the statement that a 
child suffers if the mother works. As before, the general pattern is that individuals 
have a high probability to give the same answer before and after the transition to 
marriage.
Results by covariate show that women at times 1 and 2 are less likely than men 
to express that children with working mothers suffer before as well as after the mar-
riage. In addition, individuals with higher levels of education are less likely to 
express that children with working mothers suffer. In this dimension, it seems that 
marriage does not shape individuals’ opinion of that statement. These results thus 
confirm the idea of a selection effect.
 Conclusion
The main aim of the present research was to explore to what extent marriage might 
imply more conservative values and practices (Théry 1998) and higher levels of 
well-being that lead to differences between married and cohabiting couples. The 
first hypothesis postulates that individuals who decide to get married already share 
more gendered values and practices that lead to the observed differences between 
married and cohabiting couples. Alternatively, the second hypothesis postulates that 
the transition to marriage could imply more gendered practices. Based on the meth-
odology of modeling bivariate binomial responses (Yee 2010; Yee and Dirnböck 
2009), the main results of our research tend to demonstrate that individuals have a 
high probability of responding similarly before and after the transition to marriage 
on measures of their well-being and values. This suggests that the differences 
between married and cohabiting individuals might not come from the transition to 
marriage per se but that they seem to exist before marriage. To summarize, the 
results tend to indicate that there is a form of selectivity among couples. Individuals 
who decide to get married already share more traditional perspectives on family 
practices and beliefs and have already made changes in their level of well-being. 
It might be a reason to explain why little difference between before and after 
marriage is observed in the study.
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This study is of importance because it questions the origin of the highlighted dif-
ferences between cohabiting and married individuals. However, it has some limita-
tions. The first one is the relatively small numbers of married individuals included 
in the analyses. A larger group would lead to more robust results and allow for the 
study of gender differences. For the current study, the small number of men and 
women did not allow us to highlight these differences. A second limitation resides 
in the highly selective SHP subsample we investigated. The high proportion of 
highly educated individuals does not favor the study of dynamics for individuals 
with fewer resources. Despite these limitations, our study provides some results 
about the mechanisms that lead to the well-known differences between cohabiting and 
married individuals. Further research should also better tackle these questions by 
taking into account the heterogeneity of the cohabitation and comparing cohabitant 
Table 4.3 Results of bivariate logistic regression explaining the frequency of one  opinion on 
family, before and after the marriage (log of odds ratio)
Child suffers with working mother
Coefficients:
Intercept Estimate Std. error z value
b1 3.569 3.064 1.165
b2 2.270 3.966 0.572
b3 2.609 0.370 7.052 ***
Before marriage sex:womena −0.601 0.291 −2.067 *
After marriage sex: womena −0.950 0.305 −3.118 **
Before marriage:age −0.017 0.019 −0.919
After marriage: age −0.007 0.019 −0.364
Level of education: ref. middle
Before marriage:lowb −0.890 0.821 −1.084
Before marriage:highb −1.207 0.294 −4.114 ***
After marriage: lowb 0.075 0.927 0.081
After marriage: highb −1.594 0.314 −5.082 ***
Number of children: ref. zero child
Before marriage:1 childc −0.477 0.580 −0.823
Before marriage: 2 or more childrenc 0.257 0.723 0.355
After marriage:1 childc −0.309 0.255 −1.212
After marriage: 2 or more childrenc −0.058 0.586 −0.099
Income
Before marriage: household −0.150 0.263 −0.569
After marriage: household −0.059 0.345 −0.171
Residual deviance 505.478
Degrees of freedom 676.000
Log-likelihood: −252.739
Odds ratio: 13.590
Note. * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
aref. men
bref. medium level of education
cref. childless
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who marry with those who do not marry (Hiekel and Castro-Martín 2014). This 
could become of importance in Switzerland as more and more couples decide to 
remain unmarried when they have children.
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Chapter 5




It would not be surprising to say that life has ups and downs and that its instability 
is caused by the events that individuals experience over time. The number of articles 
on happiness and well-being that appear in mainstream journals have proven a 
strong association between well-being and health, work career, social contacts and 
family episodes (Dolan et al. 2008). In this chapter, we focus on the relationship 
between family and happiness, which is motivated by the several changes that a 
family may experience and by the role that different family events may play on 
well-being (Vignoli et al. 2014). Expanding upon previous research on this topic, 
we consider five events that indicate the construction or, oppositely, the dissolution 
of family. The first situation is distinguished by the formation of the union, the tran-
sition from cohabitation to marriage and the birth of children. Dissolution is defined 
by the departure of a child from the parents’ house and episodes of the divorce/
separation.
Existing studies on family events and well-being support the theoretical predic-
tions of the positive association between being in a relationship and life satisfaction 
(e.g. Kohler et  al. 2005) and the negative impact of divorce on happiness (e.g. 
Kalmijn 2009). More scarce and mixed are the results of the presence of children on 
happiness (Aassve et al. 2012; Billari 2009; Kohler et al. 2005).
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Following the mainstream research in recent years, we used a longitudinal per-
spective to reach a double aim. First, we did so to understand how the mentioned 
events are associated with changes in subjective well-being. Second, we aimed to 
capture the duration of this effect. Specifically, we asked whether the mentioned 
events have only a temporary effect on well-being or whether this impact lasts for a 
longer time (Anusic et al. 2013; Lucas et al. 2003; Myrskylä and Margolis 2014).
We focussed on the Swiss context and used fourteen years of the Swiss Household 
Panel (SHP).
 Family Events and Well-Being
Across several decades, the literature has highlighted the positive effects of being 
part of a couple (cohabitant and married) on well-being (e.g. Kohler et al. 2005). 
The reasons are mainly associated with social, economic and emotional support 
mechanisms. Indeed, having a partner seems to help individuals cope with the dif-
ficulties of life, feel less lonely and feel less helpless (Blanchflower and Oswald 
2004), and it encourages sharing resources and financial responsibility. However, a 
jarring challenge to the consensus of the positive effects of the creation of a couple 
on well-being was proposed in recent years. A rising question asks whether the level 
of happiness (derived from having a partner) dissipates over time, rather than 
remaining stable and, more generally, whether an individual can adapt to a new 
(expected or unforeseen) family situation.
In the literature on happiness and family, one of the first studies that answered 
this question was proposed by Lucas et al. (2003). They concluded that the creation 
of a couple only increases the life satisfaction of the partners temporarily, and typi-
cally, they revert two years after marriage to the same “baseline” level of life satis-
faction that prevailed two years prior. Similarly, Lucas and Clark (2006) and Stutzer 
and Frey (2006) identified a sort of “honeymoon effect” in Germany, and Angeles 
(2010) found an analogous effects in the U.K.  Angeles (2010) also underlined 
important differences between genders: women have a larger positive effect than 
men, they enjoy an anticipation effect of one year and their level of satisfaction 
remains statistically significant until three years after marriage (whilst for men it 
lasts only one year). Anusic et al. (2013) showed that Swiss individuals are not hap-
pier after marriage, but they have a higher well-being level than they would if they 
had remained single.
Following the previous findings, we hypothesize that unions are positively asso-
ciated with life satisfaction, both for Swiss women and for Swiss men; however, we 
expect to find a “honeymoon effect”. Therefore, the year before and the years during 
the union may be characterised by the highest level of life satisfaction, which may 
tend to decrease a few years afterwards, but it presumably remains higher than 
before this event (Zimmermann and Easterlin 2006).
The adaptation approach has also been used in the studies on divorce, separation 
and widowhood. There has been the general consensus that these events (divorce in 
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particular) have a negative effect on one’s well-being (e.g. Williams and Umberson 
2004; Kalmijn and Monden 2009). Nevertheless, results were conflicting when 
using the longitudinal approach. For example, Amato and Booth (1991) found that 
people can adapt to situations of divorce, whilst Johnson and Wu (2002), using the 
same data, contradicted these results and concluded that divorce was associated 
with permanent changes in levels of distress. Lucas (2005) showed that an individ-
ual’s satisfaction drops as one approaches divorce, then it gradually rebounds over 
time, but the return to baseline is not complete. Finally, Clark et al. (2008) found 
that habituation to divorce is rapid and complete, and they proved that both men and 
women who are divorced for more than four years are currently significantly more 
satisfied with their lives.
We expect similar behaviour in dealing with the divorce of Swiss couples: large 
losses in happiness and a strong anticipation effect. We hypothesize that the initial 
fall in happiness will disappear after few years, but that individuals will not reach 
their pre-divorce level of happiness (Lucas 2005). In addition, differences between 
genders may exist. Men probably suffer more than women at the time of the break 
(Angeles 2010), but they might recover faster than females.
Whilst the creation of a couple and its disintegration have straightforward effects 
on life satisfaction, more contradicted are the results on the transition to parenthood 
(Aassve et al. 2012; Billari 2009; Kohler et al. 2005). Psychological studies suggest 
negative consequences are associated with childbearing, as parents experience 
stress that is related to increased financial responsibilities (Zimmermann and 
Easterlin 2006) and reduce their leisure time, and the quality of the couple’s rela-
tionship also tends to decrease (Lavee et al. 1996). In the opposite direction is the 
fertility theory, which suggests a positive link between life satisfaction and parent-
hood. Billari (2009) suggested that fertility is positively correlated with happiness, 
but is mediated by the policy environment. In another study, Angeles (2010) found 
that the birth of a child brings important happiness to women, with an anticipation 
effect of one year and a similar large effect at the time of birth. For men, there is an 
anticipation effect (though smaller than that of women), but there is an absence of 
such an effect at the time of birth.
Since trajectories capture not only the effect of birth but the broader process of 
childbearing (Myrskylä and Margolis 2014), we expect that happiness increases 
before a birth. In particular, Swiss women may gain more in happiness in expecta-
tion and right after a birth than Swiss men, but they may experience steeper drops 
the following years (Clark et al. 2008). Part of the stronger dip may be due to a 
larger anticipation effect, but it may also be due to the fact that women are more 
socially isolated after childbirth, as they have often taken leave from the labour 
force and act as the primary caregiver, particularly when the child is young (Della 
Giusta et al. 2011; Simon 1992).
Last, we consider the departure of children from their parents’ home. Despite 
strikingly less attention being devoted to this event in the literature (Bouchard 
2014), it is of great concern to researchers for two main reasons. First, because an 
empty nest engenders complex emotions for parents, both positive and negative 
(Beaupré et  al. 2006; Dare 2011). Second, understanding the conditions under 
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which couples can experience a more positive transition constitutes one of the first 
steps in promoting well-being among couples. Two perspectives have been devel-
oped in recent years: the role loss perspective and the role strain (relief) perspective. 
The first perspective predicts a decrease of parents’ well-being as a consequence of 
a child’s departure. In sharp contrast to the hypothesis of a loss, the role of strain 
relief perspective suggests that the empty-nest stage leads to improved parental 
well-being, since children at home increase exposure to stressors, such as daily 
demands and work–family conflicts (Erickson et al. 2010; Umberson et al. 2010; 
White and Edwards 1990). Notwithstanding, research has been slightly incoherent 
regarding the impact of the departure of a child from home, and the majority of 
studies published in recent decades have painted a more optimistic picture. They 
underline that only the absence of alternative roles in which to continue building an 
identity (after children leave home) explains the negative effects of children’s depar-
ture on parents’ well-being (e.g. Raup and Myers 1989). Looking at longitudinal 
studies in North America and Europe, we hypothesize that in Switzerland, the posi-
tive effect of the empty nest on parental well-being also appears to be stronger 
immediately after the children take their leave (White and Edwards 1990); it then 
decreases and tends to disappear after few years (Harkins 1978).
 Data
The different subsamples of SHP (Tillmann et al. 2016) participants who completed 
the individual questionnaire are defined differently depending on the transition 
under study. For each transition, individuals were followed from wave 3 (2001) until 
wave 16 (2014). The first two waves are not included in our study due to the late 
inclusion of some indicators in the questionnaire. The composition of the different 
samples is explained in the follow section.
Formation of the Union At the beginning of our observation window, only single 
individuals were included. They could live with a partner (or not) in subsequent 
waves. Cases with children or with other persons living together were not consid-
ered to decontaminate this transition from other potential influences. Our sample 
comprises 3241 persons (1903 women and 1338 men) who fulfil the abovemen-
tioned conditions and who have validly completed the individual questionnaire on 
all the considered variables (complete cases). In total, 17,188 valid1 observations 
were considered during this analysis.
From Cohabitation to Marriage We ran analyses for two different samples. The 
first sample includes only partners living in a two-person household, excluding indi-
viduals living with children or other persons (parents, etc.). At the start of our obser-
vation window, all these individuals were not married (they can be single, divorced 
1 With non-missing values for every variable included in the model.
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or widowed2). In total, 2035 individuals (1064 women and 971 men) fulfilled these 
conditions, corresponding with 7197 complete cases. In the second sample, we did 
not impose restrictions on the household size. Therefore, children or other persons 
were possibly in the household before, during and after this transition. As before, 
selected individuals were living together with a partner at the start of the period 
under review and could get married (or not) during the subsequent waves. The sam-
ple comprised 2700 individuals (1421 women and 1279 men), who were followed 
during 12,507 complete observations.
Birth of Children In total, 15,013 individuals were considered (8034 women and 
6979 men), for a total of 94,205 full observations, without an age limit or any 
restrictions concerning the composition of the households. Even individuals with-
out partners were considered here, although their chances to experience this transi-
tion were low.
Dissolution of the Union We considered the persons living with a partner at the 
beginning of their period under review. The sample consisted of 9742 individuals 
(5155 women and 4587 men), all followed during 61,115 complete periods.
Departure of Children The initial sample included individuals living with a partner 
and one or more children. In addition, the couple remained together even after the 
departure of the child. In total, 5403 parents (2875 women and 2528 men) were fol-
lowed, corresponding to 36,002 complete episodes.
 Variables
Our dependent variable is life satisfaction, measured at each wave on an 11-point 
scale ranging from 0 to 10, with 5 as a neutral position.3
The transitions under study are defined as changes from the initial status in the 
interval of two successive waves. We studied their impact on the mid-term and 
therefore did not focus only on the observation just after the transition; rather, we it 
took into consideration two years before and after the event. Therefore, we con-
structed five dichotomous variables, indicating the two years before (t-2, t-1), the 
year of the transition (t0) and the two following two years (t + 1, t + 2). The refer-
ence category is any year (before or after) which is not included in the five-year 
string surrounding the abovementioned transitions. Transitions occurring when a 
wave was skipped were not taken into consideration, given the difficulty of timing 
events precisely and building accurate measurements.
As control variables, we include the wave of the survey to control for the poten-
tial effects of the period. The ages of the respondents were introduced as a set of 
2 To get potentially married at the subsequent wave.
3 “In general, how satisfied are you with your life if 0 means ‘not at all satisfied’ and 10 means 
‘completely satisfied’?”
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dichotomous variables, given their potential nonlinear impact: less than 30 years, 30 
to 44 years, 45 thru 64 years and 65 years and older, the latter being the reference 
category. Education was introduced as a continuous scale, ranging from 0 to 10, 
representing the standardized levels of education in the Swiss system; its linear 
effect on our dependent variable was verified beforehand. Working time is expressed 
as a percentage of full-time work, and net yearly household income (in 10,000 Swiss 
Fr) was also considered, with missing values imputed (10% to 15%, depending on 
the wave) using the Little and Su procedure (Lipps 2010). Two parameters of health 
were considered. First, satisfaction with health status4 was considered as a proxy of 
health. Second, we used a variable related to health impediments in everyday activi-
ties.5 Financial satisfaction was taken into account and was evaluated on a scale of 
0–10, using 0 for “not satisfied” and 10 for “very satisfied”, as well as satisfaction 
of the individual’s interpersonal relationships.6 We also considered participation in 
clubs or other groups,7 satisfaction with free time8 and satisfaction with leisure 
activities9 for each wave to control for these aspects, which are recognized to have 
an influence on life satisfaction. Finally, we included a dichotomous variable stating 
whether the interviewee lived with a partner in the model, predicting the impact of 
the birth of children to consider lone parents in the analysis.
The inclusion of other satisfaction variables as controls can be criticized for the-
oretical reasons, but similar models were run without these variables with equiva-
lent results.
 Analytical Tool
To evaluate the mid-term impact of the events shaping family trajectories with lon-
gitudinal data, we estimated a set of multilevel linear models (MLMs) (Hox 2002; 
Singer and Willett 2003) using the SPSS software (which is notably similar to the 
SAS Proc Mixed procedure).
These MLMs were designed for longitudinal data (Hox 2002; Singer and Willett 
2003) with several observations in a varying number per individual. For these mod-
4 “How satisfied are you with your state of health, where 0 means ‘not at all satisfied’ and 10 is 
‘completely satisfied’?”
5 “Please tell me to what extent, generally, your health is an impediment in your everyday activities, 
in your housework and in your work or leisure activities? Note that 0 means ‘not at all’ and 10 is 
‘a great deal’.”
6 “How satisfied are you with your personal, social and familial relationships, where 0 means ‘not 
at all satisfied’ and 10 is ‘completely satisfied’?”
7 “Do you take part in clubs or other group activities, including religious groups?”
8 “How satisfied are you with the amount of free time you have, where 0 means ‘not at all satisfied’ 
and 10 is ‘completely satisfied’?”
9 “How satisfied are you with your leisure time activities, where 0 means ‘not at all satisfied’ and 
10 is ‘completely satisfied’?”
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els, repeated observations of the same individual constitute a sub-level10 of the anal-
ysis that takes the form of a composite multilevel model for change (Hox 2002; 
Singer and Willett 2003). The continuous dependent variables (positive and nega-
tive effects) are the linear sum of the structural components (first bracket of Eq. 5.1 
below), which have the same effect for all individuals, whereas error terms11 are 
randomly distributed among individuals.
 
Y x x xij ij ij p pij j ij= + + +¼+éë ùû + +éë ùûg b b b m e00 1 1 2 2 0. . .  
 where i waveindex and j individual index= =  
 
where ,m t e e s r0 00
20j ij i j
i iN~ ;cov ,
.( ) ( ) =¢ ¢-  
(5.1)
The residuals (last bracket of Eq. 5.1) are divided into two parts. In addition to 
the varying error term for each observation (εij), which is common to every regres-
sion equation, we also considered a second error term (μ0j) that remains constant 
for all observations of the same individual. This approach allowed us to structure the 
residuals and correlate them across waves.
The chosen model is a first-order autoregressive structural model of the covari-
ance of the residuals (AR1), which is a common choice for repeated measures. It 
means that, for a given individual, the residuals are correlated from one observation 
to the next, but in a variable fashion as a function of their proximity. Significant AR1 
diagonal (covariance) and AR1 rho (correlation with the preceding observation) 
coefficients in our analyses demonstrate the pertinence of this choice.
Our models are estimated separately for each sex and are not weighted for two 
reasons: first, weights distort the gathered data on the basis of sociodemographic 
parameters, but nothing ensures that representativeness will be reached concerning 
the variable of interest, namely life-satisfaction; and second, indicators used for 
weighting are already controlled in our models.
 Results
 The Family Construction
Table 5.1 presents the first two transitions associated with the construction of the 
family, namely the formation of the union and the transition from cohabitation to 
marriage.
10 Our models distinguish only two levels (observations and individuals), given the fact that equa-
tions are run separately for women and for men. Intra-household correlations within partners living 
together are thus avoided.
11 Error terms have a standard normal distribution (a mean of 0), an unknown variance and a struc-
ture that can be modeled.
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The formation of the union is characterized by the transition from the single- 
person household to the couple living together, without any other person (especially 
children), to control for the influence of other events.
In our sample, 251 women and 272 men experienced this transition during the 14 
waves considered. The coefficient indicated that the positive impact of the forma-
tion of the union on life satisfaction can be perceived one year before the transition 
(t-1), especially for women (0.19, p = 0.021, compared to 0.14, p = 0.079 for men), 
and reaches a peak just in the year of the transition (t0) (0.23 for women, 0.31 for 
men). The positive impact generally lasts one more year (t + 1) for both women and 
men (0.20 and 0.25) and vanishes two years after the transition (no longer signifi-
cant for both sexes).
In studying the transition from cohabitation to marriage (182 transitions for 
women and 183 for men in the simple model, and 303 and 287 in the general model, 
respectively), we found an increase in life satisfaction from both women and men 
the in the year of transition (t0) (0.20 and 0.24 for women and 0.25 and 0.22 for 
men, respectively) and one year after (t + 1) (0.20 and 0.22, and 0.17 and 0.15 for 
men, respectively). In the second year after marriage (t + 2), its positive impact was 
still perceivable among women (0.30 and 0.16) but was no longer significant among 
men. Additionally, the positive impact starts before the transition (t-1) in the general 
model, but only for women (0.16). Even when we control for the number of children 
in the household and for the birth of a child during the previous 12 months (given 
that this event is often concomitant with marriage in Switzerland), the results did 
not change. However, when marriage and the birth of a child happened in the same 
year, we did not find a supplementary impact on life satisfaction.
The models presented in Table 5.2 were run to predict the impact of the next step 
in the family construction, the birth of children. Therefore, we distinguished the 
rank of children and separately analysed the birth of the first, the second and the 
third (and subsequent) child (or children).
The impact of this transition on life satisfaction follows a different pattern 
according to the rank of children and the sex of the respondents. We first noted a 
positive impact at the time of each birth among women, even if this positive impact 
decreased somewhat with the rank of children (0.39 for the 1st child, 0.23 for the 
2nd child, 0.21 for the 3rd child and subsequent children). The impact is also posi-
tive the year before (t-1) each of those transitions (0.29, 0.14 and 0.21, respec-
tively), revealing a positive effect of pregnancy on life satisfaction. Furthermore, 
this positive influence generally does not last among women; it can only be margin-
ally noted one year after the birth of the third child (0.20, p = 0.036).
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Table 5.2 Impact of the birth of children on life satisfaction – SHP 2001–2014, unweighted
Birth of children
Women Men
Net impact Sig. Net impact Sig.
Intercept 3.682 0.000 3.692 0.000
Age younger than 30 years 0.188 0.000 0.168 0.000
30–44 years −0.095 0.000 −0.128 0.000
45–64 years −0.121 0.000 −0.146 0.000
65 years and older – Reference
Wave −0.004 0.011 −0.001 0.709
Level of education – Standardized 0–10 −0.004 0.208 −0.011 0.000
Working time – % of full-time job 0.000 0.063 0.001 0.000
Household income – In 10,000 CHF 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.000
Satisfaction with health status – 0–10 0.142 0.000 0.149 0.000
Health impediment – 0–10 −0.019 0.000 −0.023 0.000
Satisfaction with financial situation – 0–10 0.165 0.000 0.150 0.000
Satisfaction with personal relationships – 0–10 0.145 0.000 0.141 0.000
Satisfaction with free time – 0–10 0.028 0.000 0.028 0.000
Satisfaction with leisure activities – 0–10 0.066 0.000 0.066 0.000
Participation in a club or group – 0–1 0.042 0.000 0.063 0.000
Living together with a partner 0.247 0.000 0.300 0.000
2 years before birth of 1st child −0.024 0.724 0.025 0.698
1 year before birth of 1st child 0.285 0.000 0.166 0.006
Year of birth of 1st child 0.390 0.000 0.170 0.005
1 year after birth of 1st child 0.080 0.234 0.151 0.021
2 years after birth of 1st child 0.050 0.495 0.151 0.032
2 years before birth of 2nd child 0.097 0.199 0.078 0.287
1 year before birth of 2nd child 0.138 0.053 0.046 0.497
Year of birth of 2nd child 0.229 0.001 0.053 0.411
1 year after birth of 2nd child −0.088 0.172 0.127 0.044
2 years after birth of 2nd child 0.048 0.486 0.028 0.677
2 years before birth of 3rd child 0.044 0.669 0.165 0.089
1 year before birth of 3rd child 0.214 0.028 0.013 0.889
Year of birth of 3rd child 0.262 0.004 0.106 0.219
1 year after birth of 3rd child 0.200 0.036 0.134 0.136
2 years after birth of 3rd child 0.127 0.213 0.130 0.181
Number of observations 51,893 42,312
Number of individuals 8034 6979
Number of births of 1st child 316 292
Number of births of 2nd child 289 270
Number of births of 3rd child 138 137
−2 restricted likelihood 154,140 120,122
AIC 154,146 120,128
BIC 154,173 120,154
Individual random effect, AR1 diagonal (cov) 0.986 0.000 0.855 0.000
Individual random effect, AR1 rho (corr) 0.127 0.000 0.132 0.000
Random effect variance 0.382 0.000 0.363 0.000
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The situation is different for men; only the birth of the first child has a notable 
impact, but this impact is more constant and persistent on the mid-term (0.17 at t-1 
and t0, and 0.15 at t + 1 and t + 2). Apart from a marginal impact one year after the 
birth of the second child (0.13, p = 0.044), other successive births do not convey 
such a positive feeling of satisfaction.
 The Family Dissolution
Table 5.3 shows the impact of the dissolution of the union, namely living without a 
partner after having experienced cohabitation during the previous wave. We distin-
guished two forms of dissolution: the generic separation, irrespective of the reason 
(break up, divorce, widowhood, etc.), to which we added a specific effect in case of 
widowhood, to take into account the very different nature of this event.
The impact of separation on life satisfaction shows a similar pattern for women 
and men, but with a temporal gap. The negative impact is felt earlier and stronger by 
women (−0.21, −0.49 and − 0.63 at t-2, t-1 and t0, respectively), but it vanishes 
sooner (−0.28 at t + 1, no longer significant at t + 2). On the other hand, men tend 
to perceive a somewhat smoother impact until the time of the event (−0.18, −0.36, 
−0.61, at t-2, t-1 and t0, respectively), but the influence tends to persist over time 
(−0.53 at t + 1 and − 0.26 at t + 2).
The total influence of widowhood on life satisfaction is composed of the impact 
of generic separation cumulated12 to the specific effect of widowhood, given that the 
latter also comprises a separation. The total effect of widowhood is particularly 
detrimental to life satisfaction for both women and men at the time of the event 
(−1.1 and − 0.97, respectively), as well as the year after (−0.49 and − 0.53 at t + 1, 
respectively). As for generic separation, the effect lasts longer for men and is still 
perceivable two years after (−0.26), but can be observed sooner among women 
(−0.49 in t-1).
We also included a specific effect that measured the interaction of the presence 
of at least a minor child in the household at the time of the separation. Interestingly, 
its effect is slightly positive for women (0.16, p = 0.081) but largely negative for 
men (−0.44, p = 0.002). In case of separation, the presence of a child seems then to 
represent a resource for women, helping attenuate the negative effect on life satis-
faction, but engenders an increased dissatisfaction for men.
The last transition we examined was the departure of children from the family 
nest while the couple remained together. In general, the impact of this transition was 
not significant in the short term or in the medium term for both women and men. 
The only exception included the departure of the last (often the youngest) house-
hold’s child: in this case, the life satisfaction of fathers slightly increases (Table 5.4).
12 In the calculation, only significant impacts were taken into account.
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Table 5.3 Impact of the dissolution of the union on life satisfaction – SHP 2001–2014, unweighted
Dissolution of the union
Women Men
Net impact Sig. Net impact Sig.
Intercept 3.892 0.000 3.886 0.000
Age younger than 30 years 0.162 0.000 0.010 0.815
30–44 years −0.023 0.449 −0.126 0.000
45–64 years −0.053 0.035 −0.162 0.000
65 years and older – Reference
Wave −0.009 0.000 −0.002 0.163
Level of education – Standardized 0–10 0.009 0.019 0.008 0.055
Working time – % of full-time job 0.000 0.402 0.002 0.000
Household income – In 10,000 CHF 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.022
Satisfaction with health status – 0–10 0.142 0.000 0.144 0.000
Health impediment – 0–10 −0.015 0.000 −0.020 0.000
Satisfaction with financial situation – 0–10 0.176 0.000 0.162 0.000
Satisfaction with personal relationships – 0–10 0.137 0.000 0.130 0.000
Satisfaction with free time – 0–10 0.034 0.000 0.036 0.000
Satisfaction with leisure activities – 0–10 0.056 0.000 0.059 0.000
Participation in a club or group – 0–1 0.027 0.054 0.052 0.000
Presence of children <18 years – 0–1 0.000 0.998 0.017 0.364
2 years before end of union −0.210 0.001 −0.183 0.004
1 year before end of union −0.489 0.000 −0.362 0.000
Year of end of union −0.625 0.000 −0.610 0.000
1 year after end of union −0.279 0.000 −0.532 0.000
2 years after end of union −0.054 0.392 −0.258 0.000
2 years before widowhood 0.158 0.153 0.437 0.016
1 year before widowhood −0.093 0.364 0.354 0.042
Year of widowhood −0.471 0.000 −0.359 0.037
1 year after widowhood −0.215 0.043 0.297 0.123
2 years after widowhood −0.032 0.774 −0.116 0.582
Year of end of union * presence of children <18 years 0.158 0.081 −0.438 0.002
Number of observations 35,345 29,770
Number of individuals 5155 4587
Number of ends of union 620 400
Number of widowhoods 144 34
−2 restricted likelihood 102,858 82,573
AIC 102,864 82,579
BIC 102,890 82,604
Individual random effect, AR1 diagonal (cov) 0.933 0.000 0.791 0.000
Individual random effect, AR1 rho (corr) 0.130 0.000 0.111 0.000
Random effect variance 0.356 0.000 0.371 0.000
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 Conclusion and Discussion
In this study, we evaluated the relationship between life satisfaction and five family 
transitions, using a longitudinal approach. Specifically, we studied mid-term indi-
vidual trajectories, with the aim to understand not only the impact of several events 
Table 5.4 Impact of the departure of children on life satisfaction – SHP 2001–2014, unweighted
Departure of children
Women Men
Net impact Sig. Net impact Sig.
Intercept 3.934 0.000 3.948 0.000
Age younger than 30 years 0.349 0.000 0.138 0.141
30–44 years 0.018 0.718 −0.116 0.016
45–64 years −0.040 0.379 −0.196 0.000
65 years and older – Reference
Wave −0.006 0.005 0.005 0.035
Level of education – Standardized 0–10 0.008 0.128 0.011 0.037
Working time – % of full-time job 0.000 0.150 0.002 0.000
Household income – In 10,000 CHF 0.002 0.019 0.001 0.296
Satisfaction with health status – 0–10 0.135 0.000 0.142 0.000
Health impediment – 0–10 −0.018 0.000 −0.026 0.000
Satisfaction with financial situation – 0–10 0.167 0.000 0.155 0.000
Satisfaction with personal relationships – 0–10 0.156 0.000 0.133 0.000
Satisfaction with free time – 0–10 0.028 0.000 0.030 0.000
Satisfaction with leisure activities – 0–10 0.048 0.000 0.050 0.000
Participation in a club or group – 0–1 0.027 0.143 0.074 0.000
Number of children <18 years −0.007 0.571 −0.015 0.223
2 years before departure 0.009 0.791 0.070 0.042
1 year before departure 0.012 0.697 0.015 0.639
Year of departure 0.009 0.824 −0.069 0.079
1 year after departure −0.024 0.454 0.004 0.900
2 years after departure −0.033 0.353 −0.022 0.555
Departure of last child 0.037 0.510 0.163 0.005
Number of observations 19,470 16,532
Number of individuals 2875 2528
Number of departure of children 1133 919
Number of departure of last child 485 371
−2 restricted likelihood 54,772 44,200
AIC 54,778 44,206
BIC 54,802 44,229
Individual random effect, AR1 diagonal (cov) 0.827 0.000 0.711 0.000
Individual random effect, AR1 rho (corr) 0.114 0.000 0.117 0.000
Random effect variance 0.367 0.000 0.351 0.000
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on well-being, but to capture their duration. Focusing on the Swiss context, we used 
MLMs for their power in studying changes.
Our main findings can be summarised as follows. First, the creation of a couple 
increases men’s and women’s well-being, but the positive effect tends to vanish 
after a couple of years. Our first hypothesis is therefore confirmed and enables us to 
extend the previous findings on the “honeymoon effect” in the Swiss context. An 
increase in life satisfaction also appears for the second event (transition from cohab-
itation to marriage), and it is clearly stronger for women than for men. The birth of 
children is associated with increased happiness, but this association is differentiated 
over time and, again, between females and men. Women declare being happier until 
the time of the birth, whilst men show an effect the year after the birth and only for 
the first child.
It is not surprising that the break in a relationship causes unhappiness for the 
individuals involved but, in this case, women and men react differently. Women 
seem to suffer more at the moment of the disruption and the years before this event. 
However, they seem to improve their well-being quickly after the event. On the 
other hand, men show their unhappiness only at the time of the break, but continue 
to suffer during the subsequent years. Our results also show that the departure of a 
child does not induce a significant change in the level of satisfaction, as previous 
literature has underlined. However, when the effect appeared (as in case of men), it 
was positive. We therefore interpreted it as if Swiss parents were prepared for this 
event and tended to have an alternative role in which they continued to build their 
identity.
To the best of our knowledge, our study can be considered the first that takes into 
consideration both the association of the mentioned five family events with life 
satisfaction and their duration over time in the Swiss context. We underlined how 
family events have a crucial impact on the happiness of individuals and how strong 
the differences between genders are. In focusing on the Swiss context, it is not haz-
ardous to think that at least part of the divergences between men and women are 
connected with the conservative gender culture, which determines that men invest 
rather in the labour market and that still associates women with the main roles of 
wife and mother. The next step would be to confirm these findings in different cul-
tural contexts, as data from the CNEF project could allow.
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Chapter 6
The (Un)Healthy Migrant Effect. The Role 
of Legal Status and Naturalization Timing
Gina Potarca and Laura Bernardi
 Introduction
All throughout the Western world, immigrants now constitute a sizeable and fast 
growing segment of the population, making pivotal contributions to the economic 
and cultural growth of host societies (e.g., Dustmann and Frattini 2014; Eraydin 
et al. 2010). Despite these benefits, the discourse promoted by the media and right- 
wing populist parties focuses on the challenges posed by immigration, and little on 
the challenges faced by immigrants themselves, particularly regarding health. From 
a utilitarian point of view, low immigrant health has direct costs in terms of health-
care expenses. It also produces indirect costs by reducing immigrants’ economic 
input in the host country as well as in their country of origin via decreased interna-
tional remittances (Kennedy et al. 2006; Neuman 2014; Rechel et al. 2013). From a 
humanitarian point of view, an advanced and inclusive society ought to make efforts 
to reduce social inequalities in health, and to ensure that the human needs, primordi-
ally good health, of all of its residents are met, irrespective of origin or nativity 
(Davies et al. 2010).
The literature on origins and health inequalities identified a so-called ‘immigrant 
epidemiological paradox’, which refers to the fact that foreign-born migrants report 
better health compared to both natives and second generation immigrants of the 
same origin group, and that this difference is reduced with increasing duration of 
stay in the country of destination (e.g., Antecol and Bedard 2006). The bulk of 
research examining such paradox is mainly U.S. focused, with recent advances in 
Europe (for a review, see Domnich et al. 2012). The few studies that examined the 
immigrant paradox in European contexts found some evidence in support of the 
healthy immigrant effect (e.g., Borgdorff et al. 1998), but the phenomenon is far 
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from being generalized. On the contrary, a fairly substantial amount of studies 
reveal that immigrants experience worse health compared to natives (e.g., Solé- 
Auró and Crimmins 2008). The factors behind this reversed health pattern are 
largely under-researched. While both objective and self-perceived discrimination 
have been shown to be key factors negatively affecting the physical and mental 
health of European immigrants (e.g., Schunck et al. 2015), researchers call for fur-
ther investigations into the role of other more structural aspects, such as socio- 
economic or legal integration, with potentially deleterious effects on immigrant 
health (Riosmena et al. 2015). Though legal vulnerability and the stress of acquiring 
native citizenship are highly likely to perturb immigrants’ health (Mehta and Elo 
2012), it has so far received insufficient systematic attention.
In this study, we examine whether immigrants are more likely to report worse 
health than natives in the context of Switzerland, and whether these differences 
could be explained by means of citizenship status and naturalization timing. By 
means of rich longitudinal data from the Swiss Household Panel from the years 
1999 till 2014, and multilevel logistic regression modeling, we investigate if the 
detrimental effect of legal disadvantage and restrictive access to citizenship on 
health occurs over and above the one generated by economic vulnerability. We pre-
dominantly focus on second generation migrants, for whom we can differentiate 
between different life course stages of naturalization, assuming that the earlier 
migrants receive Swiss nationality, the smaller the health differences with respect to 
natives are.
The obstacles European immigrants face in gaining legal stability have become 
even more strenuous in recent years, against a background of austerity measures and 
adverse immigration policies (Barbero 2015). Switzerland is a country in which, 
despite economic prosperity and a large intake of highly skilled migrants (Liebig 
et  al. 2012), state anti-immigrant efforts have gained momentum in the last few 
years, supported by popular votes (e.g., the 2014 anti-mass immigration referendum 
vote supporting stricter quotas on foreigners) and the rising political influence of the 
right-wing Swiss People’s Party (Abu-Hayyeh et al. 2014). Documenting the link 
between legal integration and immigrant health in the Swiss context is thus a fruitful 
research task not only because of the large size of its immigrant group (i.e., more 
than a quarter of the population), but also because of the exclusionist legal condi-
tions that immigrants settle into (Castles 1995).
 Background
 The Immigrant Health Paradox
Despite fewer socio-economic resources and a limited access and use of health care 
(Ku and Matani 2001), recently arrived immigrants enjoy better health than both the 
native-born and immigrants that have been residing in the host country, and thus 
acculturated, for a long time (Antecol and Bedard 2006; Newbold 2005). Scientists 
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have been trying to decrypt the puzzle of this immigrant health paradox by advanc-
ing several explanations, including: the health selectivity of immigration, meaning 
that it is mostly individuals with positive health that choose to immigrate (Akresh 
and Franck 2008) or are allowed entry through immigrant medical screening (Breuss 
et al. 2002; Zencovich et al. 2006); the ‘salmon-bias’ hypothesis, suggesting that 
unhealthy migrants are more likely to emigrate, resulting in a stock of above- average 
healthy immigrants left in the host country (Palloni and Arias 2004); and the ‘cul-
tural buffering’ explanation referring to the lifestyle habits of immigrants belonging 
to less modern cultures, which often exclude or condemn unhealthy behaviors such 
as smoking, alcohol consumption, heavy diets, etc. (Cho et al. 2004; Hamilton and 
Hummer 2011). Previous studies examining European contexts found some evi-
dence of an epidemiological paradox, but most often used difficult-to-compare 
methodologies and focused on one origin group or a single geographical region. 
Immigrants were linked to better health than natives across a series of outcomes, 
ranging from perinatal health in Spain (Restrepo-Mesa et al. 2010), nutrition-related 
non-communicable diseases in France (Méjean et al. 2007), or disability levels in 
Germany (Giuntella and Mazzonna 2015). Recent research that looks at multiple 
health metrics at once and across various immigrant groups reveals that immigrant- 
native health differentials are highly dependent on origin group (Cebolla-Boado and 
Salazar 2016; Juárez and Revuelta-Eugercios 2014, 2016; Pacelli et al. 2016), with 
certain groups experiencing more negative health with reference to natives than 
others.
There are also studies that unequivocally find that immigrants have worse health 
than natives. For instance, examining differences in functional ability, disability, 
disease presence and behavioral risk factors among individuals aged 50 years and 
older in 11 European countries, Solé-Auró and Crimmins (2008) discovered that 
immigrants aged 50 years and older report worse health than natives, even after 
adjusting for socio-economic status. Other cross-national studies also point out 
immigrants’ health disadvantage when looking at self-rated health (Malmusi 2015) 
or mental health outcomes (Safi 2010; Sieberer et  al. 2012). The authors often 
explain the poor health of migrants by invoking the exposure to health hazards in 
their country of origin, the precarious residential and employment conditions in the 
host country, but also the stress of the migration process itself (Rechel et al. 2013). 
While integrating into a new society, immigrants commonly face a complex and 
strenuous set of social, cultural, economic and institutional hurdles, increasing their 
vulnerability to physical and mental illness (Davies et al. 2010).
 Legal Status
One factor that might contribute to the emergence of health inequalities between 
immigrants and natives is the legal trajectory that immigrants go through in the 
process of assimilation. First, access to permanent resident status or citizenship is a 
direct determinant of health disparities (Riosmena et  al. 2015). Health insurance 
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coverage of U.S. immigrants was shown to differ by citizenship status, with non- 
citizens being much less likely to receive employer-sponsored health insurance or 
government coverage, as well as being less likely to sign private health insurance 
contracts given low wage (Carrasquillo et al. 2000; Derose et al. 2009). The recently 
implemented Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act in the U.S. continues to 
exclude undocumented migrants, student and employment visa holders, and short- 
term legal residents (Joseph 2016). Given restricted access to conventional sources 
of care, one would expect immigrants to more frequently make use of complemen-
tary and alternative medicine (CAM) treatments, but research shows that non- 
citizens are less likely to use CAM compared to naturalized citizens, and even less 
so compared to natives (Elewonibi and BeLue 2015). Second, restriction to natural-
ization and legal long-term residence hampers health indirectly because of pro-
cesses of spillover across life domains and accumulation of disadvantages by which 
“exclusion in one sector can influence inequalities in another, producing a synergis-
tic matrix of social conditions that drive health inequities” (WHO Regional Office 
for Europe 2010, p. 8).
Denial of citizenship rights produces vulnerability in terms of social status, 
well- being and ultimately health (ib.). Legal status is for instance a large source 
of disparities in housing cost burden, with unauthorized immigrants being the 
most affected by housing affordability problems (McConnell 2013). The eco-
nomic recession in recent years has also accelerated the restriction of universal 
rights for immigrants, particularly those who cannot comply with strict work and 
resident permit requirements, leading to a climate of anxiety among non-citizens 
and non-natives (Barbero 2015). Immigrants with an uncertain legal status may 
also be more likely to accept atypical, precarious and demanding jobs with non-
standard work schedules through their life course, more so than natives (Halpin 
2015), leading to a higher prevalence of work-related illnesses. Furthermore, legal 
status insecurity and holding a transitory residence status could erode health 
through the simple effect of uncertainty causing psychological distress (Howell 
and Sweeny 2016).
In Switzerland, some studies encountered a mortality advantage among immi-
grants (Degrate et  al. 1999; Zufferey 2016). Other health-based research though 
shows that immigrants have worse self-rated health and daily functioning than 
natives, a disparity that is often larger than in other European countries (Solé-Auró 
and Crimmins 2008). Also employing a cross-national comparative perspective, 
Malmusi (2015) discovers a substantial health gap between immigrants and natives 
in Switzerland (even after controlling for variation in socio-economic status and 
living conditions), in opposition to the better health experienced by immigrants in 
multicultural and assimilationist countries. The author indicates that health dispari-
ties are particularly apparent in national contexts characterized by exclusionist 
immigration policies, with strict requirements for long-term residence, naturaliza-
tion, and family reunification, and where immigrants usually hold a temporary guest 
worker position and have no political rights. For instance, to currently apply for 
naturalization in Switzerland, in addition to the procedure’s high costs, the  residency 
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requirement is of 12 years,1 with a minimum cantonal residency prerequisite vary-
ing between 2 and 5 years (State Secretariat for Migration 2016). According to the 
Migrant Integration Policy Index (Huddleston et al. 2015), when compared to other 
Western European countries, Switzerland scores fairly low when it comes to access 
to citizenship as well as anti-discrimination laws. Despite the fact that international 
comparisons rate Switzerland favorably in terms of access and responsiveness of 
health care services (Huddleston et al. 2015), other evaluations point out that the 
Swiss medical system fosters a high share of out-of-pocket costs, mainly due to 
high user chargers and the non-coverage of certain services (i.e., dental care), which 
places a large financial burden on lower- and middle-income households (De Pietro 
et al. 2015). Furthermore, the compulsory health insurance system in Switzerland 
run by competing private insurers is subject to much public debate and criticism 
given issues such as poor transparency, high costs, or competition driven by risk- 
selection instead of quality services (De Pietro and Crivelli 2015). The challenges 
of navigating a fragmented health insurance system are even higher for immigrants, 
who are new to it, with the consequence being a further depreciation of their health.
Based on this argumentation and the current evidence, we expect residents with 
immigrant background to display worse health than the native Swiss, above and 
beyond differences in socio-economic conditions. We anticipate that these dispari-
ties will be especially strong for immigrants that have not acquired Swiss citizen-
ship or those that have been naturalized in adulthood. For the latter, in line with 
Riosmena et al. (2015) we imply that the health disadvantage of having had a vul-
nerable legal status in the early phases of the life course cannot be compensated by 
later-age naturalization. Therefore, we assume that the difference in health status 




The data for this study come from the Swiss Household Panel (SHP). The SHP is 
running since 1999, with further refreshment samples (meant to ensure the continu-
ing representativeness of the population in Switzerland) added in 2004 and recently 
in 2013. For this study, we select a sample of 10,010 native and immigrant respon-
dents with at least one measurement point between 1999 and 2014 (i.e., 16 waves). 
The average number of participations is 10.4 (min 1, max 16), with 5.2% of respon-
dents having participated only once and 23.5% having participated all 16 times. For 
the purpose of avoiding post-retirement changes in health and the onset of chronic 
1 As of January 2018 the minimum residency duration is lowered to 10 years, but conditions are 
stricter (e.g., no naturalization for residents with temporary residence permit, a written language 
test).
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health conditions with the advent of old age, we restrict the analysis to individuals 
who were between 18 and 60 years old at entry into the panel, in a strategy similar 
to Mazzonna and Peracchi (2012).
 Measurement of Variables
The dependent variable is general self-rated health, assessed through the question: 
‘We are now going to talk about various aspects of your health. How do you feel 
right now?’ and the following 5-item scale: (1) very well, (2) well, (3) so, so (aver-
age), (4) not very well, and (5) not well at all. Self-assessed health is a common way 
of measuring health in previous studies of health in general, as well as for compari-
sons between native and immigrant groups (Neuman 2014). Given the skewed dis-
tribution of the variable, the scale is dichotomized so that 0 signifies good health, 
and 1 signifies poor health, describing respondents that report ‘so, so (average)’, 
‘not very well’, and ‘not well at all’ health.
We distinguish between six origin groups: (1) natives, (2) ex-Yugoslavs and 
Turks,2 (3) Southern Europeans (originating from Italy, Spain, or Portugal), (4) 
Western Europeans (from Germany, France or Austria), (5) other European coun-
tries, and (6) other non-European countries. Respondent’s origin and generation 
type (for immigrants) were computed based on extensive information on both par-
ents’ nationality, respondent’s current nationality, whether having had Swiss nation-
ality at birth, and whether born in Switzerland. If the individual has current Swiss 
nationality, was born Swiss and both parents have Swiss nationality, the respondent 
was coded as ‘native’. If either one or both of the parents have foreign nationality 
and the respondents migrated to Switzerland after the age of 16, he or she was coded 
as ‘first generation’ and assigned the specific nationality group of the foreign parent 
(or of the mother, if both are foreigners) as origin. If either one or both parents are 
non-Swiss nationals and respondents came to reside in Switzerland between the 
ages of 6 and 16, they are coded as ‘middle generation’ and are given the foreign 
parent’s or mother’s nationality group as origin. If however they migrated to 
Switzerland before the age of 6 (or were born in Switzerland), they are coded as 
‘second generation’ and are given the foreign parent’s or mother’s nationality group 
as origin.
Legal Status is measured by using information on the year of birth and the year that 
the immigrant respondent acquired Swiss nationality. Four distinct categories are 
created, as follows: (1) Swiss since birth, (2) naturalized in early life (i.e., before the 
age of 18), (3) naturalized as adult (i.e., after 18), and (4) non-Swiss. Socio-economic 
2 We acknowledge that grouping respondents from Ex-Yugoslavia and Turkey into a single cate-
gory does not account for their heterogeneous background; yet, these immigrant groups are often 
treated as one group both in research and in the public discourse (e.g., Liebig et al. 2012). For the 
sake of comparability with previous studies, and to avoid small issues related with small sample 
sizes we comply with this practice for this paper.
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status is captured via three distinct variables: educational level reached (with cate-
gories: (1) low, (2) medium, (3) high), employment status (with options: (1) active 
occupied; (2) unemployed; (3) not in labour force), and the natural logarithm of 
household income.
Control Variables include gender, respondent’s age (in years), squared age, survey 
period (with options: 1999–2003, 2004–2008, and 2009–20143), and marital status 
(with categories: (1) single, never married; (2) married; (3) separated, divorced; (4) 
widow(er); and (5) registered partnership).
 Analytical Plan
First, we generate descriptive statistics on the distribution of both dependent and 
independent variables by nativity. Second, we use multilevel logistic regression 
with random individual-level intercepts to estimate poor self-rated health. The 
nested approach accounts for the non-independence of observations within indi-
viduals (Snijders and Bosker 2012), in addition to allowing for unbalanced panel 
structure or missing within-subject observations (Singer and Willett 2003).
 Results
 Descriptive Results
The baseline (i.e., corresponding to the year of entry into the panel) characteristics 
of the native and immigrant respondents are shown in Table 6.1. We first notice that 
the percentage of poor self-rated health for immigrants is higher than for natives. 
The difference is small, but being statistically significant, already pointing out to the 
health disadvantage of the former. In terms of citizenship status among immigrants, 
almost half (48.9%) do not have Swiss nationality, 26.2% were born Swiss, 19.5% 
were naturalized in adulthood,4 and 5.5% became Swiss in early life. The immigrant 
sample is also comprised of 34.9% Southern Europeans, 33.8% Western Europeans, 
10.2% immigrants from Former Yugoslavia and Turkey, 10.4% from other European 
countries, and 10.7% from outside of Europe. In terms of distribution of citizenship 
status by origin, further cross-tabulations (not shown here) reveal that whereas 
Southern and Western Europeans are over-represented among immigrants who are 
3 The cut-offs reflect equal intervals of four (or five) years. Survey period is categorized to avoid 
collinearity issues with age.
4 Only a small number of observations (i.e., n  =  125) in our sample were recorded before the 
respondent received Swiss nationality. Supplementary analyses removing such observations and 
thus only including information on self-rated health post-naturalization, showed identical results.
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Table 6.1 Descriptive 
statistics for sample of native 
and immigrant respondents 
(N = 10,010)
Natives Immigrants
%/ M (SD) %/ M (SD)
Dependent variable
Poor self-rated health 11.6 14.5
Independent variables
Citizenship status
  Swiss since birth 26.2
  Naturalized in early life 5.5
  Naturalized as adult 19.5
  Non-Swiss 48.9
Origin group
  Former Yugoslavia & Turkey 10.2
  Southern Europe 34.9
  Western Europe 33.8
  Other European 10.4
  Others 10.7
Generation type
  First generation 51.9
  Middle generation 6.1
  Second generation 42.0
Gender
  Male 46.7 46.6
  Female 53.3 53.4
Educational level
  Low 11.1 18.5
  Medium 73.9 58.0
  High 15.0 23.5
Employment status
  Active occupied 86.3 82.1
  Unemployed 1.4 3.1
  Not in labour force 12.4 14.8
Marital status
  Single, never married 21.8 16.4
  Married 72.4 77.3
  Separated, divorced 5.1 5.8
  Widow(er) 0.6 0.4
  Registered partnership 0.1 0.1
Age (range 18–60) 41.28 (10.53) 39.99 (9.60)
Household income, ln (range 
7.31–72,884.54)
10.96 (0.50) 10.89 (0.53)
N 7123 2886
Source: SHP, 1999–2014.
Note: M = mean, SD = standard deviation. All figures related to 
both dependent and independent time-varying factors correspond 
to the values measured at year of entry.
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born Swiss or became Swiss early in life, Turks and ex-Yugoslavs are over- 
represented among those who are naturalized as adults or not at all.
Overall, there are slightly more women in the sample than men. In terms of 
qualifications, immigrants are much more represented among the highly educated 
than the natives (23.5% versus 15%), with a large fraction of the Swiss natives 
(73.9%) having medium level education. Immigrants however are marginally less 
likely to be actively employed compared to natives. They are also less likely to be 
single (never married), and are on average slightly younger at entry. Finally, there 
are no particular differences between the native and the immigrant sample in terms 
of household income.
 Multivariate Analysis: Multilevel Models
Table 6.2 presents the results of three multilevel models of self-rated health. 
Model 1 estimates the origin group differences in health while including several 
confounders. Model 2 adds variables gauging respondents’ socio-economic 
 conditions, namely educational level, employment status, and household income. 
To test our main hypothesis, Model 3 includes a measure of citizenship status for a 
sub-sample that excludes first generation immigrant respondents, since the 
 distinction between holding Swiss nationality since birth, being naturalized in early 
life, or later in adulthood is only possible to make for the second generation. Finally, 
given multicollinearity when having both origin group and citizenship status in the 
same model (recall the origin by citizenship status cross-tabulation results 
mentioned earlier), the former is excluded from Model 3. All models are estimated 
on unweighted data. We prefer not using weighted data however given its smaller 
sample size, as longitudinal weights are only constructed for original sample 
members, leaving aside so-called ‘cohabitants’. Additional analyses including 
weights that correct for non- response reveal similar results.
Findings corresponding to Model 1 show that, as expected, immigrant respon-
dents belonging to almost all origin groups are significantly more likely to be in 
poor self-rated health than Swiss native respondents, with immigrants from Former 
Yugoslavia and Turkey being predominantly worse off. We initially posited that 
these differences would hold even after adjusting for variation in socio-economic 
profile. Results in Model 2 indicate that controlling for education, employment sta-
tus and household income slightly attenuate some of the differences, but immigrants 
are still linked to lower self-rated health than natives, irrespective of origin. Our 
central hypothesis proposed that immigrants’ health would be particularly disad-
vantaged in terms of health if they are not naturalized or acquired Swiss citizenship 
later in life, as opposed to at birth or earlier. Findings resulting from Model 3 
entirely confirm our expectation.
While the differences between native Swiss, on the one side, and immigrants 
born with Swiss nationality of who received it early in life, on the other side, are 
non-significant, second generation immigrants who got naturalized in adult age or, 
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Table 6.2 Multilevel logistic models of poor self-rated health among native and immigrant 
respondents
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Fixed effects
Origin group (ref. native)
  Former Yugoslavia & Turkey 1.251*** (0.171) 1.041*** (0.170)
  Southern Europe 0.676*** (0.092) 0.502*** (0.093)
  Western Europe 0.288** (0.092) 0.321*** (0.092)
  Other European 0.280† (0.161) 0.418** (0.160)
  Others 0.702*** (0.164) 0.606*** (0.165)
Citizenship status (ref. native)
  Swiss since birth 0.130 (0.105)
  Naturalized in early life 0.143 (0.247)
  Naturalized as adult 0.377† (0.224)
  Non-Swiss 0.658*** (0.195)
Educational level (ref. low)
  Medium −0.517*** (0.083) −0.446*** (0.098)
  High −0.729*** (0.106) −0.609*** (0.123)
Employment status (ref. active occupied)
  Unemployed 0.503*** (0.128) 0.468** (0.157)
  Not in labour force 0.419*** (0.055) 0.408*** (0.061)
Household income, ln −0.343*** (0.047) −0.322*** (0.052)
Gender (ref. male)
  Female 0.531*** (0.058) 0.379*** (0.059) 0.383*** (0.065)
Age 0.049*** (0.015) 0.096*** (0.015) 0.106*** (0.017)
Age squared −0.00006 (0.000) −0.001*** (0.000) −0.001*** (0.000)
Marital status (ref. single, never married)
  Married −0.225** (0.086) −0.411*** (0.088) −0.475*** (0.094)
  Separated, divorced 0.198 (0.133) 0.084 (0.134) 0.047 (0.144)
  Widow(er) −0.419 (0.370) −0.581 (0.382) −0.842* (0.419)
  Registered partnership −1.007 (0.620) −0.984 (0.615) −0.716 (0.638)
Survey period (ref. 1999–2003)
  2004–2008 −0.138** (0.044) −0.086† (0.046) −0.097† (0.051)
  2009–2014 −0.069 (0.047) 0.035 (0.049) 0.017 (0.054)
Intercept −5.210*** (0.332) −1.717** (0.603) −2.124** (0.666)
Random effects
Variance (level-two) 3.593*** (0.142) 3.320*** (0.137) 3.229*** (0.148)
N (individuals) 10,010 10,010 8316
N (observations) 60,064 56,101 47,796
− 2 log likelihood −19534.363 −18149.83 −14852.078
Source: SHP, 1999–2014.
Note: Coef = coefficient; SE = standard error; ref. = reference category. † p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; 
**p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
G. Potarca and L. Bernardi
89
even more so, those who are still without Swiss nationality are significantly more 
likely to be in poor health than natives.
Supplementary analyses (available from authors) that estimate Model 3 by immi-
grant group show that the largest effects are noticed for Western and Southern 
European immigrants. For the Turks and former Yugoslav group, the differences are 
non-significant. Another set of auxiliary analyses looking at the comparison between 
natives and first generation immigrants only, illustrates a negative gradient of health 
along legal status, with non-naturalized first generation reporting worse health than 
native. To address health-driven attition, other analyses either looked at respondents 
in their first year of panel participation, or included a measure of participation gaps 
to specifically account for potential health-related temporary exits from the panel, 
but did not reveal dissimilar results. Finally, we re-ran the analysis using several 
other health-related outcome variables (e.g., satisfaction with health, health impedi-
ment in everyday activities, frequency of depression) and encountered similar find-
ings and hierarchies.
 Conclusions
Immigrants’ health is shaped by specific vulnerabilities, including diminished 
empowerment and autonomy over life choices (Davies et  al. 2010), exposure to 
anti-migrant attitudes, difficulties in the labour and housing markets, in the educa-
tional and welfare systems, or in terms of political and social participation. Given 
the position of disadvantage experienced by this large and expanding demographic 
segment of the population, it is essential to assess and understand how immigrants 
fare in terms of health when compared to natives.
Long-term health risk factors have occasionally been linked to the legal status of 
migrants, as this determines access to health and social services (Riosmena et al. 
2015). While some attention had been given to monitor the health profile of undocu-
mented migrants (e.g., Wendland et al. 2016), much less has been done to assess the 
health of immigrants with respect to holding native citizenship (or not) and the life 
course stage in which it was granted. In this study we set out to disentangle the link 
between legal status and immigrant health in Switzerland, a context with exclusion-
ist immigration policies and a recent rise in nativism (Abu-Hayyeh et al. 2014). In 
line with most European studies (e.g., Solé-Auró and Crimmins 2008), we found no 
evidence of a Swiss epidemiological paradox. On the contrary, immigrants display 
worse health than natives. We also saw that later naturalization produces negative 
spill-over effects on health. Migrants who did not receive Swiss nationality or who 
acquired it more recently fare even worse in health than natives, illustrating that 
being naturalized later in life does not compensate for early-life legal vulnerability 
(Riosmena et al. 2015).
The study is not without drawbacks. One such limitation is that we were unable 
to examine the effect of other forms of legal statuses, given the limited variation in 
terms of types of residence permit held by immigrant respondents with non-Swiss 
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citizenship in the sample (the majority of them declare having a permanent resi-
dence permit, while a panoply of non-permanent permits are also possible and held 
by many immigrants, ranging from refugee permits to limited working permits). In 
addition, we do not have data on undocumented migrants, for whom the stress and 
urgency of legal integration would be presumably higher. Further research should 
address the potential hardship faced by this subgroup of migrants, as well as those 
with temporary residence permit, to apply for and obtain appropriate health cover-
age. For instance, undocumented migrants in Switzerland face a number of difficul-
ties in realising their formal right to subscribe to health insurance, depending on 
their economic situation, place of residence, administrative status, and the actual 
practices of different insurance companies to accept undocumented migrants (Bilger 
et al. 2011). Among other limitations we encountered by using SHP data we note 
the selective panel attrition and the underrepresentation of highly vulnerable seg-
ments of the population, including migrant groups, the lower educated, the unem-
ployed or those with a poor health status (Rothenbühler and Voorpostel 2016). As a 
consequence, we most likely underestimate the potentially larger health differences 
between immigrants and natives in the general population. Furthermore, we could 
not trace risk factors, patterns of disease, and living conditions in the immigrants’ 
countries of origin, nor could we account for lifestyle factors (smoking, diet, etc.). 
Nevertheless, previous research indicates that immigrants tend to have better (not 
worse) diet quality than natives (Méjean et al. 2007), meaning that adjusting for 
lifestyle factors would not tone down the health differences identified in this study.
Taken these limitations into account, our results are certainly a conservative test 
of the influence of legal status on immigrants’ health and the epidemiological dis-
advantage associated with the delayed or denied acquisition of political rights in 
Switzerland. Insights into the effects of citizenship on wage rise (Steinhardt 2012), 
employment opportunities (Fougere and Safi 2009) and remittances (Piracha and 
Zhu 2012) show that legal status is an important condition for economic and labour 
integration and the reduction of social inequalities between migrants and natives. 
We add to this literature by showing the negative effects of a non-permanent or non- 
timely achieved legal status on immigrants’ health. Further research is needed to 
exactly calculate the societal costs of the immigrants’ health disadvantage due to the 
current naturalization policy. Our findings though already cast sufficient doubts on 
a naturalization policy that considers the acquisition of the Swiss nationality more 
as a privilege to be deserved than as a tool to promote integration.
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Chapter 7
The Association Between Self-Reported 




This chapter focuses on the relationship between individual health and its financial 
effects on the household in Switzerland in terms of its welfare, a topic which to date 
has been rarely explored scientifically. Given the widely documented national and 
international research findings on the association between social inequality and 
health, this topic warrants attention. Two major explanatory models have emerged 
in the social science debates about health inequalities on the individual level: the 
causality hypothesis and the selection hypothesis. The causality hypothesis has a 
long tradition of research, revealing that higher socioeconomic status leads to better 
health and, conversely, lower socioeconomic status to worse health. It has repeat-
edly been confirmed that socioeconomic factors such as income, education, and 
social status affect health (e.g. Allanson et al. 2010). International findings have also 
made clear that the effect of socioeconomic factors on health is not country- 
dependent. In Europe, in Australia, Canada, and the US, mortality rates are highest 
for people with lower occupational status, lower educational levels, and lower 
incomes (Mackenbach 2006). Longitudinal analyses have provided information 
about the long-term effects of socioeconomic factors on health and studied the 
selection effect of health (Dragano and Siegrist 2009; Rueda et al. 2012). Selection 
in this context refers to the process of social mobility: as the likelihood of upward 
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social mobility is greater for healthy people, there is a higher risk of social decline 
for those who are sick (Connolly et al. 2007).
From a life course perspective and focusing on individuals, the existence of 
health-related selection processes is undisputed. Epidemiological and health 
inequality research has explored and discussed both causal and selective health 
mechanisms, which are not thought to be mutually exclusive. Nevertheless, the 
causal hypothesis with its focus on individuals has continued to receive more atten-
tion in research and thus overshadowed research both on health selection mecha-
nisms and the consequences of ill health beyond individual circumstances. Research 
in countries of the Global North has neither paid sufficient attention to the conse-
quences of a household member’s ill health for the household’s welfare and social 
mobility nor for other household members.1
In this contribution, we ask whether the household’s welfare, i.e., material well- 
being, is affected when a household member’s health deteriorates. Deterioration in 
health is a complex phenomenon that cannot be defined solely according to the 
dichotomy of “healthy” vs. “sick” (Erhart et al. 2009). From an individual and sub-
jective perspective, the experience of being healthy or sick is certainly important. 
Therefore, the subjective perception of well-being reflects whether a person feels ill 
or healthy; this perception may change between points in time on a temporal con-
tinuum over the life course. Ill health may be interpreted as a phase of imbalance 
between risks and protective factors occurring when an individual lacks the physical 
and/or mental resources to cope with the various requirements of everyday life 
(Hurrelmann 2006). The onset of ill health may also be understood as a critical life 
event that disrupts individuals’ normal contexts of activity requiring adaptions for 
everyday activities (Filipp and Aymanns 2009).
With this in mind, we ask whether and to what extent the onset of a member’s ill-
health affects his or her household’s welfare, when this member’s function is that of 
a breadwinner. The “breadwinner” refers to the “sole-earner” in a household or to a 
“co-earner” contributing a substantial proportion to household income. Household 
members with no substantial contribution to the household income (“secondary earn-
ers”) are not considered breadwinners. Analytically, we focus on sole-earner house-
holds. In sole-earner households one member takes over the breadwinner role and 
secures household income, whereas in multiple-earner households various house-
hold members as co-earners each contribute substantially and share the function of 
the breadwinner to secure household income together. When combining the resource 
and the deprivation approach, welfare, i.e., material well- being, may be understood 
as the result of different living standards and income situations (Townsend 1979). For 
our analysis, we concentrate on the changes over time in three “welfare positions” 
(“prosperity”, “precariousness”, and “poverty”). The dynamic relationship between 
the deterioration of breadwinner’s health for the household and the household’s wel-
fare may be considered a function of the  demographic, resource-specific, and psy-
1 There is, however, an ongoing debate and research in countries of the Global South for example 
with regards to “catastrophic health expenditures” and the economic burden of illnesses for house-
hold and their strategies.
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chosocial characteristics of households when comparing the situation before and 
after the deterioration of the breadwinner’s health. The Swiss Household Panel 
(SHP) provides the data for our empirical analysis.
 Health and Welfare in the Household: A Theoretical 
Framework
A private household may, in general, be classified as belonging to an individual’s 
everyday experience. Private households as units of analysis may include one or 
many individuals. Multi-person households may be differentiated into couple 
households with or without children, households with single parents and children, 
and others. A functional household’s constitutive characteristics are that to provide 
material and immaterial services to meet the household members’ welfare-relevant 
needs and goals, and that some activities and expenditures are shared (Casimir and 
Tobi 2011; Egner 1976).
The resource approach emphasizes economic aspects and the extent to which 
individual household members take on a provider status. The relative amount of 
income that each person contributes to the household determines the provider status 
(Blood and Wolfe 1960). The breadwinning function of household members may be 
distinguished according to the following categories: “sole-earner”, “co-earner”, or a 
member who contributes no (substantial) income, a “secondary earner”. If the 
breadwinner function relies on one person, households are considered to be “sole- 
earner households”; if this function is shared by more co-earning household mem-
bers substantially contributing to household income, they constitute “multiple-earner 
households”. It may be argued that the household’s welfare goes beyond economic 
terms and also depends on the emotional and symbolic tasks that household mem-
bers take over (albeit generally unequally distributed) on the basis of solidarity 
amongst the household members (Galler and Ott 1993). Household organization, 
thus, depends the distribution of income generation, unpaid housekeeping and care-
giving. The latter are, when necessary, still performed in the majority of cases by 
women in the household (Daly 2011; Budowski et al. 2016). Moreover, to better 
understand how households allocate income generation for the household and its 
usage, it is relevant to consider not only tangible but also intangible resources, such 
as education, health, and social support (Thébaud 2010). Household members 
mobilize their personal, social, and economic potential and organize their work in 
order to ensure the provision of welfare-relevant contributions to the household 
(e.g., prosperity, health, or prestige).
Adopting the life course perspective as a “status biography” (Levy 1996), the 
individual life courses of household members may be considered both as products 
of employment and income-specific configurations, and as contingent on the house-
hold’s standard of living and welfare. The position and role structures within the 
household shape its welfare over time and, depending on social conditions, are asso-
ciated with different capacities and limitations for the members to achieve desired 
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objectives. As we focus on the function of the breadwinner within the household, 
we conceptualize the onset of his or her health deterioration as a critical event that 
may interfere with routine activities and affect the household’s welfare (Filipp and 
Aymanns 2009). Such an event may influence the way the household is organized, 
for example, the household members’ division of labor. Daily activities are expected 
to change both for the person with ill-health and for the other household members 
and to be contingent on the household situation. Coping strategies may be required, 
for example, to deal with the consequences of the breadwinner’s ill-health-related 
inability to work (and particularly income-loss) that may lead to material burdens.
 Hypotheses
From a life course perspective, a deterioration in a breadwinner’s health may be 
conceptualized as a critical event that causes an interruption of familiar and every-
day household procedures (Filipp and Aymanns 2009). Following this line of argu-
ment, it is reasonable to expect that the effects of a breadwinner’s deterioration in 
health depends both on the severity of his or her health conditions and on his or her 
provisioning function, i.e., the positions and role structure within the household. 
These elements should contribute to explaining an enhanced risk of decline in 
household welfare. The first hypothesis therefore makes explicit the relationship 
between the deterioration of the breadwinner’s health (sole-earner or co-earner), use 
of healthcare services, and the risk of change to a less favorable welfare position:
H1: As a result of a breadwinner’s chronic, mental and physical illness and his or 
her increased use of healthcare services, the risk of descent in household wel-
fare position is likely to augment.
The impact of a breadwinner’s health deterioration on household welfare position 
needs to be understood in light of household-dependent factors. Research into pov-
erty and inequality has shown that sociodemographic factors play a key role in 
explaining deprivation and income in the household (Callens and Croux 2009; 
Halleröd and Gustafsson 2011). Whereas a greater number of children living in the 
household is associated with an increased risk of poverty, a greater number of adults 
is associated with additional income potential in the household (Jenkins 2000). 
Thus, apart from the breadwinner’s deterioration in health, sociodemographic fac-
tors influence the household’s welfare leading to hypotheses H2 and H3:
H2: If more adults live in the household prior to the deterioration of the breadwin-
ner’s health, the risk of descent in household welfare position is likely to 
diminish.
H3: If more children live in the household prior to the deterioration of the breadwinner’s 
health, the risk of descent in household welfare position is likely to augment.
The household is a dynamic unit over time. From the perspective of different points 
in time and at the household level, some studies have provided evidence that 
M. Masia et al.
101
demographic processes (e.g., the birth of a baby, the departure of a household mem-
ber) or critical events (e.g., divorce, death) impact on household income (Chen and 
Korinek 2010; Jenkins 2000; Sauerborn et al. 1996). Thus, hypothesis (H4) is:
H4: An increase in the number of adults in a household (when compared to before 
the deterioration of the breadwinner’s health) reduces the risk of descent in 
household welfare position as a result of the deterioration of the breadwin-
ner’s health.
Considering the importance of cumulative disadvantages, it is probable that an 
accumulation of psychosocial strain affects the behavior of household members 
after the deterioration of a breadwinner’s health (Jungbauer-Gans and Gross 2009; 
Steinkamp 1999). These stressful events may reflect in behavior-specific risk factors 
affecting the household members’ coping strategies, thereby making it more diffi-
cult to achieve material security. Therefore, we put forth the following hypotheses 
(H5 and H6):
H5: The higher the level of psychosocial strain in the household before the dete-
rioration of the breadwinner’s health, the more likely will be a descent in 
household welfare position.
H6: The greater the number of chronically ill people living in the household prior 
to the deterioration of the breadwinner’s health, the greater the risk of a 
descent in household welfare position.
Considering cumulative disadvantages and advantages, we assume that the house-
hold may reorganize itself after the deterioration of the breadwinner’s health. This 
reorganization need not be interpreted in terms of risk only, but may also be done in 
terms of favorable or risk-reducing resources (Keck and Sakdapolrak 2013). 
Household members’ individual characteristics and their social relationships may 
work as protective factors. Therefore, the resource-specific configuration of the 
household (e.g., education, health, and social support) may buffer the risks of 
descent in household welfare after the deterioration of the breadwinner’s health. 
Hypothesis 7 states this relationship:
H7: Higher intangible resources (highest level of education, average health, aver-
age social support) within the household prior to the deterioration of the 
breadwinner’s health are likely to protect against a descent of the household’s 
welfare position.
Based on the accumulation model, and adopting a dynamic perspective on the 
household, we expect that a deterioration of the breadwinner’s health will lead to an 
accumulation of psychosocial strain in the household. The risks to household wel-
fare may therefore intensify, so that a decline of the household’s welfare position 
becomes more likely. In contrast, the event may also lead to a change in employ-
ment status of other household members. If there is a potential for additional 
income, the risk that the household welfare position declines may be reduced. The 
compensatory possibilities offered by other members in the household become 
more important. This results in the following two hypotheses (H8, H9):
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H8: Greater psychosocial strain in the household as a result of the deterioration of 
the breadwinner’s health increases the risk of descent in household welfare 
position.
H9: An increase in the workload of all adults in the household as a result of the 
deterioration of the breadwinner’s health reduces the risk of descent in house-
hold welfare position.
 Methodological Issues and Operationalization
The empirical test of our hypotheses is based on data from the first 16 waves of the 
Swiss Household Panel (SHP, 1999–2014). The SHP contains a large range of vari-
ables related to the household, such as living conditions, standard of living, and 
certain activities. It also contains a large array of information about individual 
household members (e.g., health status, life events, occupation, education, employ-
ment level, occupational prestige, health, etc.).
In order to analyze how the household’s welfare position is affected by a house-
hold’s breadwinner’s deterioration of health, we employ data from the entire panel 
for all household members who had suffered a deterioration in (self-reported) health. 
All households were included in the analyses, in which one household member aged 
18 to 64 years had suffered a deterioration of health within a time frame of four years 
(single person households were excluded). A deterioration of health was defined to 
have occurred when a household member experienced a (subjective) deterioration of 
health (i.e., when interviewees answered with point 4 or less on an 11-point scale 
regarding the question: “In the last 12 months, has your health improved or wors-
ened, if 0 means “greatly worsened” and 10 “greatly improved”) and when his or her 
health status remained unchanged for two further years thereafter. The longitudinal 
data were pooled at the time point at which (subjective) health deteriorated. Hence, 
the results are not interpreted per calendar year, but in relation to the onset of the 
household member’s deterioration in health. Data were available one year before the 
point in time health deteriorated (t−1), in the year in which health deteriorated (t0), 
and for the two following years. A before/after comparison (from t−1 to t0) was con-
ducted in order to perform an inferential statistical analysis of the change in house-
hold welfare position. In the SHP data (1999–2014), 859 persons experienced a 
deterioration of health within a four-year time frame as described above.
As is commonly known, poverty rates fluctuate considerably according to how 
income poverty thresholds are defined. In the Swiss case, previous research has 
shown that poverty rates fluctuate from about 6 to 23% for the years 1999 to 2003, 
depending on the selected income level (50, 60, or 70% of the median) (Tillmann 
and Budowski 2006). This kind of poverty threshold represents an indirect poverty 
measure because it is based on income. Direct measures of poverty include house-
hold expenditures or fulfilling certain criteria that correspond to an “acceptable 
standard of living” in a given context (Townsend 1979). According to Gordon and 
Spicker (1999), the direct measure of an “acceptable standard of living” is consid-
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ered superior to the expenditure approach. Following Townsend’s studies, we con-
ceptualize poverty with a measure that integrates income, and possession of goods 
and opportunities for activities and services. The monetary poverty threshold is set 
at 60% of the median equivalized household income. Deprivation consists of the 
lack of goods (e.g., a car, a washing machine, a dishwasher, or a computer) or activi-
ties or services (e.g., eat at a restaurant at least once a month, take a week’s holiday 
away from home each year, save money in a private pension fund, or invite friends 
to the household at least once a month) due to financial reasons that a majority of 
households in Switzerland does not lack.
We combined these two aspects (income and deprivation) to construct three wel-
fare positions. The first household welfare position is defined by non-poverty; for 
reasons of comprehensibility we refer to it as “prosperity”. The second household 
welfare position is defined as “precarious”: the household is deprived in two or 
more items yet avails an income level above the poverty threshold or, alternatively, 
the household with an income level below the poverty threshold yet is deprived at 
most in one item. The third welfare position is defined as consistently “poor” (an 
income level below the poverty threshold and deprived in two or more items).
The effects of the deterioration of the breadwinner’s health are considered in 
terms of his or her household’s movements across these different welfare positions 
(prosperity, precariousness, and poverty). To compare the welfare position before 
and after the deterioration of the breadwinner’s health (i.e., from t−1 to t0), we cre-
ated a dependent variable capturing the household’s movement. Households remain-
ing at the same welfare position before the deterioration of the breadwinner’s health 
(t−1) and after it (t0) are considered “stable”. Households changing their welfare 
position (from t−1 to t0) are considered either to ascend (i.e. be “upwardly mobile”) 
or to descend in welfare position (i.e. be “downwardly mobile”). The operational-
ized independent variables included in the analysis model are shown in Table 7.1.
 Results
 The Development of Health-Related Factors
To empirically ground the perceived deterioration of health as a critical life event, 
we examined how various health-related variables, for example, physical and psy-
chological health problems and the use of healthcare services changed in the course 
of the defined time period (four subsequent years). To compare the changes in dif-
ferent health-related variables we present the percentage change in health over time 
(see Fig. 7.1).
Figure 7.1 shows a clear pattern of change emerging regarding (physical and 
psychological) health problems and the use of healthcare services accompanying 
the subjectively perceived deterioration in health. The rates increase for all three 
indicators by more than 5%. Although the health care system is utilized more 
 intensively after the onset of ill-health (t0), the level of use a year later (t1) is practi-
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cally the same again as it was before the onset (t−1). Physical health problems show 
a similar pattern of change, whereby the increase in physical health problems after 
the initial deterioration of health is not significant. In contrast, psychological strain 
increases more strongly and then decreases gradually over time. Thus, subjectively 
perceived deterioration of health shows different effects over time, whereby it may 
be assumed that the effect of this life event is health-specific. Based on these 
considerations, we now focus on the household and, more specifically, address the 
topic of how a breadwinner’s deterioration of health particularly affects the house-
hold’s welfare. The regression analysis allows for generating more detailed infor-
mation about the relevance of the breadwinner’s deterioration of health with respect 
to a change in the household’s welfare position.
Table 7.1 Operationalization of the independent variables
Health factors These factors capture three different aspects of the breadwinner’s health: 
physical and psychological health and use of healthcare services. The three 
health indicators were extracted by means of an exploratory factor analysis from 
nine items available in the SHP. The ranges of values (min/max) of these three 
factors are: −4.74/6.56 (psychological strain), −7.06/6.88 (physical problems), 
−3.58/4.95 (use of health care services).
Number of 
adults
Number of adults in the household
Number of 
children
Number of children (up to age 17) in the household
Psychosocial 
strain
For each adult member of the household the summative index “number of 
psychosocial strain” calculates the number of strains and captures the amount of 
strains that all adult household members reported on the household level (e.g., 
problems with their own children, conflicts with a close relationship, the break, 
illness or the death of a close relationship). Alongside the mean number of 
psychosocial strains within a household, the mean intensity of the strain for the 
household is calculated as the arithmetic mean of all scores as a household 
characteristic. The survey collects the information on the subjective rating of 
each strain on a Likert scale ranging from 0 “not at all burdened by strain” to 10 








Highest education level represented in the household (adults only), converted 
into the number of years of education; values range from 0 (no schooling) to 21 
(PhD-degree)
Health The mean health of all adult household members; subjective ratings on a Likert 
scale ranging from 1 “very poor” to 5 “very good”
Mean social 
support
For each adult member of the household the summative index “social support” 
describes the practical and emotional support received from partners, relatives, 
neighbors and friends. The mean social support is the arithmetic mean of all 




Accumulated work load of all adult household members. In our dataset, the total 
employment load after a deterioration of breadwinner’s health varied from −200 
to +200 (this corresponds to +/−2 fulltime jobs in the household).
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 Factors Influencing the Household’s Welfare Position
The multinomial logistic regression modeling procedure analyzes the effects of a 
breadwinner’s deterioration of health on the household’s welfare position. To 
empirically substantiate the relevance of the breadwinner function in sole-earner 
households by means of an exploratory group comparison between two types of 
households, we estimate two logistic models: one for “sole-earner households” (i.e., 
households with a breadwinner who contributes 80% or more to the household’s 
income) and another for the “multiple-earner households” (i.e., households where 
co-earning members contribute between 40 and 80% to the household’s income). 
The multivariate analysis serves to test the postulated effects of the independent 
variables (H1 to H9) on the probability of the dependent categorical variable “house-
hold welfare position” (i.e., the three categories: remaining stable, ascent or descent 
in welfare position) following the breadwinner’s deterioration in health. A stable 
welfare position was the reference category; the estimated coefficients of the house-
holds in the other two positions (ascent or descent in welfare position) are inter-
preted on the basis of this reference category.
Table 7.2 provides the estimated results of the multinomial regression with 
respect to ascent and descent of household welfare position as the result of a dete-
rioration of health in the household. The first model (sole-earner household) tests 
the extent to which a change in the breadwinner’s psychological and physical health 
Fig. 7.1 Changes in health problems and the use of health-care services over four years (in per-
centages of levels before the subjectively perceived deterioration of health)
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as well as the use of health-care services after deterioration of health affect the prob-
ability of descent in household welfare position. An important finding is contrary to 
the postulated effects: only the increase of psychological strain augments the risk of 
descent in household welfare position. The changes in the health-related variables 
following the deterioration of a co-earner’s health, however, are not able to explain 
a change in the household’s welfare position. Thus, the first hypothesis (H1) can 
only be partly confirmed.
The relationship between the demographic- and resource-specific household 
characteristics before the breadwinner’s health deteriorated and the likelihood of a 
change in the household’s welfare position is revealed in Table 7.2. In sole-earner 
households a larger number of adults in the household considerably reduces the risk 
of descent, whereas a greater number of children in the household increases the risk 
of descent. These results confirm the second and the third hypotheses. In addition, 
the increase in the number of adults in a household supports an ascent in household 
welfare position. The risk of descent, however, is not significantly reduced. 
Therefore, hypothesis 4 must be rejected. In multiple-earner households, none of 
the demographic variables (number of adults in the household, number of children 
in the household, and change of number of adults in the household) exerts an influ-
ence on the probability of change in household welfare.
Hypotheses 5 and 6 must be rejected, because neither the number of chronically 
ill household members nor the extent of psychosocial strain in the household are 
found to exert an influence on the probability of change in household welfare. For 
multiple-earner households, the risk of descent in welfare position increases signifi-
cantly with a growing number of chronically ill members in the household. When 
the effect of resource-specific factors is integrated into the analysis, households 
with members with higher educational levels tend to show greater stability in wel-
fare position than those with lower educational levels. Both the likelihood of sole- 
earner households ascending in welfare position and the risk of multiple-earner 
households descending in welfare position decreases. A higher average health status 
in the household seems to support stability and also lower the risk of ascent in wel-
fare position. Contrary to our expectations, however, the average social support on 
the household level has no effect on the probability of a change in household wel-
fare position. The seventh hypothesis may thus be rejected.
A change in psychosocial strain in the household has no significant effect on a 
change in household welfare position. An increase in the household’s total employ-
ment load reduces the risk of descent in welfare position for both types of house-
holds. Hypothesis 8 may thus be rejected; whilst hypothesis 9 may be accepted.
 Discussion and Conclusion
This contribution dealt with the relationship between a household breadwinner’s 
health deterioration and the change in the household’s welfare (operationalized by 
three welfare positions). From a life course perspective, there is, overall, empirical 
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evidence that a deterioration in health not only affects individual modes of dealing 
with everyday activities but also the household’s complex structure of roles and 
positions. In this regard, there is a clear association between the deterioration of the 
breadwinner’s psychological health troubles in sole-earner households and the risk 
of a decline in household welfare. In contrast, the deterioration of a breadwinner’s 
physical health troubles has no effect on the household’s welfare in both household 
types.
In agreement with previous research (see Chen and Korinek 2010; Jenkins 2000), 
our findings show that while a greater number of adults in a household lowers the 
risk of a household of experiencing a decline in welfare, a greater number of chil-
dren considerably increases this risk. Moreover, our analysis shows that the average 
health status in a sole-earner household tends to exert a stabilizing effect on the 
household’s welfare following the deterioration of the breadwinner’s health. Not 
only risk but also protective factors come into play and contribute to explaining the 
change of a household’s welfare: both demographic factors and an increase in the 
overall employment load clearly lower the risk of the household to experience a 
decline in welfare. As such, the results suggest that in order to compensate for antic-
ipated losses in employment or income due to the deterioration of a breadwinner’s 
health, other household members activate their potential income generation capa-
bilities by taking employment or increasing their employment loads.
Our findings support the thesis that the increase in psychological health troubles 
of the breadwinner (in sole-earner households) and the demographic and resource- 
specific factors of the household are relevant for explaining the change of the house-
hold’s welfare position as a result of a deterioration of the breadwinner’s health. The 
analysis further substantiates empirically that demographic and resource-specific 
household factors (e.g., psychosocial strain) vary in relevance, depending on the 
organization of the provider status amongst the household members. In this regard, 
the comparison of the sole-earner and multiple-earner households reveals striking 
differences: in multiple-earner households, neither the type of illness nor demo-
graphic factors (e.g., number of adults or children in the household) are relevant 
regarding its change in welfare position. Moreover, other household-related factors 
are more important, such as the number of chronically ill household members.
The results further suggest that not all of the household-related characteristics 
studied here are associated with change in household welfare position. Rather, it 
is the interaction of the provider status amongst the household members (e.g., 
sole- earner or multiple-earner household) and household composition that con-
tribute to explaining to some extent the change in household welfare position. 
Further research that explores the effects of changes in a household member’s 
health more deeply would be highly desirable: at the household level, it would be 
important to study the effects of health deterioration of members with different 
roles regarding income contribution in households ranging from the traditional 
sole-earner household to the modern dual-earner household. Therewith, more 
knowledge about the influence of position and role constellations of the house-
hold members on health- specific mechanisms and their effects on household wel-
fare could be generated.
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Chapter 8
Between Social Structure Inertia 
and Changing Biographies: Trajectories 
of Material Deprivation in Switzerland
Pascale Gazareth, Katia Iglesias, Eric Crettaz, and Christian Suter
 Introduction
In contemporary societies, attaining a decent standard of living which allows people 
to lead a socially integrated life is a key issue for human rights and social policy. 
However, social inequalities reduce the chances of reaching this standard of living. 
Social structure is actually still a strong determinant of poverty risks, which impacts 
durably the lower classes and are transmitted from generation to generation, whether 
we consider material or immaterial poverty. Despite decades of social and educa-
tional policy, structural determinants like social origin, education, or occupational 
position still play a major role in explaining poverty or prosperity. Social structure 
is, then, a powerful factor of inertia for what concerns the persistence of poverty in 
contemporary societies (class hypothesis).1
1 The theoretical framework we present in this introductory section was commonly used in previ-
ous researches on the same topic (see Section 2). Due to place restriction, we concentrate on the 
most important aspects for our purpose and renounce to cite the large literature related to this 
framework. For a more detailed presentation including corresponding literature, see Section 1.1 of 
Heeb and Gutjahr about the dynamics of poverty (Heeb and Gutjahr 2012).
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Yet, social structure is more porous today than it was until the end of the Second 
World War. According to the individualization hypothesis (Beck 1992), uncertain 
life events such as a job loss, matrimonial and other family changes, or health issues, 
surpass the effect of the social structure; hence, poverty is less predictable, or more 
precisely, democratized (middle and upper classes are also concerned) and without 
predetermined temporal structure (poverty occurs in various short-term or long- 
term episodes in discontinuous and heterogeneous biographies). Moreover, social 
positions are not as fixed as they were. Job opportunities and successes, as well as 
marriage, are well-known factors of social elevation; symmetrically, economic set-
backs or divorce are factors of social downgrading.
The literature on this topic reveals that both hypotheses (class vs. individualiza-
tion) are valid in Switzerland, though to a varying degree (class having a larger 
impact than individualization). Other hypotheses also emerged, like the cumulating 
(dis)advantages or the life course perspectives. They suppose a sequential view of 
poverty: rather than a permanent (class) position or unstructured patterns (individu-
alization), poverty evolves in time following trajectories of reinforcement of the 
original social position (increasing poverty over the life course) or specific patterns 
related to successive life course phases (e.g.: poverty is higher at the entry into inde-
pendent adulthood when young people have unstable and low paid jobs, then 
reduces in middle-age when they gain stable occupational and social positions, 
reduces again after the departure of grown-up children and with the accumulation of 
goods and savings, then increases after retirement when pensions replace wages, 
and finally when old-age dependence impacts the financial situation with high costs 
for care).
We are interested in changes and inertia at the bottom of the social structure dur-
ing the last decades.2 Based on poverty trajectories, we examine which part of the 
population experienced the inertia of the social structure and remained durably in 
low economic strata – and which part moved from its initial position or faced indi-
vidualized biography patterns. We also consider the main drivers of the various 
observed trajectories. In other words: What characteristics or events are related to 
inertia or, on the contrary, to changing socio-economic trajectories, and what do 
they reveal of the respective forces of change and inertia in contemporary 
Switzerland?
2 This contribution is part of the research project ‘Income and wealth inequality, deprivation and 
wellbeing in Switzerland, 1990–2013’, supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation 
(SNF; request 100017_143320 / 1). We use data collected by the Swiss Household Panel (SHP; 
www.swisspanel.ch), which is based at the Swiss Centre of Expertise in the Social Sciences 
FORS. SHP is financed by the SNF. We express our most grateful thank you to Ursina Kuhn who 
helped preparing the data and the deprivation trajectories.
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 What Do We Know About Poverty Trajectories 
in Switzerland?
Poverty is mostly defined in material terms and indirectly measured through income. 
In a longitudinal perspective, income is affected by yearly variations (e.g. irregular 
secondary incomes, compensation for inflation) which do not necessarily reflect 
real changes in the socio-economic positions (Lollivier and Verger 2005), and ren-
der the analysis of poverty trajectories more complex. In addition, income is known 
to be affected by measurement errors which are cumulating in longitudinal analyses 
(Whelan and Maître 2006). Even if these difficulties can be overcome, some schol-
ars developed an alternative approach to poverty measurement, with a focus on 
‘material deprivation’, which is more directly connected with the standard of living 
of the population and less affected by measurement errors in longitudinal 
analyses.3
Material deprivation as defined by Townsend in the 1970s is a direct measure of 
poverty based on the difficulty of households to face expenses in order to have a 
decent living and to be able to participate to social life. In Townsend’s words mate-
rial deprivation is defined as: ‘the absence or inadequacy of those diets, amenities, 
standards, services and activities which are common or customary in society’ 
(Townsend 1979, p. 915). This measure is considered as a complementary measure 
to income poverty because the correlation between both is only partial: Households 
facing material deprivation without income poverty or income poverty without 
material deprivation are many. This can be explained by non-income resources or by 
special needs of the households that blur the relation between income and the real 
socio-economic situation of the population. Thus, we focus on longitudinal analyses 
of material deprivation in Switzerland, and leave aside the literature devoted to the 
dynamics of income poverty.
Three research teams were active on this topic during the last decade in 
Switzerland, all using data from the Swiss Household Panel. Based on data from 
1999 to 2003 and analyzing episodes of consistent poverty (combination of income 
poverty and material deprivation), Tillmann and Budowski (2006) highlighted that 
a large part of the Swiss population was durably preserved from poverty (85%), 
when 5% faced persistent poverty and 10% occasional poverty. They confirmed the 
strength of inertia forces measured by the relation between persistent poverty and 
determinants associated with the social class (socioprofessional position, 
education).
Later, Gazareth and Suter compared transitions between two five-year periods at 
the beginning and at the end of the interval from 1999 to 2007 (Gazareth and Suter 
2010). Using a deprivation measure with three positions (no deprivation, low, high), 
they found smaller proportions of stability patterns in the population with 46% 
durably non-deprived, 20% in long-lasting low deprivation, and 5% in persistent 
3 They are, however, affected by adaptative preferences (Halleröd 2006; Crettaz and Suter 2013). 
This topic will be further discussed below.
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high deprivation. Changing patterns mostly concerned transitions from or to the 
intermediate position (30%), while transitions between both extreme positions were 
seldom observed. These findings confirm the strength of social structures’ inertia 
but also that change is more frequent when considering deprivation in more detail; 
yet, it is restricted to transitions to a close position. In addition, Gazareth and Suter 
revealed that SHP data on deprivation are affected by selective attrition: households 
facing deprivation are more likely to drop out of the survey.4 This necessarily affects 
the proportion of households measured in the various transitions, and potentially 
also their characteristics.
Furthermore, Crettaz and Suter (2013) highlighted that people facing long- 
lasting deprivation tend to adapt their aspirations to their objective possibilities. 
They are, then, more likely to mention personal preferences rather than financial 
constraints when lacking items (adaptative preferences). The phenomenon also 
affects the proportion of the population measured in the various transitions.
Finally, based on a continuous index of material deprivation and latent growth 
analyses, Heeb and Gutjahr concluded that four main types of trajectories appear 
when analyzing material deprivation from 1999 to 2008 (Heeb and Gutjahr 2012). 
They found that 80% of the population was durably preserved from material depri-
vation and 5% durably exposed to that form of poverty. This is comparable to 
Tillmann and Budowski and confirms the large impact of the inertia forces of the 
social structure. A contrario, 10% experienced a progressive reduction of the mate-
rial deprivation they endured at the beginning of the period and 5% faced a progres-
sive increase. For these 15%, poverty is a changing reality, potentially affected by 
singular individual events or cumulative processes. As panel data suppose a pro-
gressive aging of the sample, a part of these ‘trajectories of change’ could also 
reflect life course effects, like the improvement of the material situation of young 
people who entered independent adulthood at the beginning of the data collection.
Among people durably affected by material deprivation, Heeb and Gutjahr found 
more people with low education, more women, more individuals in lone parent 
households (and less in couple households), and more unemployed persons. A con-
trario, living in a couple, having a higher educational level, and being in employ-
ment characterize those durably preserved from poverty. Regarding an increase in 
material deprivation, low education, separation or divorce, and unemployment were 
found to be associated to a higher risk, and age (40 to 64 in comparison to 65 and 
more) and living in a couple with children were found to be related to a lower risk. 
Finally, among people experiencing a decrease in material deprivation, the follow-
ing groups were over-represented:
 – Unemployed, lowly educated persons, younger people (<24 and 25–39), indi-
viduals living alone, and married persons in the first wave.
 – Employed persons (as opposed to students or homemakers) and widows (vs mar-
ried people) in the last wave.
4 Further tests confirm that attrition impacts the data durably, not only in first waves (Gazareth and 
Iglesias 2017).
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The researchers conclude that trajectories of poverty are clearly connected with 
social stratification and with life course transitions. Traditional drivers of vertical 
inequality like education and (un)employment distinguish the destiny of the various 
social groups, as gender or age do. Only divorce, and mainly lone parenthood, could 
be related to the deregulation theses.
Building on those previous results on Switzerland, we address these questions in 
new ways. First, we considered a longer period (15 years) which allows us to draw 
conclusions about the long-term evolution of the social structure. Second, as pov-
erty depends on the needs and resources of households (considered as communities 
of people sharing goods and resources), we focused our analysis at the household 
level instead of at the usually considered individual level. Third, as we deal with 
time and change, we introduced this dimension by constructing dynamic measures 
of the main drivers we analyzed; this is probably our most original contribution.
 Methods
 Data
We used Swiss Household Panel (SHP) data from 1999 to 2013 including the first 
two samples (SHP I starting in 1999 and SHP II starting in 2004). Material depriva-
tion data are collected in SHP in the household questionnaire and are measured 
through questions about goods or activities (‘items’) that the household cannot 
afford. Nine5 items are available in every wave and can be used for longitudinal 
analyses: one week vacation away from home once a year, invite friends at least 
once a month, meal at a restaurant minimum once a month, car for private use, color 
TV, washing machine for exclusive use, dishwasher, computer at home, and going 
to the dentist if needed (knowing that dental care is not included in the obligatory 
health insurance in Switzerland).
 Trajectories of Deprivation
Trajectories shall be understood as the successive statuses a household occupies 
within a given period with regard to the dimension under observation (material 
deprivation). The number of trajectories we can theoretically observe corresponds 
5 A tenth item is available on all waves but was removed from our analyses: the third pillar (private 
pension plan). Gazareth and Iglesias (2017) explain that this item is submitted to measurement 
problems, like the confusion about which saving plans should be included or not. In addition, the 
existence of a compulsory second pillar for employees makes that item less relevant for Switzerland.
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to the number of statuses (2 – not deprived or deprived)6 raised to the power n (n 
being the number of observations: 15 waves), or 32,768 trajectories (without taking 
into account possible missing informations within waves). An important matter is, 
then, to reduce the number of trajectories in order to have an overview of the main 
types of trajectories present in the data. This can be attained mostly by gathering 
similar sequences together.
Gathering similar sequences together is complicated. Basically, three main trajec-
tories can be defined: the ‘never deprived’ (households never reporting any enforced 
lack for any item), the ‘always deprived’ (with households reporting every year at 
least one enforced lack), and the ‘crossing the line’, which can be separated in sev-
eral subgroups based on the number of observations (waves) in deprivation (mainly 
deprived or mainly not deprived), and/or the direction of changes (moving into pov-
erty or out of poverty) the successive observations underline. Manual or statistical 
methods can be used to gather the trajectories together. We present results based on 
the manual construction of seven trajectories: (1) Non-deprived (no deprivation or 
max. once), (2) Mainly non-deprived (2 or 3 deprivation episodes, or 3 deprivation 
episodes and at least 7 non-deprivation episodes), (3) Mainly deprived (analogous to 
mainly non-deprived), (4) Durably deprived (always deprived or max. once non-
deprived), (5) Moving into deprivation (several non-deprivations episodes followed 
by several deprivation episodes7), and (6) Moving out of deprivation (analogous to 
Moving into deprivation), (7) Fluctuating (without any clear direction). Trajectories 
1 to 4 refer to stable positions, and 5 to 7 to changing positions. We decided to 
include households facing one exception to their main status into the ‘non-deprived’ 
or the ‘durably deprived’ categories. Indeed, such exceptions are not relevant for 
defining the socio-economic position of the household on a large period.
The treatment of missing values is a critical issue for sequence analysis: missings 
can occur within a sequence, at the beginning or at the end of the sequence. From 
1999 to 2013, the maximum length of sequences is 15 observations for SHP I, and 
10 for SHP II. We had, then, to choose a compromise between few highly compa-
rable cases (long trajectories with same length) and more but less comparable cases 
(use of much of the available information). We present results based on households 
6 The choice of a binary index is coherent with our purpose, as we are mostly interested in changes 
in socio-economic positions defined as out-of-poverty versus in-poverty, and not in changes taking 
into account the severity of poverty. Many theoretical considerations are in favor of a more com-
plex measurement. However, due to the very asymmetrical distribution of deprivation (the large 
majority of households are non-deprived), the results do not vary much if we deal with more than 
one deprivation status, and the possibilities to analyze a continuous measure are reduced (problems 
with the statistical assumptions). Yet, using a binary measure brings some limitations, like empha-
sizing transitions from positions around the poverty threshold.
7 More precisely: One change from non-deprived to deprived with the first two observations not 
deprived and the last two deprived; two changes from non-deprived to deprived, with the last three 
observations deprived, max. Once deprived in the first three waves, and at least three time non-
deprived in total; two changes from non-deprived to deprived with two episodes non-deprived 
within the first three observations, rest deprived; one change from deprived to non-deprived and 
return to deprived, with the first observation deprived, at least three episodes non-deprived, and at 
least the last three observations deprived.
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with at least 9 observations from 1999 to 2013 (N = 4319). This includes 53% of the 
initial sample and 39% of the refreshment sample.8
 Determinants
A rich literature provides theoretical inputs and empirical results about the determi-
nants of poverty, and material deprivation more specifically (for details see e.g. 
Layte et al. 2001; Suter and Paris 2002; Figari 2012). We first present the determi-
nants associated with our framework at the individual level as analyzed 
traditionally.
Determinants of material deprivation can be divided in four groups. First, deter-
minants associated with vertical inequality (social origin, education, income, occu-
pational position), referring to the class conception of poverty, have to be considered. 
They should be associated with unchanging deprivation trajectories, because pov-
erty is seen as a permanent and transgenerational phenomenon. Second, ascriptive 
characteristics referring to horizontal inequality, like gender, age or ethnicity/
nationality, are also essential. They shall be related to stable trajectories, as they 
remain unchanged over the life course for most individuals, except for age.
Third, critical life events (disruptions in the occupational trajectory, divorce, 
sickness) are taken into account as determinants related to the individualization 
hypothesis. Their influence should result in unstructured trajectories with short peri-
ods of poverty following such events. Fourth, as standard of living is related to the 
composition of the household and the sharing of resources and expenses between 
members, these attributes also have to be part of the analysis. Changes in the house-
hold structure (arrival of new members or departure of others, like grown-up chil-
dren) are associated with durably changing trajectories, especially when the changes 
affect the main earners in the household. This last group of determinants coincides 
to some extent with the third one (e.g. divorce) but is also strongly connected to 
life- course transitions, as age can be. This consideration is important for the inter-
pretation: the influence of some determinants is possibly multiple, which pleads for 
various hypotheses depending on how these factors affect deprivation trajectories.
As mentioned earlier, material deprivation refers essentially to the economic 
situation of the household, as most of the resources and durables are shared by all 
members even if they belong to one member specifically. Due to heterogeneous 
individual characteristics like higher and compulsory education within the same 
household, the relation with the deprivation status of the household is confused 
when analyzed at the individual level (mostly when all members, except young 
8 Hence, sequences of various lengths (9 to 15 observations) are considered: observations are miss-
ing in 26% of the households at the beginning of the sequence and in 14% at the end (non-partici-
pation); 32% present gaps inside the sequence (whole or partial non-response). All in all, 62% of 
the sequences with at least 9 observations are incomplete. This is an important issue for the validity 
of the inference on the global population.
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children, are interviewed like in SHP). In order to avoid this confusion, individual 
characteristics must be transposed at the household level. In doing so, the respective 
influence of the various members has to be taken into account. We assume that 
material deprivation is mostly related to the situation of the adult or couple who 
contributes mainly to the household’s income (usually the parents in family 
households).
Consequently, for most individual attributes, we considered the situation of the 
‘head’ of the household defined as the main earner (ME) and his or her partner, if 
any (whatever the marital status or sex). For some characteristics such as health- 
related impediment in everyday activities, we considered whether any household 
member was affected (because impediment of any member leads to particular 
expenses that affect the standard of living of the whole household).
In a similar way, we used dynamic determinants based on variables dealing with 
changes or events that occurred during the period. Education of the household head 
for example was constructed as the highest degree achieved by the head in all waves, 
but also as movement (no change, increase, decrease,9 varying). In other instances, 
we used the mode value within the period, or the percentage of years in which a 
specific characteristic, situation or event was observed, or the occurrence of some 
events at least once. For every determinant, we defined a construction and thresh-
olds that take into account theoretical considerations (expected impact of the deter-
minant) as well as the size and distribution of the created subgroups in the sample. 
The resulting variables are presented in Table 8.1.
The analysis of the determinants was performed using multinomial logistic 
regressions. We first ran univariate models in order to test the potential influence of 
our determinants one-by-one. Then, we ran multivariate models to assess each 
determinant’s strength. We used a stepwise procedure to select a model with the 




A large majority of the households (82.4%) stayed durably in the same status from 
1999 to 2013 (see Table 8.2). Among those with changing trajectories, the larger 
groups are those who experienced fluctuating changes of status (9.7%), or who 
moved out of deprivation (5.6%). Only a small group faced a durable entry into 
poverty (2.3%). These percentages at the household level are globally consistent 
with those found at the individual level (Tillmann and Budowski 2006; Heeb and 
Gutjahr 2012). The strength of inertia forces appears clearly, as well as the good 
9 As head can change, a decrease in level of education is possible, for example after divorce.
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situation of the Swiss population over the period; deprivation remains low, and 
entries into poverty are scarce.
However, two methodological issues challenge the representativeness of our 
results, especially the relative size of our trajectories: non-randomized attrition and 
panel conditioning. Attrition is characterized by deprived households being more 
likely to drop out of the survey, especially during the first waves (Gazareth and 
Table 8.1 Variable construction for the main determinants of trajectories 
Variable
Categories: Reference 
category vs. other Level
Education of head: highest level over the whole 
observation period (hereafter ‘over obs.’)
Upper secondary vs. 
compulsory; tertiary
HEAD
Education of head: change over obs. Unchanged vs. increase; 
decrease; variation
HEAD
Log of net HH income (mean value over obs. + value at 
first obs.); Variation of net HH income: last 3 obs. 
divided by first 3 obs.; Reported change in income since 
previous interview: mean value over obs.a
Continuous HH
Unbalanced HH budget (i.e. HH gets into debts or eats 
assets) (% of obs.)
Never vs. <25%, 25–100% HH
Homeowner (% of obs.) Never vs. <2/3, 2/3+ HH
Retirement of HH head Never vs. event (retirement 
occurred after 1st obs.); 
always (retired since 1st obs.)
Head
Death of a close person since previous interview; Illness 
or accident since previous interview (if still affecting)
Never vs. min. once ALL
Health-related impediment in daily activities (any 
member) (% of obs.)
Never vs. <25%; 25–50%; 
>50%
ALL
Head reporting: bad healthb; deterioration of health since 
previous interview; chronic health condition (% of obs.)
Never vs. <25%; 25–50%; 
>50%
Head
HH composition: New partner of head; Separation of 
head; Lone parent HH
Never vs. min. once HH
Dependent child(ren) in HH (share of obs.) Never vs. <2/3, 2/3+ HH
Notes: Level: ME  =  Main Earner; Head  =  ME + partner if any; All  =  all members 15+; 
HH = Household characteristic (identical for all members).
aFor each observation: Income improved since previous interview  =  1; decreased  =  (−1); no 
change = 0.
b‘How do you feel right now?’: ‘so, so’ (average), ‘not very well’, or ‘not well at all’.
Table 8.2 Trajectories of material deprivation, 1999–2013: min. 9 observations
Stable trajectories Moving trajectories
Non-deprived 61.6% Moving into deprivation 2.3%
Mainly non-deprived 12.5% Moving out of deprivation 5.6%
Mainly deprived 4.1% Fluctuating 9.7%
Durably deprived 4.3%
Source: Swiss Household Panel (SHP I and SHP II, unweighted), own calculation.
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Iglesias 2017). Trajectories that deal with deprivation should, thus, be underesti-
mated. Further analyses would be necessary to know which ones exactly, and to 
what extent. Conversely, the households participating in at least 9 waves are clearly 
more stable (and wealthy) than households in the whole Swiss population. More 
generally, how random the many missing observations are is a crucial issue. The 
effects of panel conditioning, that is, the transformation in the cognitive process 
when answering several times the same questions, are more difficult to anticipate 
(answers about the reason for lacking items are possibly concerned), but tests based 
on measures of subjective wellbeing confirm that SHP data are affected (Iglesias 
et al. 2017).
Adaptative preferences also challenge the results by affecting mainly the stated 
reason for lacking an item (Crettaz and Suter 2013). Some households could seem 
to move out of deprivation, yet are actually durably affected by deprivation and have 
gotten used to it. As a consequence of these limitations, the real comparative 
strengths of change and inertia in Swiss society are probably somewhat different. If 
the comparative strengths are not fully representative, it is reasonable to say that the 
general patterns are not affected.
 Determinants
Three groups of determinants, classified by the strength of their relation to depriva-
tion trajectories, emerged from the initial one-by-one regressions.
The first group includes the three determinants with the strongest predictive 
power for the trajectories (pseudo R2 between 0.030 and 0.082). They are all related 
to the financial situation of the household: household income, unbalanced budget, 
and reported change in income since previous interview.
The second group (pseudo R2 between 0.011 and 0.020) is more diverse. The 
economic situation is still present (home ownership), but also determinants related 
to vertical or horizontal inequalities (HH head’s highest education, main earner’s 
sex), as well as health (any member with health-related impediment in everyday 
activities and head reporting bad health) and two determinants related to the struc-
ture of the household (depending child(ren) in household, lone parent household).
The last group includes determinants with a weak predictive power for trajecto-
ries (pseudo R2 between 0.05 and 0.01): Age of the main earner, all members being 
less than 25 at first participation, region where the household mainly lived, change 
in the household head’s education, social origin (education of the father, financial 
problems during childhood), household being jobless (all non-retired members are 
unemployed or out-of-employment). In addition, many life events we tested show a 
marginal relationship (pseudo R2 < 0.05) to the trajectories: separation or (re)part-
nering of household head, retirement, accident or illness since previous interview, 
or death of a closely related person since previous interview (connected with pos-
sible inheritance). Nationality, usually influent in socio-economic phenomenons, 
also presents a very weak relation to the deprivation trajectories.
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Table 8.3 presents our best multivariate model (pseudo R2 of 0.171), which deals 
with seven determinants. The trajectory ‘moving into deprivation’ was excluded in 
this model.10
The determinants related to the economic situation of the household strongly 
impact on deprivation trajectories, what was expected and confirms previous 
results (Heeb and Gutjahr 2012). In particular, compared to remaining non-
deprived all over the period, the chance of being in deprived trajectories decreases 
when the mean household’s income increases over the period, with larger beta 
coefficients for more unfavorable trajectories (from β= −1.7 for the ‘mostly non-
deprived’ trajectory to β= −3.9 for the ‘durably deprived’). This pattern is similar 
10 Too many estimates in regard to the small number of households available in the sample; similar 
results.
Table 8.3 Main determinants of trajectories of material deprivation 1999–2013: beta coefficients 








Moving out of 
deprivation Fluctuating
β β β β β
Income (mean of log 
net)
−1.66*** −3.34*** −3.94*** −1.65*** −2.52***
Unbalanced budget (ref. never)
<25% of observations 0.74*** 0.92*** 1.33*** 0.80*** 1.00***
25% and more 0.40* 1.63*** 1.74*** 0.77** 1.35***
Evolution of income 
since previous interview 
(mean)
−0.01*** −0.02*** −0.04*** n.s. −0.02***
Homeowner (ref. never)
<2/3 of observations n.s. −0.94*** −0.94*** n.s. −0.36*
2/3 and more −0.51*** −1.33*** −1.68*** −0.87*** −0.80***
Health-related impediment (ref. never)
<25% of observations n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 0.45*
25–50% n.s. 0.57* n.s. 0.50* 0.90***
More than 50% 0.54** 1.09*** 1.39*** 0.75** 0.89***
Retirement (ref. never)
occurred within period −0.62*** −1.13*** −1.01** −0.60* −1.02***
yes since 1st obs. −0.99*** −2.05*** −1.89*** −0.93** −1.77***
Dependent child(ren) (ref. never)
<2/3 of observations 0.61*** n.s. 1.09*** 1.12*** n.s.
2/3 and more 0.54*** 0.75** 1.19*** 0.90*** 0.73***
Constant 16.25*** 33.06*** 38.78*** 14.98*** 24.85***
Notes: P value: * <0.05, ** <0.01, *** <0.001, n.s. = not significant. Households with min. 9 
observations. N = 4319.
Source: Swiss Household Panel (SHP I and SHP II, unweighted), own calculation.
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for unbalanced budget: Having an unbalanced budget at least once compared to 
never (budget always balanced) increases the chance to be in deprived trajectories 
compared to remaining non-deprived all over the period. The more often the bud-
get was unbalanced over the period, the greater the β coefficient – except for the 
‘mostly non- deprived’ and ‘moving out of deprivation’ trajectories. In other words, 
and not surprisingly: deprived households have less money and have problems 
balancing their budget. Coherently, being a homeowner at least two third of the 
time compared to never, decreases the chance to be in ‘mostly non-deprived’ and 
‘moving out of deprivation’ trajectories compared to remaining non-deprived all 
over the period; and being a homeowner at least once compared to never decreases 
the chance of being in ‘mostly’, ‘durably’ or ‘fluctuating’ deprived trajectories 
compared to remaining non-deprived all over the period. Regarding the mean 
reported change in income since previous interview, the chance of being in 
deprived trajectories compared to remaining non-deprived all over the period 
decreases when the mean change in income increases, except for the ‘moving out’ 
trajectory.
The other determinants of our final model are more interesting: Durable impair-
ment due to a health condition, retirement, and many years with dependent 
child(ren). They are all related to life course and life events. Having health-related 
impediment more than 50% of the time compared to not having any impediment 
increases the chance of being in deprived trajectories compared to remaining non- 
deprived all over the period.11 Impediment in 25 to 50% of the time compared to not 
having any impediment increases the chance of being in the ‘mostly deprived’, 
‘fluctuating’ or ‘moving out’ trajectories compared to remaining non-deprived. 
However, the causality in the relation between deprivation and health cannot be 
observed from our analyses.
In relation to the life course hypothesis, retirement has a ‘protective’ effect: the 
fact that the household head or his/her parnter has retired (since the beginning of the 
period or during the period) compared to ‘no one ever retired’ decreases the chance 
of being in a deprived trajectory compared to remaining non-deprived, with β coef-
ficients larger when retirement lasts longer (retired at first observation).12 Finally, 
having dependent children compared to never having dependent children increases 
the chance of being in a deprived trajectory compared to remaining non-deprived, 
especially ‘durably deprived’.
Results in Table 8.3 globally show that the chosen determinants are impacting 
the chance of being in deprived trajectories compared to remaining non-deprived, 
and that the β coefficient usually increases when the trajectory implies more depri-
vation phases. Furthermore, the impact of a factor depends on the number of years 
11 The stepwise procedure confirms that the impact of impairment is not related to age.
12 In the literature, retirement is usually seen as a risk of deprivation. However, in Switzerland, the 
retired own a large part of the wealth. Attrition and adaptative preferences could also explain this, 
as both contribute to hide poverty in old age.
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during which it affects the household. All in all, these factors have a larger impact 
on trajectories with long-lasting deprivation; and the impact is larger when the unfa-
vorable situation of the determinant lasts.
 Conclusion
‘Les faits sont têtus’ (‘facts are stubborn’, literally) is a French saying meaning that, 
when reality is strong enough (homogenous and stable), it always appears as it is, 
whatever the way you look at it. The alternative and innovating methodology we 
used to measure trajectories of deprivation and their determinants delivers relatively 
similar results to previous researches. Using trajectories dealing with a longer 
period of observation, based on a binary measure of deprivation, and constructed at 
the household level rather than at the individual level (as is usually done in main-
stream research), reveals similar patterns of stable and moving trajectories to those 
found in previous studies. Like Tillmann and Budowski (2006), as well as Heeb and 
Gutjahr (2012), we found that about 80 percent of households remained in a (mostly) 
stable position (which was expected following the class hypothesis), with a large 
majority of survey participants never reporting any deprivation or only once over 
the 9 to 15 waves they participated in. Among those who experience change, most 
households display fluctuating patterns without any clear structure (which was 
expected following the individualization hypothesis). Trajectories related to durable 
transition into or out of deprivation are scarce.
This chapter therefore fills a gap, because results that rely on similar concepts 
and definitions always raise the same question: are their findings robust? Our clearly 
different approach – based on the use of household-level variables and on a different 
treatment of time-varying factors – leads to similar conclusions; therefore, we can 
be reassured that these results are quite robust.
Indeed, our results show the strength of inertia forces over the last decade. Yet, 
some elements mitigate this conclusion. First, we classified the mostly (non-)
deprived trajectories as stable. These trajectories, representing 17 percent of the 
households, could also be associated to moving patterns and related to the individu-
alization or life course hypothesis: they potentially correspond to non-definitive 
transitions following unpredictable life events or life course transitions, rather than 
to temporary deviations from a durably stable position. When keeping these 17 
percent out of the stable households, the proportion of stability becomes even 
smaller than in Gazareth and Suter (2010), which is coherent (the longer the period, 
the higher the probability of change).
In addition, methodological issues affect the representativeness of panel data 
(which are the only data allowing such analyses of trajectories). Non-randomized 
attrition is the most problematic issue. It reinforces the strength of inertia because 
households facing deprivation are more likely to drop out (Gazareth and Iglesias 
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2017), including households in transitional life course phases that drop out before 
any change can be measured (e.g. a household headed by a young adult entering 
stable occupational position but dropping out before moving out of deprivation). By 
and large, the many missing observations challenge the results. Furthermore, adap-
tative preferences improve the probability of false identification of ‘moving-out-of- 
poverty’ trajectories. In conclusion, although we think that our results convincingly 
show that structural factors still represent powerful determinants of the poverty risk, 
they should not be taken as an exact quantification of this phenomenon, because of 
the methodological challenges mentioned above.
The analysis of the determinants of trajectories confirms the influence of factors 
related to unchanging vertical or horizontal inequality. The longer the households 
face unfavorable social conditions, the higher the risk they follow trajectories with 
many deprivation phases, like the mostly or durably deprived ones. This conclusion 
is coherent with the class hypothesis, but also with the cumulative (dis)advantages 
hypothesis. It pleads in favor of pursuing efforts engaged to reduce social inequali-
ties, such as redistributive and social policy, educational support for children of the 
lower class, or the prevention of discrimination.
Life course transitions are clearly another driver of deprivation trajectories. 
Dependent children and retirement appear as the life events with the strongest 
impact in our analyses. Most interestingly, the‘moving out of deprivation’ trajectory 
is more likely if a household had dependent children for only a part of the period 
(less than 2/3 of observations), what can be partly related to grown-up children. This 
emphasizes the importance of family policy and support.
Health issues, and in particular the resulting impediments in everyday activities, 
is the last determinant with a clear impact on deprivation trajectories. This impact, 
however, is related to the duration of the (bad) health condition: when occurring 
occasionally (in less than 25 percent of the observations), impediment has no signifi-
cant impact, except for the risk of fluctuating trajectory that increases slightly, what 
is coherent with the individualization hypothesis. If it occurs more frequently (25–50 
percent), the ‘mostly deprived’ and ‘moving out of deprivation’ trajectories are also 
concerned. The last result is interesting: it indicates that overcoming an impediment 
contributes to moving out of deprivation. Finally, if impediment characterizes most 
of the experience of a household (that is, it affects one/several household member/s 
in at least half of the observations), all trajectories containing deprivation phases are 
more likely, especially the ‘durably deprived’ one. Without further analyses, it is 
hard to determine the direction of the causality; it is probably circular in some cases.
In summary, our contribution confirms the importance of inertia forces in 
Switzerland (class and cumulative hypotheses) and the limited or mostly temporary 
effect of life events (individualization hypothesis). In addition, life course transi-
tions are found to have a clear impact on changes in social positions (but probably 
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not much on changes in the social structure). Finally, it is noteworthy that the way 
in which we measure deprivation, the household composition and the changes in the 
situation of the household, has only a limited impact on the results, and so has the 
length of the observed period.
Our findings suggest that some of the claims that have been made regarding the 
individualization of social inequalities and the decline of social class (e.g. Beck 
1992; Bauman 2000), are not confirmed empirically, and that the classical determi-
nants of social inequalities remain powerful predictors. Sure enough, critical life 
events can have an impact; however, the scale of this impact is nowhere near as great 
as the effect of ‘classical’ poverty factors. This discrepancy between the assumed 
individualization of risks and what has been observed in recent years is attributable 
to the fact that these ‘grand theories’ of the new modernity (Goldthorpe 2002; 
Atkinson 2007) are not based on rigorous empirical work. Facts are, indeed, quite 
stubborn.
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Chapter 9




A growing proportion of the European population faces situations of vulnerability. 
Stable employees feel more and more at risk of losing their job or of experiencing a 
deterioration of their employment situation (Gallie et al. 1998). The share of stan-
dard employment relationships are declining, whereas atypical and precarious 
employment is on the rise (Rodgers & Rodgers, 1989; Hipp et al. 2015). In addition, 
joblessness in different forms—invalidity insurance, social assistance, early retire-
ment—has also grown in recent decades (Paugam 2005). One of the unresolved 
issues is the relative scope of these phenomena. First, the advocates of what we 
could call exclusion thesis contend that only a small and marginal group is touched 
by material poverty and that this deprivation is inherently accompanied by isolation 
and segregation (Paugam 2005). A second approach, most famously brought for-
ward by Robert Castel (2002), contends that not only the margins but also the larger 
zones of the labour market are characterised by precariousness. In a third perspec-
tive, it is asserted that work, even in formerly prestigious and well-paid occupations, 
is less and less socially recognised (Bourdieu 1999; Paugam 2000).
We argue that none of these three perspectives alone appropriately describes the 
current situation. They ought not to be conceived as alternative conceptual fram-
ings, but as facets of the same phenomenon. Life course sociology seems to be a 
particularly promising approach to link these facets of vulnerability together. In this 
contribution, we relate the different expressions of vulnerability to each other 
through the use of sequence analysis and investigate the development of the share of 
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individuals in precarious jobs, unemployment, and situations of exclusion during 
the period from 2000–2010  in Switzerland. Event mining techniques are used to 
investigate the odds of transition between crucial states of vulnerability and pre-
cariousness. Finally, we examine how the membership to different trajectories of 
vulnerability is influenced by cohort, gender, educational level or ethnic origin.
This chapter begins with a discussion of the three mentioned facets of vulnerability 
and an explanation of how they can fruitfully be linked together by a biographical 
approach. Then, we present the data and the Swiss case and discuss the results at 
greater length. In the concluding section, the findings and the heuristic value of the 
employed research strategy are discussed.
 A Biographical Approach to Vulnerability
Subjective insecurity, precariousness, and exclusion are phenomena that emerge as 
the result of the interplay between the dynamics of the labour market and welfare 
policies. In this article, we seek to bring together the literatures addressing each of 
the issues and then discuss how they can be blended into a biographical approach.
The first step towards vulnerability is often a certain feeling of insecurity in an 
otherwise stable job. This subjective impression of job insecurity can be approached, 
for example, by the premonition that one will lose one’s job within the next 
12 months. According to Gallie et al. (1998), insecurity has become, in recent years, 
an increasingly relevant dimension of the well-being at and the satisfaction with 
work. It can be hypothesised that the feeling of job insecurity depends on the sub-
jective impression of being in danger of becoming unemployed, previous spells of 
unemployment or the salience of unemployment as an issue in the media or personal 
entourage. Regardless of whether the threat behind this feeling is real, it can have 
psychological consequences and lead to a generalised hunch that one’s work perfor-
mance is not adequately rewarded (Paugam 2000).
When insecurity ceases to be a feeling but becomes linked to precarious employ-
ment conditions, we can speak of precariousness. Precarious employment embraces 
a large number of situations that differ from the male standard employment situa-
tion: part time employment fixed-term and otherwise temporary contracts, work at 
home, work in pseudo self-employment, on-call work (and all other forms of forced 
flexibility), night and weekend work, several employments, poorly paid jobs, or 
underemployment (Kalleberg 2000; 2009; Hipp et  al. 2015). Night, weekend, or 
on-call work may prevent people from enjoying their social lives, meeting friends, 
and participating in clubs and associations. Others, such as temporary and fixed- 
term contracts, make it difficult for people to plan ahead and schedule important 
events, such as having children or buying a house.
Exclusion became a major analytical category at the beginning of the 1990s, first 
in France, later also in the German context (Kronauer 1996). In France, it developed 
jointly with concepts such as “precariousness” and “new poverty” (Paugam 2005). 
When, in the early 1990s, the unemployment rate and the number of those depen-
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dent on social assistance rose dramatically in almost all European countries, a grow-
ing group of “excluded” or “dispensables” people emerged. As a consequence of the 
enduring absence from the labour market, these people were unable to provide for 
the living cost of their households and depended on social assistance or invalidity 
insurance (Kronauer 1996). Not surprisingly, exclusion renders it difficult to live 
according to socially and culturally recognised norms and therefore often leads to 
social stigmatisation.
According to Castel (2002), different degrees or zones of precariousness are 
related to each other. The reserve army of the excluded put pressure on both groups 
in the zones of vulnerability and security. Those who are in the zone of vulnerability 
may want to move to the zone of security because they are afraid of falling back into 
the zone of exclusion. From a biographical angle, the fears that are typical for each 
zone, may be based on personal experiences and biographical mobility between one 
or several of these zones. A biographical approach, focused on how people pass 
through different forms of vulnerability, is, therefore, a simple but effective strategy 
to get a comprehensive glance at all these phenomena. We can reasonably assume 
that during their life courses, the same people go through situations of subjective 
insecurity, precariousness, and exclusion. As in theories of labour market segmenta-
tion, these zones may be defined by an absence of mobility between them and a 
large amount of mobility within them. Biographical mobility between groups is an 
important aspect of the activation, maintenance and reinforcement of boundaries 
between different welfare categories at the margins of the labour market (Lamont 
and Molnàr 2002; Scherschel et  al. 2012). By studying the individual boundary 
crossing through entry into (or exit from) different situations of vulnerability, it is 
possible to understand the meaning of these boundaries as well as the categories of 
people who are labelled as “precarious” or “excluded.” Situations of vulnerability, 
which are easily and regularly crossed by biographical movements, might lose their 
symbolic power of distinction, demarcation, and discrimination. They will be con-
sidered permeable and biographically reversible.
It has insistently been argued that precariousness or exclusions should be consid-
ered dynamically, not statically (Bane and Ellwood 1983; Leisering and Leibfried 
1999). However, despite the progress made in dynamic poverty research, we believe 
the dynamic character of vulnerability can still be explored further. The studies of 
poverty spells tell little about the order and the velocity of the processes with which 
a person passes through a situation of vulnerability. Hence, it is different to be 
excluded all of a sudden to go through a long and slow process of precariousness. 
What is more, we can assume that a short precarious situation may remain ephem-
eral, whereas a longer spell in the same situation can lead to psychological and 
social repercussions. A biographical approach is, therefore, a promising strategy to 
gain a comprehensive and relational perspective on these three forms of vulnerabil-
ity. Our inquiry will be guided by three research questions: (a) What is the overall 
and comparative proportion of individuals feeling insecure, employed in precarious 
jobs, or finding themselves in situations of exclusion during the period from 2000–
2010? (b) What transition and mobility patterns can we observe between different 
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situations of vulnerability? (c) Which typical trajectories of vulnerability can we 
distinguish, and how can these types be explained by cohort, gender, educational 
level, or ethnic origin?
 Data and Method
Analysis of trajectories of vulnerability must rely on longitudinal data. Therefore, 
this article is based on data from the Swiss Household Panel (SHP) (Voorpostel 
et al. 2011). As the same respondents are interviewed every year, it is possible with 
these data to construct trajectories of a certain length. In the present case, we have 
used the waves 2 to 11, covering the years 2000–2010  in yearly intervals.1 This 
period covers both the relatively prosperous early 2000s and the years of crisis from 
2008 to 2010. The analysis has been limited to the population aged between 20 and 
65 years in all waves. This means that the sample is constrained to those who, in 
2010, were between 30 and 65 years old. In general, we must assume that those in 
vulnerable situations are underrepresented in the SHP and more concerned by 
attrition (Voorpostel et al. 2011). In addition, we have excluded all trajectories with 
more than three missing years.2 This leaves us with 1332 individuals. The follow-
ing table compares our subsample to the entire sample concerning a series of key 
socio- demographic variables (Table 9.1).
Groups, which according to the literature are threatened by vulnerability, are 
slightly underrepresented in the sequential sub-sample (immigrants, people with 
only compulsory education, younger cohorts)—very likely as a consequence of a 
higher attrition rate of these groups. However, other potentially vulnerable groups 
1 The first wave in 1999 features not all variables on social assistance and invalidity and was thus 
not taken into account.
2 An alternative would have been to use techniques of multiple imputation (see Halpin 2016). 
Because of the relative large number of missing values we have to be aware of possible selection 
effects and interpret the results cautiously.
Table 9.1 Comparison of Sub-sample and SHP Sample
Sub-sample 2010  
(30–65 years)
SHP Sample 2010  
(30–65 years)
% n % n
Women 58.3 777 52.8 2938
Foreigners 8.9 119 12.6 4862
Compulsory education 5.0 66 8.2 452
30–39 years 12.9 172 19.5 1086
40–49 years 38.7 515 35.1 1953
50–64 years 48.4 645 45.4 2527
Total 100 1332 100 5566
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are overrepresented (women) or fairly well represented (50–65 year old people). In 
general, the differences between the sub-sample and the whole SHP sample are not 
very large. It is also noteworthy that for the year 2006, we must deal with a filter 
error for one of the central variables (time limited contracts) and have about 5% 
more missing values compared to the other years.
The construction of the variables draws on the gradual conceptualisation of pre-
cariousness proposed by Paugam (2000), but differs on important point from it. As 
opposed to France, Switzerland has a relatively liberal labour law and lacks, in 
particular, a strong legal protection of categories considered as the stable core of the 
labour market. Therefore, less stable labour contracts, such as fixed-term contracts 
or temporary contracts are not as strongly opposed to permanent contracts. As a 
consequence, certain categorical adjustments were made. Categories were con-
structed based on the question on the risk of becoming unemployed in the next 
12 months, the temporal limitation of the employment contract, and questions about 
unemployment, social assistance, invalidity insurance, and pre-retirement schemes. 
We present them here in an order of decreasing security:
 – Stable and secure employment (31%)3: People in this situation possess a for-
mally stable contract (no temporary or fixed-term employment) and they indicate 
also that they feel subjectively sure (risk of becoming unemployed estimated at 
0 on an 11-item scale from 0 to 10).
 – Stable and insecure employment (36%): This group enjoys a formally stable 
employment, but is considered to be at risk of becoming unemployed in the next 
12 months (risk estimated at 1 to 5 on a scale from 0 to 10).
 – Stable and very insecure employment (6%): Identical to the second group, except 
that the risk of becoming unemployed is estimated rather high (6 to 10 on a scale 
from 0 to 10).
 – Unstable but secure employment (2%): Despite experiencing a situation of for-
mal employment precariousness, this group feels subjectively secure.
 – Unstable and insecure employment (4%): More consistent, these individuals are 
both formally and subjectively insecure. Not only is their employment contract 
non-permanent, but they are considered at risk of becoming unemployed in the 
next 12 months (1 to 10 on a scale from 0 to 10).
 – Registered as unemployed (2%): These people report not being employed at the 
moment and are officially registered at a Swiss unemployment office. In other 
words, they are ready and willing to work if they find a job.
 – Social assistance, invalidity insurance, pre-retirement (6%): This group is defined 
as people under 65 who are out of the workforce and simultaneously receive an 
old-age pension, a payment from the invalidity insurance, or a payment from 
social assistance.
 – Out of workforce (13%): This group is not employed, but, at the same time, 
declares itself neither unemployed, nor dependent on contributions from one of 
the aforementioned insurances. Even though the status of this group is probably 
3 These percentages are average values over the period 2000–2010.
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heterogeneous, we can assume that its members have left (or never entered) the 
labour market voluntarily.
In addition, we will test the composition of the trajectories with respect to some 
basic socio-demographic factors. Therefore, we have defined the following vari-
ables: sex (male and female), birth cohort (30–39 years; 40–49 years; 50–65 years), 
highest educational level (compulsory education; apprenticeship/high school; 
higher educational education; university/applied university) and nationality (rich 
countries, southern countries, Swiss).4
To respond to our research questions, we used transition mining, sequence analy-
ses, and a multinomial regression model. To examine the transition between differ-
ent forms of vulnerability, we searched for and counted all transitions and compared 
their frequency to an expected frequency, based on the proportion of a single state 
among all the possible states. To study the trajectories of vulnerability, we carried 
out a sequence analysis conducted with the R-libraries TraMineR (Gabadinho et al. 
2009) and WeigthedCluster (Studer 2013). This method, popularised by Abbott, 
allows the researcher to display trajectories graphically, group them into types 
according to similarity, and link them to explanatory factors by the means of multi-
nomial logistic regression models or discrepancy analysis (Abbott and Hrycak 
1990; Aisenbrey and Fasang 2010; Studer et al. 2011). We used an optimal match-
ing algorithm by calculating the substitution costs empirically and setting the 
insertion- delition costs at 1.5. Further, we used weighted Ward clustering and 
decided on the number of solutions on the basis of an extensive evaluation of cluster 
quality (Studer 2013). The six clusters are represented by a distribution plot, which 
gives an aggregate overview of the trajectories. Finally, we applied a multinomial 
regression analysis on the six clusters in order to understand which social categories 
trajectories are typical.
 The Historical Dynamic of Vulnerability (2000–2010)
In a first step, we seek to trace the overall evolution of the above defined forms of 
vulnerabilities for the period from 2000–2010. Compared to most of the European 
countries, Switzerland’s labour market remained for a long time spared from major 
crisis in the form of mass unemployment. Even when, in the early 1990s, the unem-
ployment rate rose, its increase was gentler than in many other Western countries. 
This has specific reasons: unemployment was, for a long time, buffered by the peri-
odic pushing out of the labour market of the foreign workforce and women 
4 In Switzerland the traditional working-class migration from southern countries between 1960- 
1980s has recently been completed by a group of better educated immigrants from northern 
European countries. We defined Italy, Portugal, Spain Ex-Yugoslavia as “southern countries” and 
Germany, France, USA and the UK as “rich countries”.
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(Streckeisen 2012).5 In the early 1990s, as women would increasingly crowd into 
the labour market and the yearly regulation of labour immigration was abandoned, 
the economic crisis caused a rise in the unemployment rate from about 1% to 4%. 
Long-term unemployment rose from 20% of the unemployed to over 30% in 1995 
and 40% in 1999 (Bühlmann et al. 2012). In addition and as a consequence of the 
increasing long-term character of unemployment rates, recipients of invalidity 
insurance and social assistance rose in the 1990s and then particularly in the early 
2000s. These two insurance systems, structurally conceived as support of the last 
order, became the collecting tank of those who were no longer supported by the 
regular unemployment insurance.
Beyond the increase of those durably excluded from the labour market, we can 
also trace the rise of precarious jobs through the same period. An increasing propor-
tion of the workforce labours in fixed-term contracts, with temporary agencies, on 
call or in part-time arrangements. Whereas, for instance, only about 4500 people 
were working for a temporary agency in 1993, this number rose to 46,000 in 1997, 
201,000 in 2003 and even 236,000 in 2009. Also the proportion of employees in 
fixed-term contracts and employment on call increased about 35%, respectively 
38% between 2001 and 2009. This contrasts rather strongly with the stagnation or 
slight decrease of both full-time jobs and permanent employment during the period 
of 2001–2009.6 The parallel rise of exclusion and precarious employment is no 
coincidence. It has strong institutional links. Beyond new recruitment and personnel 
administration policies of firms, it was also novel social policies that contributed to 
the rise of precarious employment. Modification of the unemployment law in the 
spirit of the “activation policies” reduced the period of unemployment support 
(especially for younger people), enlarged the definition of jobs that must be accepted, 
and created a series of re-integration courses and programs, some of which corre-
sponded to precarious forms of employment (Bonvin 2008; Tabin 2000; Streckeisen 
2008). How are these official data from the Swiss Labour Force Survey now reflected 
in the data used for this study? (Fig. 9.1).
The period between 2000 and 2010 was characterised by a massive growth of 
subjective employment insecurity. This sharp rise, which is not documented in offi-
cial data as discussed above, has much larger amplitude than the increase of precari-
ous employment conditions. We may speak of a creeping general vulnerability, a 
growing destabilisation of otherwise stable jobs. This surge in employment insecu-
rity means the proportion of people with a stable and secure job, a situation that is 
supposed to represent the male norm of the post-war period, became a minority. For 
the years 2009 and 2010, it amounts to less than 30% of the age group between 20 
and 65. More generally, we can observe a rather consistent overall trend towards 
5 The so called « Saisonnierstatut », which allowed Switzerland to limit the number of foreign 
workers per year at will, and which gave virtually no labour rights to this important foreign part of 
the workforce, was abandoned in 1991 for non-EU citizens and 2002 also for citizens of the 
European Union.
6 These numbers draw on the Swiss Labour Force Survey. See also Pelizzari (2009) for the period 
2001–2006.
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less security and stability in employment. Most categories of unstable and insecure 
jobs are on the rise. It is important not to over-interpret this trend though; the most 
significant rise concerns those who feel slightly instable in their job. Very insecure 
jobs and combinations of insecure and instable jobs do not increase as strongly. In 
other words, there is a widespread uncertainty in the Swiss society, but this uncer-
tainty is comparatively superficial. To understand how biographical dynamics con-
tribute to this rise of vulnerability in Swiss society, we examine the transition 
between different states of vulnerability and then carry out a sequence analysis to 
identify typical trajectories of vulnerability.
 Mobility Between Different Forms of Vulnerability
By studying the relative chances of transition between the eight states of vulnerabil-
ity we have defined, we will first examine whether the pathways into and out of 
insecurity (respectively, precariousness or exclusion) are abrupt or rather gradual. 
Second, we ask whether we can identify certain segments of vulnerability within 
which mobility is common, while at the same time mobility between these segments 
is rare. This will shed light on the social boundaries that potentially enclose differ-
ent situations of vulnerability.
We mine for transition between the states and calculate the relative chances to 
accede to each of the states from each other state (odds ratios). These odds ratios 
result from a calculation of the relative chances to move to a state (measured by the 
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Fig. 9.1 Development of situations of vulnerability in Switzerland, 2000–2010
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state who moved to this state. A value of 1 means that the comparative chances to 
move to this state equal the chances under a uniform distribution. A value of 0.5 
means that the chances are only half what they should be under conditions of a uni-
form distribution. A value of 2 means that the chances are two times higher than 
with a uniform distribution (Table 9.2).
In the light grey upper part of the table, the odds of transitions are displayed from 
relatively stable and secure situations on the left to more and more insecure and 
excluded situations on the right. The results confirm the trend found on the indi-
vidual level: generally, people move away from “stable and secure jobs” towards 
less stable or secure types of employment. Second, we find it more likely to move 
to a neighbouring state than to “jump” to states that are farther away on the scale of 
vulnerability. This means the trajectories of vulnerability are rather regular and 
gradual. It is conspicuous, that there is no specific threshold between unstable jobs 
and registered unemployment. Moves in and out of unemployment are, thus, rela-
tively common.7 Third, we can identify a certain caesura between the states “inva-
lidity and social assistance” and “out of workforce” versus all other states. Direct 
moves to these states of exclusions are relatively rare.
The lower part of the matrix displays the odds to move from marginal and unsta-
ble states to more stable forms of employment. Mirror-inverted to the findings 
above, shifts to secure and stable forms of employment were generally rare in the 
period of 2000 to 2010. Also in the inverse direction, gradual moves to neighbour-
ing state are more likely than jumps from total exclusion to total stability. It is very 
unlikely to shift from registered unemployment or social assistance directly to a 
stable and secure job. The chances to move to a better situation along the scale 
diminish the better the conditions are in comparison. Third, the only situations that 
offer relatively good chances to move to stable and secure jobs is from stable but 
insecure jobs. When it comes to upwards mobility, these two states at the stable pole 
of the scale seem to constitute a homogenous zone.
 Biographical Dynamics of Vulnerability
As a further step, a sequence analysis was carried out to identify and represent seven 
typical trajectories graphically. The following distribution plots represent the years 
between 2000 and 2010 as pillars on the x-axis. For each year, the proportional 
distribution of the states is displayed (Fig. 9.2).
The first type, stable but insecure jobs (n = 458), corresponds to a continuous 
trajectory of employment in formally permanent but subjectively insecure jobs. 
Even if these jobs are not contractually limited in time, this group feels there is a 
certain risk that they will become unemployed in the next 12 months. This type is 
by far the largest group in contemporary Switzerland. Even when there are no for-
mal reasons to feel vulnerable in a job, the very low legal obstacles to lay off people 
7 This is among other things a consequence of the liberal Swiss labour law and is unlikely to happen 
in other countries which have a stronger protection of permanent labour status.








































































































































































































































































































































































in Switzerland seems to create a widespread fear of losing one’s job. Also the indi-
viduals in the second cluster, out of workforce (n = 92), remain essentially stable 
over the whole period of 2000 to 2010. This group refrains from participating in the 
labour market. At the same time, it does not declare itself as unemployed or depen-
dent on social assistance. We can assume that the member of this cluster remain 
voluntarily out of the labour market. It is probably mainly composed of women 
who, permanently or for a child rearing period, decide (or are forced) to live a life 
as a homemaker. Turbulent entries (n = 193) include pathways that change between 
different forms of unsteady employment. Typically, short periods of insecure or 
unstable employment alternate with spells of unemployment, as well as with stable 
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Year_2000 Year_2003 Year_2006 Year_2009
Stable and secure trajectories Paths to exclusion
Increasing insecurity
Out of workforce
Fig. 9.2 Typology of trajectories of vulnerability 2000–2010
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and the permanence of vulnerability; the members of this type never really reach a 
secure shore in the form of stable and secure jobs. This trajectory seems to be typi-
cal for labour market entries between 2000 and 2010. It includes a certain share that, 
in the beginning, is out of the workforce and then enters the labour market.
The fourth trajectory (labelled increasing insecurity) assembles 272 individuals 
who are first in stable and secure job and then slowly move towards jobs that they 
deem exposed to the risk of becoming unemployed even though the formal status of 
these employments is not changing. These people went through a kind of subjective 
vulnerabilisation of their employment situation between 2000 and 2010. The 
trajectory- type, which was supposedly the norm for men during the economically 
golden post-war years, has survived, but concerns only a rather small group. 84 
individuals can be found in the stable and secure trajectories cluster. These trajec-
tories are characterised by a continuous sequence of stable and secure employment 
situations. In some cases, people feel insecure in the beginning and then become 
increasingly sure towards the end of the ten-year period. The last type is best char-
acterised as paths of exclusion (n = 57). Its members were employed or out of work 
in the early 2000s and then successively fell out of the labour market and are taken 
care of by the either invalidity insurance, social assistance, or early retirement 
schemes. Returns from this state to the labour market are rare, even in the form of 
insecure or instable jobs. Invalidity insurance or social assistance seems, thus, to be 
an irreversible state.
 Explaining Trajectories of Vulnerability
In order to characterise these six trajectory-types socially, we carried out a multino-
mial regression analysis. This method allows us to characterise the cluster member-
ship by a series of simple socio-demographic variables, such as gender, age group, 
ethnic origin, and educational level.8 Stable and secure trajectories were chosen as 
the reference group. Table 9.3 displays the results of these analyses. Because of the 
relatively large number of missing values in our analytical sample, the results of this 
regression analysis have to be interpreted with caution.
Stable but insecure trajectories are common among younger men aged 30–40 
and 40–50. Surprisingly, those with a basic education or migrants do not feel par-
ticularly threatened. Trajectories out of workforce are above all female trajectories. 
Virtually no men move voluntarily out of the employment system. This is confirmed 
by other longitudinal studies on male work trajectories (Widmer et al. 2003) Second, 
8 We deliberately refrained from using variables which do not apply to all types (such as occupa-
tion, which makes no sense for people out of the workforce) or which are ambivalent according to 
their temporal-causal relationship with reference to the trajectories.
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we see that those with only a compulsory education or an apprenticeship stay for 
long periods out of the labour market. We can make the hypothesis that rather than 
women in general, it is women with a small amount of educational capital, who 
refrain from labour market participation. Women who invested more into education 
may want to “capitalise” that investment.
When it comes to turbulent entries, we see that these concern above all younger 
people who make their entry into the labour market. However, with our data it is not 
possible to compare the labour market entry of different cohorts. Therefore we are 
not able to say if the labour market entry is more turbulent for the younger cohorts. 
It seems also that turbulent entries are less prevalent among Swiss citizens than 
among foreigners from poor countries. However, they are not particularly bound to 
any educational level: they occur to a broad range of young adults. This is surpris-
ing. We would have to dig deeper in order to examine whether this form of vulner-
able trajectories may are typical for project-oriented and voluntarily flexible 
occupations (such as graphic designer, architects or journalists). Paths to exclusion 
threatens those who only possess a compulsory school degree, those with an appren-
ticeship, and, much less, those holding a higher vocational degree or a university 
degree. In addition, similarly to what has been found in other studies, it touches 
particularly the older cohorts (Oesch and Baumann 2014): it is particularly wide-
spread among poorly trained older workers.











Sex Men 1.55° 0.07** 1.03 1.15 0.94
Women – – – – –
Cohort 30–40 2.30* 1.21 2.11* 2.33* 0.20°
41–50 3.01** 1.98° 2.89** 3.17** 0.78
51–65 – – – – –
Education Compulsory 2.94 10.28* 1.50 9.12* 20.10**
Apprenticeship 1.10 2.85* 0.90 1.40 3.28*
Higher 
vocational
1.63 0.56 0.78 1.59 0.92
University – – – – –
Ethnic 
origin
Swiss 0.52 0.72 0.27* 0.56 0.40
Rich countries 0.94 1.54 0.40 0.42 0.52
Poor countries – – – – –
° < 0.1; * < 0.05; ** < 0.01.
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 Conclusions
The fear of losing one’s job, precarious employment, or long-term exclusion from 
the labour market have become more urgent over the last decades. However, the real 
scope of the phenomenon and the angle from which to approach it remain contro-
versial. While certain scholars consider the economic and social exclusion of a 
minority as the main problem, others frame the issue in terms of precarious employ-
ment situations. Still, others deem the declining subjective employment security as 
the main problem. In this contribution, we sought to relate these three forms of 
vulnerability with a biographical approach.
A comparative examination of different forms of vulnerability shows that in 
Switzerland only a minority held a secure and stable job in 2010. Even within a 
sample such as the SHP, in which marginalised actors tend to be under-represented, 
less than 30% enjoy stable and secure employment conditions. More severe forms 
of vulnerability, unstable and insecure jobs, for instance, have also risen, but on a 
lower initial level and in a much less spectacular way. Subjective insecurity touches 
a wide range of the Swiss population and increases steeply between 2000 and 2010. 
It is particularly widespread among young (men). Possibly, the “objectively” turbu-
lent entries into the labour market of those aged between 30–40 years one reason for 
this subjective feeling of insecurity.
Through an analysis of the transitions between the different forms of vulnerabil-
ity, we can observe certain social boundaries beyond which circulation is rare 
(Lamont and Molnár 2002). The findings show that the pathways to precariousness 
or exclusion are rather incremental. This also means that in countries such as 
Switzerland, there is no specific protection threshold against unemployment. The 
only boundaries between zones are constructed by social policies that actually direct 
mobility. Movements to situations of social assistance or invalidity often make it 
necessary to pass first through a longer period of unemployment. On the other hand, 
once somebody finds him- or herself in a situation of unemployment or precarious 
employment, the way back to stable and secure employment is boarded-up.
A biographical analysis reveals that the younger generation seems to be particu-
larly concerned by vulnerability. Increasing insecurities and turbulent entries, spells 
of unemployment, and late access to secure jobs are common among the younger 
generation. When we examine the older age class, it seems that, on one hand, its 
poorly trained fraction is clearly more in danger of becoming irreversibly excluded. 
On the other hand, older people are also well represented among the cluster of stable 
and secure trajectories. Either because they are towards the end of a long career and 
have achieved positions that are more secure or because they have never gone in 
their younger years through turbulent phases they seem to feel more confidence 
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Chapter 10
The Impact of Modernization and Labor 
Market Conditions on the School-to-Work 
Transition in Switzerland: A Dynamic 
Analysis of the Period from 1946 to 2002
Christoph Zangger, David Glauser, and Rolf Becker
 Introduction
The transition from the education system into the labor market is a significant and 
sensitive phase in the life course of young generations given the long-term conse-
quences of work history and impact on future opportunities (Blossfeld 1985, 1987; 
DiPrete et al. 2001). It is undisputed that the school-to-work transition depends on 
individual resources, such as social background and attained educational qualifica-
tion (Buchmann and Sacchi 1998; Jann and Combet 2012; R. Becker and Zangger 
2013) and on the structure and organization of the education and the employment 
system as well as their institutional linkage (Allmendinger 1989; Kerckhoff 1995; 
Shavit and Müller 2000; Wolbers 2007). In addition, opportunities to attain specific 
educational credentials and returns to investments in education at the beginning of 
the occupational career vary over time (e.g., Blau and Duncan 1967). They affect 
the patterns of labor market entry and the status attainment in the course of people’s 
occupational career, and indicate the openness of the class structure across birth 
cohorts (Blossfeld 1987; Sørensen 1986; Shavit and Müller 1998). However, this 
time dependency of these trajectories has often been neglected in previous empirical 
research. Therefore, there is limited information on the probability and process 
through which individuals accept profitable employment and the social status they 
achieve when they enter the labor market. In addition, it is important to understand 
how these factors are related to (1) the long-term social changes with respect to 
modernization (e.g., educational expansion, tertiarization of professions and 
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industries, and increasing social welfare), (2) the economic business cycles in the 
post-war period (e.g., boom periods, recessions resulting from oil price shocks, dot- 
com and real estate bubbles, financial and bank crises), and (3) the fluctuating state 
of the labor market (e.g., decrease in full time employment, increasing youth 
unemployment).
In this chapter, the transition of different birth cohorts into the labor market is 
reconstructed as a dynamic process that is time-dependent on the (a) transition 
duration from the education system to the first job (age or life-cycle effect), (b) 
period-specific changes of labor market conditions, the level of modernity in the 
economy, and the social structure after completing education (period effect), and (c) 
the economic and social conditions at the time of achieving educational qualifica-
tions (cohort effect). The age-period-cohort (APC) analysis aims to answer the fol-
lowing questions with respect to Switzerland in the period from 1946 to 2002: (1) 
What is the role of the modernization trend and economic business cycles in deter-
mining the speed of transition and the likelihood of attaining a prestigious job? (2) 
Are there still direct effects of social background and educational qualification 
across cohorts on the likelihood of graduates starting their career and achieving 
status in their first jobs if the modernization trend and economic business cycle are 
taken into account? (3) Despite the increasing uncertainty due to globalization and 
labor market competition, are the institutional arrangements of the education sys-
tem and its linkage to the labor markets effective in providing “safety roads” for 
young professionals to start their career?
The remainder of this contribution is organized as follows. In the next section, 
the theoretical background is briefly outlined. Subsequently, the data, operational-
ization of the variables, methodological design, and statistical procedure are pre-
sented. The empirical results are discussed in the fourth section and the findings are 
summarized in the final concluding section.
 Theoretical Background and Hypotheses
Following Shavit and Müller (2000), the organizational structure of the education 
system and labor markets as well as their institutional linkages affect the extent to 
which a “safety net” for socially disadvantaged adolescents and a “safety road” for 
graduates to their first job is provided (Imdorf and Hupka-Brunner 2015; Buchs 
et al. 2015). Additionally, the attained educational qualification (in terms of creden-
tials) and social background of adolescents (in terms of socio-economic status of 
parental home) are important factors in the transition from school to work (Müller 
and Kogan 2010). According to the human capital approach (G. S. Becker 1964), 
investment in education is a necessary precondition for access to privileged 
positions in the labor market. Furthermore, the signal theory emphasizes that labor 
market access depends on attained certificates that signal the productivity of young 
professionals. Both these theoretical approaches are consistent with the assump-
tions of the labor queue model (Thurow 1975): the better people are educated, the 
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better their position in front of the entry ports of firms and therefore the higher their 
chances to get hired in favorable positions.
In the course of the educational expansion, the tertiarization of professions and 
industries, and the upgrading of successive birth cohorts (Oesch and Rodríguez 
Menés 2010; Oesch 2013), the attained (vocationally or academically oriented) 
education has become increasingly important in securing the first job. This is 
because the supply of well-trained graduates has increased. In this respect, social 
background and familial social networks might have also become increasingly 
important for occupational beginners (Franzen and Hangartner 2005; Kramarz and 
Skans 2014). However, it has to be kept in mind that the institutional interpretation 
by employers of graduates’ credentials, productivity, and desirable qualities depends 
on macro processes, such as modernization and economic business cycles (Gangl 
2002). Crowding-out processes in the school-to-work transition might intensify 
because of tertiarization and increase in qualification requirements of jobs in the 
service and administrative areas. Consequently, younger school-leaver cohorts, who 
benefited from the educational expansion (R. Becker and Zangger 2013; Zangger 
and Becker 2016), are in a more advantageous position at the start of their career 
compared to older school-leaver cohorts. The percentage of persons who have com-
pleted at most compulsory education level has declined across birth cohorts and is 
remarkably low for the youngest cohorts. In addition, the Swiss case is character-
ized by a rather smooth school-to-work transition (OECD 2015): The majority of 
adolescents who have completed upper secondary education gain access to perma-
nent, secure, and suitable jobs within a short timeframe (Buchs et al. 2015; de Lange 
et al. 2013).
If the dynamics of the entry process in the labor market are considered in context 
of the timing and speed of transition and the macro-level situation during this time 
period, then the process of modernization and the fluctuations of economic cycles 
will affect labor markets and therefore the school-to-work transition and returns to 
education in the early phase of employment (Raaum and Røed 2006; Gangl 2002). 
Presumably, under better economic conditions, the opportunities to enter the labor 
market immediately after graduation and attain employment in a high-level position 
will improve (cohort effect). In addition, better economic conditions will lead to a 
smooth transition into the labor market after leaving the education system (period 
effect). However, the insider-outsider approach (Lindbeck et al. 1988) provides an 
additional perspective: If there is a decline in the economy, the situation of recent 
graduates will become more challenging as they will have to compete against groups 
that are already employed. Under these conditions, the competition between school- 
leavers will intensify. Graduates with vocational and academic training increasingly 
displace the less educated people in the labor market. Furthermore, if the economic 
recession lasts longer, then the competition among school-leavers that have attained 
vocational education and training will increase. In contrast, people who have 
attained a higher education may continue their education, thus, gaining a foothold 
in the labor market for the future.
Finally, the linear trend of modernization in Switzerland – the combination of 
educational expansion, size of the labor force, changes in the occupational  structures 
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during tertiarization, and increases in qualification requirements – is associated with 
substantial differences in the patterns of the school-to-work transition between 
cohorts. On one hand, it is assumed that higher levels of modernity at the time of 
graduation and training increases the graduates’ chances of being hired in a high-
level position (cohort effect). On the other hand, continuous modernization during 
the job search will result in more favorable outcomes (period effect).
In sum, we expect that the school-to-work transition is influenced by age, period, 
and cohort effects. The age effect will be observed when a long-lasting job search 
worsens the labor market outcomes of school-leavers in terms of lower employment 
opportunities and lower chances of being hired in a high-status position (Gebel 
2009). Period effects will be observed with the increasing level of modernity and 
favorable labor market conditions during the job search that will smoothen the tran-
sition into the labor market and provide access to prestigious jobs. In addition, and 
due to the higher level of modernity, we assume that younger school-leaver cohorts 
are in a more advantageous position at the start of their career (cohort effect).
 Data, Variables, and Statistical Procedure
In the following section, we present the data, the operationalization of variables, and 
the statistical procedure used to test our research hypotheses.
 Data and Variables
This study uses data from the retrospective biographical calendar collected in 2002 
as part of the Swiss Household Panel (SHP). It allows the identification of respon-
dents’ stages across the life course in terms of education, employment, civil status, 
and housing. Thus, the data are suitable for this study since they allow a time- 
dependent modeling of the transition from education into employment. The partici-
pants include those who left education prior to entering the labor market between 
1946 and 2002, which corresponds to birth cohorts born between 1912 and 1986. 
After excluding missing values, the total sample size consists of 2344 individuals. 
Education is defined as a categorical variable comprising the following educational 
levels: “compulsory schooling,” “vocational education,” “general education,” 
“higher vocational education,” and “university (of applied sciences).” The depen-
dent variable is the respondents’ status in the labor market after leaving education 
and is based on the International Socio-Economic Index (ISEI) scores of the first 
job. However, since not all subjects entered the labor market, this variable was 
divided into categories in order to include those who were not part of the labor 
market and those who were unemployed. This resulted in a categorical variable with 
six values: those not in the labor market, the unemployed, those in the first (lowest), 
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second, third, and fourth (highest) quartile in the status distribution. Since the unem-
ployed category was marginal, it was merged with those who are not in the labor 
market.
Other variables include the respondents’ gender, citizenship as a substitute for 
migration background, and a measure of social background (the highest education 
of the primary income earner at the age of fifteen years, operationalized the same 
way as respondents’ education). Descriptive statistics for all the variables are listed 
in the Appendix. Of main interest, however, are the measures for cohort and period 
effects. In the theoretical section, it was outlined that the changing labor market 
conditions might have an impact on the successful transition of entrants to their first 
job. Therefore, the trend of changes in labor market conditions is an important indi-
cator, and is measured in terms of the unemployment rates (left side in Fig. 10.1). 
Based on the analysis using the historical observation window from 1946 until 
2002, it was observed that the most remarkable changes of labor market conditions 
occurred in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. The unemployment rate at the time of 
graduation is considered as the first cohort effect and the changing unemployment 
rates between graduation and entry into the labor market indicate period effects.
It is suggested that the process of modernization is an additional secular develop-
ment affecting labor market outcomes of graduates. Since modernization is a com-
plex process with different interrelated developments, this process is measured by a 
combination of different indicators, such as educational expansion, tertiarization, 
individual and general welfare, population, and economic dynamics (see Table 10.1). 
In order to prevent an identification problem resulting from highly correlated time 
series, confirmatory factor analysis is used on the fifteen time series (Kolenikov 
2009; Harrington 2009). The factor, modernization, is the result of the main compo-
nent method and orthogonal factor rotation. The factor explains 96 per cent of the 






















Fig. 10.1 Labor market conditions (unemployment rate in %) and modernization (factor scores) 
in Switzerland (Source: Federal Office of Statistics; Historical statistics of Switzerland online)
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period-specific factor scores is shown in Fig. 10.1 (right side) from 1946 to 2015. 
The trend of modernity levels is monotonic and almost linear. The level of  modernity 
at the time of graduation is an indicator of the second cohort effect, while the chang-
ing modernization levels in the period between graduation and entering the first job 
reflects the second period effect.
 Statistical Procedure
The time dependent process of entering the labor market is modeled using survival 
(or event history) models. More specifically, we estimate the propensity of an event 
(labor market entry) in a given time interval (t, t + ∆t] using an exponential pro-
portional hazards model of the form h(ti) = h0(t) exp [Xβ], where X is a n × p matrix 
of covariates and β, a p × 1 column vector of parameters. However, in order to con-
sider the time-varying covariates, namely, cohort and period effects in terms of 
modernization and unemployment after graduation and prior to labor market entry, 
we make use of the well-established procedure of episode splitting (Blossfeld et al. 
2007). As a result, the process of entering the labor market is modeled as a 






Educational spending 0.9824 0.0348 0.8162
No. of students eligible for university 0.9862 0.0273 0.9569
No. of students in universities 0.9944 0.0112 0.9106
No. of PhD 0.9754 0.0486 0.8344
No. of employees 0.9851 0.0295 0.8811
Share of employees in tertiary sector 0.9817 0.0362 0.8099
Labor volume 0.9759 0.0477 0.8859
Index of real income (1939 = 100) 0.9304 0.1344 0.7842
Consumer price index of private  
households
0.9885 0.0299 0.9279
No. of employees in public and  
private banks
0.9653 0.0682 0.8812
Population 0.9747 0.0499 0.8205
Gross domestic product (GDP; 
1990 = 100)
0.9897 0.0204 0.9268
Private consume 0.9931 0.0137 0.8806
Public consume 0.9882 0.0234 0.8793




Source: Federal Office of Statistics; Historical statistics of Switzerland online – own calculation
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stochastic and time-varying function of individual resources (micro level) and as the 
change of the modernization process and labor market conditions of business cycles 
(macro level).
 Results
Before presenting the results of the multivariate analyses, we briefly discuss the 
temporal patterns of educational attainment and labor market entry against the 
background of the educational expansion in Switzerland. In line with previous 
research (R. Becker and Zangger 2013; Zangger and Becker 2016), the respondents 
demonstrate a gradual increase in the level of qualification across birth cohorts in 
the twentieth century–especially women. With regard to the purpose of this study, 
Fig. 10.2 depicts the education of the respondents before their entry into the labor 
market. By comparing this figure to the well documented higher qualification across 
birth cohorts, it is apparent that successive birth cohorts differ less in terms of their 
education when entering the labor market than what would be expected from the 
general trend of an increasing higher qualification as a result of the educational 
expansion in Switzerland (Becker and Zangger 2013; Zangger and Becker 2016). 
This suggests an early labor market entry for younger cohorts since they rarely 
postpone their entry until they complete their highest education. While this pattern 
might be the result of different processes (e.g., high costs of continuing education 
Fig. 10.2 Education prior to labor market entry by birth cohort and sex
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makes it necessary to work alongside), it suggests that we need to introduce a con-
trol for further education in the multivariate analyses.
Turning to the multivariate results, we focus on three different outcomes: (1) The 
propensity of entering the labor market (as opposed to being unemployed/ not being 
part of the labor market), (2) the likelihood of being in the highest, and (3) the likeli-
hood of being in the lowest quartile. Regarding the individual characteristics of 
interest–education of the individual before entering the labor market and that of the 
main income earner at the age of 15  years–the expected results were obtained, 
which is a higher probability of entering the labor market and being in the highest 
quartile of the status distribution with higher levels of educational achievement.1 
Besides this, there is also evidence of the impact of one’s social background, espe-
cially with respect to the propensity of entering the highest and the lowest quartile 
(increasing likelihood of respondents from a higher social status background 
 entering the highest quartile and a decreasing propensity of the same group entering 
the lowest quartile).
Focusing on the parameters of main interest, first, we observe that the probability 
of entering the labor market increases monotonically with the level of modernity at 
the time of graduation. This is the first cohort effect (first three columns of 
Table 10.2). Thus, younger cohorts are more likely to enter the labor market. On the 
other hand, the labor market conditions, in terms of unemployment at that time, do 
not seem to have an effect. Regarding period effects, the opposite result is indicated: 
With the increasing level of modernity in the years after an individual’s graduation, 
its likelihood of entering the labor market seems to decrease (second and third col-
umn). However, this unexpected effect is most likely a methodological artifact. The 
biographical data used in this analysis only allow the identification of years with 
distinct events. About ¾ of all respondents entered the labor market within the first 
year after completing their education; therefore, cohort and period effects overlap in 
these observations. This collinearity is revealed by the stunning increase in both 
effect size and standard error of the cohort effects after controlling the period effects. 
Furthermore, since modernization increases linearly with time, the negative effect 
of modernity levels after entering the labor market might reflect longer search dura-
tion for those who did not directly enter the labor market.2 Finally, further education 
(indicated by the positive effect of the dummy variable “Further education after 
labor market entry”) also seems to increase the likelihood of entering the labor mar-
ket. However, contrary to the impression from the descriptive analysis above, sig-
nificant interaction of the cohort measure (level of modernity) with further education 
1 Additional analyses (available on request) further illustrate the dependence of one’s own educa-
tion prior to entering the labor market on the education and, to a lesser extent, the social status of 
the main income earner at the age of 15 years. This suggests a strong indirect effect of one’s social 
background on respondents’ labor market performance.
2 This interpretation is strengthened by the fact that on controlling for search duration (negative 
impact), the period effect of the level of modernity completely disappears. For the very same rea-
son we do not include search duration in any of the models. Due to the collinearity of search dura-
tion and the aggregated time dependent process of modernization, measured in years, it is therefore 
not possible to model an independent age effect.


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































suggests a decreasing likelihood of entering the labor market for younger cohorts in 
cases where they have pursued further education in later stages in their lives. 
Including additional higher order terms (especially a three-way interaction of the 
cohort measure with education prior entry and further education) shows an increas-
ing likelihood of being employed for higher educated graduates who are pursuing 
further education across time (not reported). Thus, the result in Fig. 10.2 is con-
firmed: Younger cohorts, who subsequently attain higher education, enter into the 
labor market earlier than older cohorts do.
While the evidence presented so far is in line with the hypotheses in the theoreti-
cal section, the results with regard to entering the highest quartile are puzzling. 
There is no evidence to support the linear cohort effect in terms of modernization. 
However, there is a higher likelihood of entering the most favorable labor market 
positions with an increasing unemployment rate in the year of completing educa-
tion: With a one percent increase in the unemployment rate, the likelihood of enter-
ing the highest quartile increases by about 25% (5th and 6th column in Table 10.2). 
However, a closer examination of this effect suggests that it is caused by the group 
of people who graduated between 1992 and 2000. This is by no means surprising 
since Fig. 10.1 suggests low variation in the unemployment rate in the reference 
period–with an exception of the 1990s.3 Thus, it is disputable whether this result 
reflects the effect of the higher unemployment rate in this period or the (dichoto-
mous) difference between younger and older cohorts, which would be in line with 
the hypotheses. However, based on the data, we cannot exclude either of the 
explanations.
Finally, we focus on the third outcome under study, the risk of entering the low-
est quartile in the status distribution. Similar trends are observed as reported earlier 
in the case of entering the labor market. The positive and significant cohort effect of 
modernization, which are again inflated once controlling for subsequent period 
effect due to the mentioned collinearity, suggests an increasing hazard of entering 
the lowest quartile for younger cohorts. Importantly, further examination of the 
negative cohort-further education-interaction does not provide any evidence in line 
with the descriptive evidence presented in Fig. 10.2 when including higher order 
terms. However, the increasing risks for younger cohorts need explanation. The 
analysis only focuses on those entering paid employment; therefore, the increasing 
risk of entering the lowest quartile might barely reflect the increase in number of 
jobs in this segment. This interpretation is supported by the data where we find–
although rather weak–evidence for an increasing share of the lowest quartile seg-
ment across birth cohorts (Table available on request from the authors). However, 
the absence of any significant interaction effect (not reported) of the cohort measure 
and respondents’ education prior to labor market entry rejects a polarization hypoth-
esis: Thus, in our analysis we find no evidence for an increasing risk over time of 
entering the lowest quartile for a particular group (e.g., the lower educated).
3 We remind the reader that as the data was collected in 2002; therefore, the high increase in the 
unemployment rate post 2002 does not enter the analysis.
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 Conclusion
This study aimed to analyze the impact of the level of modernity and the labor market 
conditions on the school-to-work transition in Switzerland for the historical period 
from 1946 to 2002. Based on our knowledge, this is the first analysis on the time 
dependency of the labor market entry across cohorts in Switzerland. In addition, we 
addressed the direct effects of social background and educational qualification across 
cohorts on their entry into professional life and whether the institutional arrangement 
of the education system and its linkage to the labor markets will provide “safety 
roads” to employment. In order to address these questions, we used data from the life 
calendar collected in 2002 as part of the Swiss Household Panel, along with adminis-
trative data to control for changing labor market conditions (unemployment rate) and 
constructed a scaling variable that represents the level of modernity. An event-history 
analysis was conducted on the school-to-work transition of a sample of 2344 individu-
als born between 1912 and 1986. The aim was to determine the effect of the level of 
modernity and labor market conditions for different cohorts on: (a) the propensity 
to enter the labor market, (b) the likelihood to be in the highest quartile, and (c) the 
probability of being in the lowest quartile of the status distribution in the first job.
While a strong and consistent link has been observed between educational quali-
fications and labor market outcomes, there was also considerable evidence for a 
continuous and independent effect of respondents’ social background, especially 
with respect to entering the highest or lowest quartile of the status distribution. 
Furthermore, we find support for the suggested positive linear influence of the level 
of modernity at the time of graduation on the likelihood of entering the labor market 
(cohort effect). However, the corresponding cohort effect of the unemployment 
level is not statistically significant in most of the models. This could be due to the 
minor variation in the covered period. On the other hand, the period effects in terms 
of subsequent levels of modernity between graduation and entrance into employ-
ment are of the opposite sign. Instead of describing a true period effect, this result 
most likely reflects the negative impact of a longer search duration as the level of 
modernity is a (almost strictly) positive linear function of the underlying time axis. 
Finally, there is little evidence to support the interaction effects between respon-
dents’ prior education and the cohort measures on any of the outcomes under study. 
Thus, in line with findings of Oesch (2013), there is no evidence for a polarization 
or displacement at the time of transition into the first job within the covered time 
window. Although the empirical results emphasize the effects of persistent social 
inequality on entering the highest or lowest quartile of the status distribution across 
cohorts, the institutional arrangement of the education system and its linkage to the 
labor markets seems to protect the majority from precarious employment condi-
tions. However, these concluding remarks are restricted to the school-to-work tran-
sition. Factors in the professional careers of people such as further occupational 
mobility and access to further education and prestigious jobs have not been consid-
ered in this analysis. Thus, the afore mentioned outcomes need to be considered in 
order to draw conclusions related to the long-term consequences of period and 
cohort effects on people’s life chances.
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Finally, there are several concerns regarding the validity of our results. First, the 
data on events is available in years only; therefore, an accurate identification of the 
period and age effects is not possible. Furthermore, the sample size considerations 
impede the identification of the hazards of unemployment across time. These con-
siderations are particularly problematic in the present case of the labor market entry 
since three-quarters of all cases entered the labor market within the first year after 
graduation.
 Appendix
Variable Observations Mean SD Min. Max.
First job (Dependent variable)
Unemployed/Not working 2344 0.041 0.120 0 1
First (lowest) quartile 2344 0.229 0.420 0 1
Second quartile 2344 0.228 0.420 0 1
Third quartile 2344 0.262 0.440 0 1
Fourth (highest) quartile 2344 0.241 0.428 0 1
Gender 2344 1.529 0.499 1 2
Year of birth 2344 1955.516 12.987 1912 1986
Education prior to labor market entry
Compulsory schooling 2344 0.139 0.346 0 1
(Some) Vocational education 2344 0.587 0.493 0 1
General education 2344 0.084 0.278 0 1
Higher vocational education 2344 0.056 0.230 0 1
University (of appl. Sciences) 2344 0.134 0.341 0 1
Citizenship
Swiss 2344 0.826 0.379 0 1
Northern & Western Europe 2344 0.015 0.121 0 1
South & Southwestern Europe 2344 0.023 0.149 0 1
Central & (South) Eastern Europe 2344 0.026 0.161 0 1
Rest of the world 2344 0.110 0.313 0 1
Social origin (Education)
Compulsory schooling 2344 0.159 0.365 0 1
(Some) Vocational education 2344 0.527 0.499 0 1
General education 2344 0.080 0.271 0 1
Higher vocational education 2344 0.143 0.350 0 1
University (of appl. Sciences) 2344 0.091 0.288 0 1
Education after entering labor market 2344 0.348 0.476 0 1
Modernization (cohort effect) 3834 −0.354 0.663 −1.373 1.071
Labor market (cohort effect) 3834 0.680 1.142 0 5.2
Modernization (period effect) 3834 −0.301 0.661 −1.373 1.071
Labor market (period effect) 3834 0.758 1.245 0 5.2
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Chapter 11
Wealth, Savings and Children Among 
Swiss, German and Australian Families
Laura Ravazzini and Ursina Kuhn
 Introduction
The accumulation of wealth is an important aspect when evaluating the economic 
situation of families. For many years, the lack of wealth information in survey data 
in general, particularly longitudinal data, has restrained the research on this topic. 
Recent demographic changes such as delays in fertility and population ageing, ris-
ing female labour force participation and insecure future retirement pensions make 
the relationship between children and wealth accumulation a particularly relevant 
topic.
The overall effect of children on net worth is ambiguous because children may 
influence parents’ wealth accumulation through different paths. On the one hand, 
parents might save more for their financial protection, in anticipation of future 
income losses, or out of a bequest motive. On the other hand, children might bring 
higher expenses and lower income (e.g., through reduced labour force participation) 
and, therefore, reduce the capacity to save. To the best of our knowledge, the link 
between children and wealth has never been specifically investigated in a compara-
tive perspective. A comparative study using panel data will therefore provide useful 
insights about the ability of families to save in different settings.
In this contribution, we analyse data from the Swiss Household Panel (SHP), the 
German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) and the Australian Household, Income 
and Labour Dynamics (HILDA) Survey. We chose these databases because of 
their panel structure. Germany has been selected as another continental European 
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country, and both Germany and Australia act as references because of previous 
literature on the link between children and wealth in these countries.
Our empirical strategy has the following three aims: first, we establish the effect 
of children on net worth and saving behaviour. Second, we disentangle the effects 
of income changes from consumption changes by controlling for earned income and 
labour supply. Third, we use a comparative perspective to indicate whether results 
are general or country specific.
This chapter is organised as follows. We first provide a brief literature review 
on the theoretical and the empirical relationships between children and wealth. 
We then continue with the description of the data, the sample and the methodology. 
The results are presented separately for short-term effects and long-term effects. 
The conclusion summarises our findings and points to possible further research.
 The Role of Children in Wealth Accumulation
There are different potential effects of children on wealth. Among the motives for 
wealth accumulation (Keynes 1936; Browning and Lusardi 1996), several might be 
reinforced through the presence of children. First, parents might save more to pro-
tect themselves and their children from financial risks. Second, future parents might 
save more before the arrival of a child in anticipation of future income losses (e.g., 
due to reduced labour force participation) or higher expenses. Third, the accumula-
tion of capital necessary to buy houses, cars or other durable goods and finally the 
bequest motive might be more important for fathers and mothers than for childless 
individuals.
The increased incentives for wealth accumulation are paired with income losses 
and higher expenses for children (e.g., for food, accommodation, child-care, educa-
tion or insurances) (Bradbury 2014). This aspect is also considered in the life-cycle 
model of Modigliani and Brumberg (1954), which assumes that people choose to 
maintain stable lifestyles. In its simplest form, people are expected to save during 
their mature active life and to dissave when young and during retirement. An addi-
tion to this theory highlights that the presence of children reduces current savings 
and the future level of accumulated net worth (Modigliani 1986).1 Dockery and 
Bawa (2015) question the expenditure part of this framework and claim that expen-
ditures for children might substitute other expenditures. For example, instead of 
long distance travels to exotic destinations or visits to fancy restaurants, parents 
engage in inexpensive activities such as walks in the park, nights at home or visits 
to close relatives. In addition to this, home production might also increase if activities 
1 “The amount of net worth accumulated up to any given age in relation to life resources is a 
decreasing function of the number of children and that saving tends to fall with the number of 
children present in the household and to rise with the number of children no longer present” 
(Modigliani 1986, pp. 160).
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such as cooking, gardening and do-it-yourself become more frequent. Lower 
expenses in other areas might therefore compensate the additional expenses result-
ing from having children. Furthermore, the impact of children on wealth 
 accumulation also depends on institutional characteristics, such as child allowances, 
availability and costs of child-care, the tax system, special programmes targeting 
children and other programmes of this type (Grinstein-Weiss et al. 2006).
A final point to mention is the potential endogeneity of the relationship between 
fertility and wealth. Debt and financial instability have been shown to delay mar-
riage (Addo 2014) and are therefore likely to delay or cancel the decision to have 
children. We know from Dockery and Bawa (2015) that fertility in Australia is 
inversely related to income, but we do not know its relationship with wealth.
 Previous Findings on the Effect of Children on Wealth 
and Savings
The few studies on the subject focused mainly on Anglo-Saxon countries and show 
a weak negative effect of children on wealth. Scholz and Seshadri (2009) found that 
each additional child reduces the average net wealth of US-American families by 
$6384. In Australia, a recent study estimated that each dependent child reduces 
couples’ wealth by approximately $2000 per year (Dockery and Bawa 2015). 
Contrary to this, the presence of children benefits savings in the long-run. A simula-
tion study by Love (2010) using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics in the USA 
indicates that households with children accumulate substantially less wealth during 
the working years, but, probably out of a bequest motive, save more during retire-
ment and end with more savings than households that have never had children. The 
effects might be different for some family types, particularly for single parents 
(Austen et  al. 2014). Controlling for other factors, the results from Switzerland 
indicate that single mothers have 17,890 CHF less in non-housing wealth than 
childless single women (Ravazzini and Chesters 2018). This difference is large, but 
single mothers are not representative of the overall population and constitute a par-
ticularly disadvantaged and vulnerable group (Grinstein-Weiss et  al. 2008). In 
Germany, having children under five years old was found to have a negative, but 
insignificant, impact on net worth (Sierminska et al. 2010). A recent study found 
that parenthood is associated with lower wealth accumulation for women but not for 
men. This effect can be explained by discontinuous employment experiences 
(Lersch et al. 2017). Additionally, for Germany, Rottke and Klos (2016) found that 
overall household consumption drops after a child moves out of the household, but 
at the same time, adult-equivalent consumption significantly increases. After all 
children are gone, parents are found to upgrade their personal lifestyle to a level 
approximately equal to childless peers and save only a small proportion of their 
resources. Therefore, the saving behaviour in Germany seems quite different from 
that in America, where savings increase when children leave the households.
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 Data and Sample
Our analysis is based on three Household Panels of the Cross National Equivalent 
File (CNEF), namely, the Swiss Household Panel (SHP), the German Socio- 
Economic Panel (SOEP) and the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics Survey 
in Australia (HILDA). The main advantage of these databases is that they provide a 
longitudinal perspective following the same households over time. A disadvantage 
for an analysis on wealth with survey data is that people at the top – and in some 
cases at the bottom – of the distribution are underrepresented. To at least partially 
correct for this problem, the SOEP oversamples high-income households by includ-
ing a high-income sample since 2002. In the HILDA, wealth variables are top-coded 
using an average value for all the cases that exceed a given threshold. We decide not 
to top-code wealth in the SHP and in the SOEP because this would present a loss of 
information.
There are some important differences between surveys regarding the main vari-
ables of interest. The HILDA and the SHP collect wealth at the household level, 
whereas household wealth in the SOEP is aggregated from information at the indi-
vidual level. In contrast to the HILDA and the SOEP, which contain detailed infor-
mation on different assets,2 the SHP provides only basic information about wealth 
and does not include negative wealth. More specifically, the SHP distinguishes only 
between family home wealth and other wealth. In terms of frequency of data collec-
tion, the Australian panel offers wealth information for four time points (2002, 
2006, 2010 and 2014) and the German panel for three (2002, 2007 and 2012). 
Currently, a longitudinal analysis on wealth is not possible with the SHP because 
information about wealth has been collected only in 2012. More information about 
the quality of the wealth variables in the Swiss panel can be found in Kuhn and 
Crettaz (2015).
Our analytic sample consists of single adult and couple households with and 
without children. Other household types have been excluded because, with the 
exception of the SOEP, we do not know how income and wealth are pooled inside 
the household.
In addition to wealth variables, the three panel surveys collect information on 
saving behaviour. The SHP contains a yearly categorical variable at the household 
level (household can save, household spends what it earns, households eats into 
wealth, household goes into debt). A similar variable is present in the HILDA in 9 
waves of 14, but the question is asked at the individual level. We therefore consider 
the information given by the main earner of each couple but also comment on 
findings including the partner’s saving behaviours. In two waves, the HILDA addi-
tionally provides the reasons why people save. Among these reasons,3 there are two 
2 The HILDA is the only panel that includes complete information about pension savings from 
employer’s pension plans.
3 People can choose between 16 well-defined reasons plus one undefined reason. Multiple answers 
are allowed.
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specific answers on descendants (Education for children or grandchildren, To help 
children or other relatives) and three possible answers about home-related expendi-
tures (Pay off mortgage on home, To buy a home (other than present one), Home 
improvements / extensions / repairs), which might still be related to children’s 
needs. The SOEP contains a yearly variable with the amount that households can 
save for wealth creation and for precautionary savings.
 Methodology
Our empirical analysis focuses on the following two dependent variables: the prob-
ability to save and net worth. For the first model, we compare households that are 
saving with those that are not saving. Because a binary variable has been observed 
in (almost) all panel waves, we can exploit the variance within households over time 
with a fixed effects (FE) regression. The main advantage of this method is that it 
excludes any unobserved heterogeneity bias. Even though we have a dichotomous 
dependent variable, we estimate a linear probability model.4 As main independent 
variables, we include the number of dependent children living in the household by 
age groups (0–4 years, 5–9 years, 10–14 years or 15–24 years). Children older than 
15 years are considered as dependent if they are in education and do not work full- 
time. In addition, we include a binary variable for planning/wanting a child to test 
whether anticipating a child increases motivation for saving. This variable has not 
been collected in the German SOEP, however. To test the mediating effect of income 
on savings, we include household income (yearly earnings adjusted to household 
size)5 and working hours (mean working hours for couples). We control for the 
following variables that have been revealed to be important in previous studies 
(Finke and Pierce 2006; Pericoli and Ventura 2011; Vespa and Painter II 2011): age 
and its squared term (of the household head), civil status, years of cohabitation of 
the couples and home ownership. Despite its possible endogeneity, we also include 
an indicator about home ownership because repayment of a mortgage might not 
be considered as savings and because home ownership might increase the money 
available for non-housing consumption.
4 For the following reasons, logistic FE models (conditional logistic models) are not a good option 
for our research design: First, logistic FE models exclude households with a stable saving behav-
iour (those that always save or never save). Second, it is not possible to compute effect sizes in 
terms of marginal effects or predicted probabilities. Third, coefficients cannot be compared across 
models. This last point is crucial for our analysis because we want to compare different model 
specifications and countries. Nevertheless, we have also estimated FE logistic models as a sensitiv-
ity analysis and find consistent conclusions.
5 Following the modified OECD equivalence scale, we divide the income of a couple’s household 
by 1.5. We do not correct for the number of children, as this effect should be captured by our spe-
cific variables about the number of children. Income has been corrected for inflation using the 
consumer price indexes.
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The main advantage of the FE models is that they capture the causal effect of 
dependent children on the probability to save. As these models have two important 
limitations, we complement the analysis with an OLS regression on net worth. First, 
FE models can only analyse changes that occur within the duration of the panel 
(e.g., maximal until children are 25 in the SOEP). Accordingly, FE models measure 
the impact of having dependent children in the household compared to the situation 
of no dependent children in the household. Second, the dependent variable indicates 
the presence of savings but not the amount saved (this information is available only 
for Germany). The OLS regression can capture long-term effects of children (once 
children left the household) on wealth accumulation and will reveal the size of the 
effect. Net worth is defined as the sum of all assets minus the level of accumulated 
debts. For couples, we split the amount of household wealth in half. As each country 
is analysed separately, we use national currencies and adjust for inflation. As a 
method of analysis, we use (pooled) linear regressions.6 To address individuals 
without wealth or debts and to limit the influence of extremely high values, we 
apply an inverse hyperbolic sine transformation (hereafter IHS) on total net worth 
(see Friedline et al. 2015 for details). Because we are interested in the effect of chil-
dren on wealth accumulation in the long term, we need to consider children irre-
spective of their age and of whether they live in the household. Following Dockery 
and Bawa (2015), we compute a variable that we call child-years. This variable 
multiplies the number of children by their age with a maximum of 18 years per 
child. Lacking more precise information, the maximum of 18 is set as the average 
age for independency. This maximum considers that children pursuing professional 
training might become independent before and that children enrolled in university 
might finish their education later. As in the FE model, we estimate a separate model 
controlling for income and labour supply. Income refers here to permanent house-
hold income, which we define as the average of all available previous earnings and 
pensions. In addition to the variables included in the FE model (age, civil status, 
years of cohabitation and home ownership), we control for variables’ stable charac-
teristics. The educational level (three levels with the highest educational level of the 
couple) is included as a proxy for wiser choices in saving and investing behaviours. 
Living in a city centre is included because it might imply not only higher living 
costs but also higher property values. We also take into account the number of sib-
lings (in Switzerland the presence of siblings) and a measure for parental socio- 
economic status to capture possible effects of inheritances on the accumulation of 
wealth over the life-course. Other control variables are country specific. In Australia, 
we include a binary variable for the English mother tongue because non-native 
speakers find difficulties in terms of integration, whereas we identify foreign-born 
individuals in Switzerland and in Germany. In Switzerland, we include a variable 
for the linguistic region, and in Germany we distinguish the Western from the 
Eastern part. For age, nationality, siblings and parental socio-economic status of 
couple households, we consider the information provided by the main earner.
6 We cannot exploit the panel character with the SHP, as we currently have only one wave of data 
on wealth.
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When comparing models of different countries and different surveys, we have to 
pay attention to different sample sizes and differences in the definition of the vari-
ables. We commented on these differences whenever necessary.
 The Short-Term Effect of Children on Savings
Using FE models, we first address the probability to save. The first model in 
Table 11.1 (M1 for Switzerland, M3 for Australia and M5 for Germany) shows that 
households are less likely to save when they have children in the household. A first 
general finding is that children older than ten years have a weaker effect on saving 
propensity than younger children. In Switzerland and Germany, pre-school children 
(between 0 and 4 years) have, with 5.7% and 2.2%, the strongest negative effect on 
savings, whereas in Australia, children from 5 to 9 years of age reduce the probabil-
ity to save most strongly (by 1.8 percent). To test whether lower income or higher 
consumption are responsible for the lower saving propensity, models M2, M4 and 
M6 in Table 11.1 control for the mediating effects of income and working hours. In 
Switzerland, the coefficients for children in the household become only slightly 
weaker (M2 compared to M1), which means that income and labour supply explain 
only a small part of the negative effect of small children. Rather, high expenses for 
children, and most likely high childcare costs, are responsible for the lower saving 
probability.7 The same holds for 5- to 9-year-old children in Australia. In Germany, 
the entire negative effect of pre-school children disappears once we control for 
income and working hours (M6). This means that households with small children 
can save less because labour and income drops after childbirth.8 A second general 
finding is that expenditures reduce saving propensity considerably for children 
between 15 and 24 years old. After controlling for income and labour supply, older 
children reduce the probability to save by 3.5% in Switzerland, by 1.2% in Germany 
and by 1.9% in Australia.9 This result is in line with previous findings on consump-
tion for children in other countries (Bonke and Browning 2011). As a cautionary 
note, we must say that we might underestimate the negative effect of children on 
7 According to the OECD Family Database, childcare fees amount to 67.3% of the average wage. 
This is the highest proportion among 36 OECD countries. For middle-class double earners, this 
corresponds to 23.6% of their net income.
8 Results for Australia become slightly weaker when the saving behaviour of the partner, if present, 
is included. Without mediating effects (M3), the only significant coefficients results are for depen-
dent children 15–24 years old (−0.10*). Once income and labour supply are excluded (M4), two 
of the three significant coefficients remain, namely, the positive effect of small children (0.011*) 
and the negative effect of older children (−0.013**). The effect for children between 5 and 14 years 
old becomes insignificant.
9 In Germany, it is possible to estimate the amount saved. Children between 15 and 24 lower sav-
ings by 21 euro per month. Interestingly, younger dependent children also make parents save less 
money (between 12 and 14.5 euro per month).
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savings because we consider only the effect of children living in the household and 
neglect the effects on parents who do not live with their children.
The models in Table 11.1 test also whether planning to have a child increases the 
probability to save. This hypothesis is supported in Australia, where planning to 
have a child increases the probability to save by 4.9%. An additional analysis on 
Australians who save in 2002 and in 2006 (the only waves with information about 
Table 11.1 FE regression on the probability to save
CH CH AUS AUS D D
(M1) (M2) (M3) (M4) (M5) (M6)
Children aged 0–4 years −0.057** −0.041** −0.005 0.014* −0.022** 0.007*
(−8.43) (−6.06) (−1.13) (2.94) (−6.68) (2.03)
Children aged 5–9 years −0.049** −0.039** −0.018** −0.009* −0.005 0.005
(−8.51) (−6.73) (−3.75) (−1.97) (−1.74) (1.76)
Children aged 10–14 years −0.038** −0.031** −0.011* −0.007 −0.001 0.002
(−7.03) (−5.69) (−2.51) (−1.63) (−0.50) (0.93)
Children aged 15–24 years −0.034** −0.035** −0.015** −0.020** −0.006** −0.012**
(−7.78) (−8.15) (−2.85) (−3.68) (−2.91) (−5.94)
Yearly earnings/pension 0.000** 0.032** 0.002**
(8.90) (5.37) (32.85)
Weekly working hours 0.004** 0.004** 0.000**
(17.04) (23.30) (37.75)
Planning to have a child 0.012 0.018 0.048** 0.048**
(1.26) (1.95) (7.00) (7.11)
Age 0.000 −0.001 0.004** 0.005** −0.001** 0.001**
(−0.24) (−1.49) (7.95) (9.96) (−7.52) (5.25)
Years of cohabitation −0.000 −0.000 0.023* 0.020* 0.015** 0.015**
(−1.81) (−2.10) (2.50) (2.25) (3.00) (3.04)
Single (ref.)
Married 0.038* 0.036* −0.012 −0.001 0.100** 0.074**
(2.16) (1.97) (−1.21) (−0.12) (14.21) (10.62)
Unmarried couple 0.056** 0.069** 0.053** 0.059** 0.105** 0.092**
(4.53) (5.31) (4.79) (5.40) (16.61) (14.65)
Separated/divorced −0.026 −0.038 −0.030* −0.029* 0.046** 0.021*
(−1.31) (−1.87) (−2.38) (−2.35) (5.36) (2.47)
Widowed 0.044 0.096** −0.038 −0.027 0.061** 0.042**
(1.69) (3.63) (−2.45) (−1.76) (5.60) (3.84)
Ownership 0.006 −0.005 −0.005 −0.003 −0.029** −0.040**
(0.70) (−0.59) (−0.93) (−0.65) (−7.41) (−10.34)
Number of observations 63,022 63,022 66,969 66,969 223,465 223,465
Number of households 12,246 12,246 18,202 18,202 28,801 28,801
Sources: SHP 1999–2014, HILDA 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, SOEP 
1992–2014
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. Notes: T-stats in parenthesis. Information on the intention to have a child 
is not available for Germany. Children refer to dependent children
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the reasons for saving) shows that 13% of them declare to save for their children and 
28% for home-related expenditures. In Switzerland, planning to have a child has no 
significant impact on the saving propensity. The coefficient is close to statistical 
significance, but the effect, even when significant, would be very small.
More generally, the FE analysis on saving behaviour confirms the life-cycle 
hypothesis. Children slow wealth accumulation because of both lower income and 
higher expenditures. We are confident that we measured a causal effect because 
these models analysed only the variation within households over time and not the 
variation between different household types.10
 The Long-Term Effect of Children on Net Worth
So far, the analysis was based on children living in the household and was not aimed 
at establishing the long-term effects that children have on wealth. We now look at 
net worth to estimate the magnitude of the coefficients in real economic terms and 
use the variable child-years to capture long-term effects.
Figure 11.1 gives an overview of wealth accumulation over the life course in the 
three countries and shows average net worth by the age of the household head. Note 
that absolute wealth levels cannot be compared directly because wealth is measured 
in national currency. In Australia, the accumulation of wealth is almost linear before 
65 years of age, and dissaving starts after retirement.11 In Germany, dissaving after 
retirement is much less pronounced. The analysis with Swiss data shows no dissav-
ing directly after retirement, but only later in life. This finding is in line with Moser 
(2006), who analysed wealth levels by age groups using tax records from the canton 
of Zurich.
Because this descriptive figure does not distinguish the accumulation of wealth 
for parents and households without children, we now move to the results of the 
regression models shown in Table 11.2. In all countries, parents are less wealthy 
than childless individuals, although the effect is weak.12 In Switzerland, one child- 
year reduces net worth by 377 CHF, which amounts to 6714 CHF per child in the 
long term. This estimation increases slightly (374 per child year) when permanent 
income and years in paid work are included. Higher expenditures rather than dura-
ble income losses explain therefore why parents in Switzerland have lower wealth 
than childless households. In Australia, children have a slightly stronger negative 
10 Logistic FE models give very similar results in terms of the significance and the direction of the 
effect.
11 Including superannuation (2nd and 3rd pillar for retirees and for the active population) to the 
Australian wealth measure does not change the Australian curve.
12 In Australia and in Germany, the effects remain significant but become smaller (−0.05  in 
Germany (M5 and M6) and − 0.10 (M3) and − 0.09 (M4) in Australia) if we apply a bottom-code 
for negative net worth, and we recode negative values to zero as in Switzerland. This means that 
the wealth loss associated to children in Switzerland might be underestimated because of censor-
ing of negative values of net worth.
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impact on net worth (859  AU$ per child-year, 15,462  AU$ for children up to 
18 years old). Lost years in paid employment or permanent income losses explain a 
small part of this effect (118 AU$ per child-year explain 14% of the total negative 
impact of children on net worth). In Germany, children have an almost negligible 
impact on the total amount of accumulated wealth (34 EUR per child-year and 619 
EUR for children up to 18  years old). This effect is not affected by permanent 
income or years in paid work. These differences between countries might be gener-
ated by institutional contexts or by saving behaviours.
We briefly comment on an additional test that we do not report in tables because 
of limits of space. When we constrain the analysis of Table 11.2 to retirees, wealth 
differences between parents and childless households disappear in Switzerland and 
decrease in Germany and in Australia (−0.005**). A possible explanation for this 
interesting finding would be that individuals in retirement spend less than childless 
individuals probably out of a bequest motive.
We also tested whether wealthier individuals are more likely to have children. In 
Switzerland and in Australia, neither home-ownership nor wealth is significant in 
simple fertility models. This leads us to conclude that a selection bias is very 
unlikely in these two countries. In Germany, however, richer parents seem to have 
more children. This endogeneity constitutes a bias that might underestimate the 
importance of children on wealth in the OLS regression, but not in the FE model, 
which takes into account only the variation within households over time.
Fig. 11.1 Wealth over the life-cycle in Australia, Germany and Switzerland (Sources: SHP 2012, 
HILDA 2006, 2010, 2014, SOEP 2002, 2007, 2012. Note: Local currencies represent 2011 
AUS$000 s, 2012 CHF000s and 2011 EUR000s. Wealth of couple households has been divided by 
2. Weighted data)
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Table 11.2 OLS regression with IHS transformation on net worth
CH CH AUS AUS D D
(M1) (M2) (M3) (M4) (M5) (M6)
Total child-years −0.012** −0.013** −0.013** −0.011** −0.007** −0.007**
(−3.47) (−3.72) (−11.77) (−10.66) (−4.92) (−4.87)
Permanent income 0.000** 0.018** 0.027**
(5.49) (23.63) (8.11)
Years in paid work 0.000 0.026** 0.033**
(0.05) (10.34) (7.42)
Owner 4.507** 4.418** 3.919** 3.639** 5.786** 5.550**
(33.80) (33.99) (57.04) (55.29) (68.06) (64.22)
Age 0.043 0.042 0.241** 0.172** 0.149** 0.014
(1.63) (1.45) (22.06) (14.06) (9.27) (0.75)
Age squared −0.000 −0.000 −0.002** −0.001** −0.001** 0.000
(0.39) (−0.22) (−17.97) (−10.92) (−6.48) (1.57)
Single (ref.)
Married couple −0.681** −0.990** 0.758** 0.622** 0.316* 0.243
(−3.01) (−4.26) (12.50) (6.62) (2.21) (1.70)
Unmarried couple −0.134 −0.405* 0.541** 0.520** 0.707** 0.663**
(0.58) (−1.71) (7.15) (3.70) (3.98) (3.74)
Separated/divorced −1.056** −1.025** 0.493** 0.447** −1.511** −1.476**
(−4.55) (−4.43) (4.25) (4.01) (−7.91) (−7.87)
Widowed 0.221 0.206 0.850** 0.927** 0.149 0.233**
(0.76) (0.71) (5.15) (7.69) (0.38) (1.37)
Years of cohabitation 0.015 0.016 −0.315 −0.377* 0.010* 0.013**
(1.88) (1.93) (−1.84) (−2.15) (2.36) (3.31)
Lower secondary (ref.)
Upper secondary 1.209** 1.182** 0.527** 0.408** 1.626** 1.447**
(5.98) (5.86) (8.17) (6.37) (11.98) (10.79)
Tertiary 2.040** 1.905** 0.499** 0.056 3.014** 2.510**
(9.18) (8.55) (6.30) (0.68) (20.41) (16.41)
Living in an urban centre −0.067 −0.077 0.071 −0.094 0.205* 0.112
(−0.51) (−0.59) (1.34) (−1.78) (2.46) (1.34)
(Number of) siblings −0.092 −0.022 0.024 0.003 −0.278** −0.155
(−0.60) (−0.14) (0.40) (0.05) (−2.51) (−1.41)
Parental socio-eco status 0.371* 0.315* 0.117** 0.026 0.134** 0.091*
(2.34) (1.98) (3.50) (0.75) (3.53) (2.37)
Foreign born −0.621** −0.637** −1.475** −1.350**
(−4.81) (−4.95) (−10.54) (−9.78)
Native English speaker 0.422** 0.178*
(5.33) (2.20)
French linguistic region −0.599** −0.601**
(−4.38) (−4.39)
(continued)
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 Conclusions
This study has illustrated how children affect the probability to save and accumulate 
wealth. The analysis has been run on Swiss, Australian and German panel data 
using the longest possible time span. Although the selected countries differ in sev-
eral aspects, this analysis has brought to light some similarities. Dependent children 
older than 15 are the most expensive and make savings more difficult in all contexts. 
Pre-school children in Switzerland, who are even more costly than older children, 
present an exception that is most likely due to high costs for child care. Moreover, 
small children considerably reduce the propensity to save in Germany and in 
Switzerland because women tend to drastically reduce their labour supply and, 
therefore, their income after the arrival of children. The effect of young children on 
saving is rather small in Australia.
Over the entire life course, the effects of children on wealth and savings show a 
brighter picture. The accumulated level of net worth is hardly compromised by child 
rearing. Each child reduces wealth by 6714 CHF in Switzerland, 15,462 AU$ in 
Australia and 619 EUR in Germany. When we look at the wealth of retirees, the 
effect wanes or even disappears. This suggests the importance of the bequest motive 
for wealth accumulation. Therefore, in the long term, children do not seem to be a 
major financial risk.
The analysis has also highlighted some interesting differences between coun-
tries, which merit further investigation. Parents in Germany do not seem to have 
considerably lower wealth than childless individuals. This could be due to either 
endogeneity (wealthy individuals tend to have more children), to small costs associ-
ated with children (subsidised childcare and public schools) or to particularly thrifty 
lifestyles. Higher costs of children in terms of wealth accumulation in Switzerland 
and in Australia could be explained with a more contained family policy. Frequent 
private schooling and high costs for university in Australia might be an element 
that hinders positive savings of parents in this country. More generally, the role of 
Table 11.2 (continued)
CH CH AUS AUS D D
(M1) (M2) (M3) (M4) (M5) (M6)
Italian linguistic region 0.564* 0.638*
(2.24) (2.54)
Eastern Germany −0.714** −0.575**
(−7.21) (−5.58)
Number of observations 3907 3907 30,092 30,092 33,117 33,117
R2 0.322 0.327 0.269 0.287 0.301 0.314
Sources: SHP 2012, HILDA 2006, 2010, 2014, SOEP 2002, 2007, 2012. Notes: T-stats in paren-
thesis. Standard errors in Australia and in Germany are adjusted for clustering
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. † Foreign born means non-native English speaker in Australia
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institutions and legislations deserves a closer look. Other interesting aspects for 
future studies are the distinction between the ability to save and the willingness to 
save and the longitudinal dynamics of net worth. This last analysis will be possible 
when more waves of data of the SHP become available.
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Although wealth is a central dimension of social inequalities, scientific attention to 
wealth inequality is relatively recent (e.g., OECD 2015). Several studies have 
pointed out that wealth inequality is particularly high in countries with low home-
ownership rates (Kaas et al. 2015; Mathä et al. 2014).
In this contribution, we focus on homeownership and wealth in Switzerland and 
Germany, which show the lowest proportion of owner-occupiers in Europe with 
about 40% and 50% of households, respectively. Other European countries have 
ownership rates of more than 90%, for example, in Romania, Lithuania or Hungary 
(Eurostat 2015). Nevertheless, real estate represents the most important wealth 
component, even in Switzerland and Germany (Grabka 2014; Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office 2014).
Homeownership is not only related to wealth inequality but also to average net 
worth. There are different explanations for the relationship between homeowner-
ship and wealth. First of all, only relatively wealthy households might be able to 
purchase their own home. Because real estate is typically the most valuable asset 
category, low ownership rates translate into low values for net wealth at the indi-
vidual and the country level (Kaas et  al. 2015). Secondly, house ownership has 
shown to have a positive effect on saving behaviour (e.g., Di et al. 2007) and thus 
contributes to higher wealth levels and lower wealth inequality. The forced repay-
ments of mortgages are an important driver for regular savings. Thirdly, lower 
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wealth inequality may result from rising values of real estate. Usually, investment in 
property yields higher returns than the money in bank accounts. Fourth, property 
wealth enables an owner to borrow on a mortgage to finance, e.g., a formation of an 
enterprise or other economic activities, which will pay off later. Having said that, 
fifth, one can also argue that wealth levels and wealth inequality depend on the 
extent of the social security system, particularly for old age and health. The neces-
sity for private wealth accumulation tends to be smaller in countries with a compre-
hensive social security system, as is the case in Germany and Switzerland. 
Compulsory levies impair wealth accumulation and the investment in housing and 
leave a large part of the population with a small net worth.
Some of these mechanisms present a causal effect of homeownership on wealth 
accumulation. Owning a home provides financial security and produces (additional) 
wealth. This implies that wealth inequality could be lowered by encouraging home-
ownership. However, there have been doubts on the financial and social benefits of 
owning for low-income households (Shlay 2006). The housing burst in several 
countries (e.g., US, Spain or Ireland), and the numerous foreclosures in particular, 
have raised awareness about the risks of homeownership. Homeownership is par-
ticularly risky for low-income households that finance their property with a high 
level of debt. In a financial crisis, market values decline, while the debt remains 
unchanged, thus leading to indebtedness. For example, in the US, the median net 
worth dropped by 44% between 2007 and 2010, and the share of owner-occupiers 
shrank by nine percentage points (Wolff 2016). In sum, it is controversial whether 
facilitating access to property to households with little wealth is a means to fight 
social inequalities.
 Homeownership in Switzerland and Germany
Switzerland’s ownership rate is low from a comparative perspective but has 
increased in the last decades from 31% in 1990 to 37% of all households in 2010. 
This increase is somewhat surprising considering that owning has become more 
expensive relative to both renting and to the average income (OECD.Stat 2016). 
Since 2000, prices for private real estate have risen by 159%. The high prices due to 
the scarcity of land and high construction quality standards present the most fre-
quently mentioned reason for the low ownership rate. Other explanations are a well- 
functioning rental market with protection for renters (restrictions on rent increases 
and eviction), a restrictive mortgage system and high down-payment requirements.1 
There is a wide variation in ownership rates within Switzerland, with low ownership 
in urban areas and ownership rates over 50% in rural areas.
1 Requirements are an amortisation over 15 years to 65% of the house value, annual costs of own-
ing a house must not exceed 33% of the gross household income and there is a minimum of 20% 
deposit for the purchase (second and third pillar assets can be used for this) and a ca. of 4% for 
close costs.
U. Kuhn and M. Grabka
177
The legislation that is relevant for ownership varies strongly between cantons 
and municipalities, but there is no general political promotion of homeownership 
(Thalmann 1999). Despite different taxes for homeowners (wealth tax, income tax 
on imputed rents, transfer taxes, property taxes), owners have a small tax advantage 
over renters (Bourassa and Hoesli 2008).2 However, also taxes vary strongly among 
cantons and municipalities.
In Germany, the share of owner-occupiers was 46% in 2010 (Statistisches 
Bundesamt 2013). However, there are significant differences between East and West 
Germany. While the respective share is almost 50% in the West, only about a third 
of all East-German households are owner-occupiers (Grabka 2014). Since reunifica-
tion, the share of owner-occupied households increased by eight percentage points 
in both parts of the country.
In East Germany, the low share of owner-occupied households can be explained 
by the socialistic economic system in the GDR, which did not promote the pos-
session of property. In West Germany, the respective share is still rather low 
because of the vast demolition during the World War II. In addition, about 14 mil-
lion displaced persons fled between 1945–1950 from formerly German regions in 
the East to the GDR and FRG. Thus, there was a significant shortage of living 
space after World War II (Kesternich et  al. 2014). The government in West 
Germany reacted with housing programmes, particularly through social housing.3 
Private housing construction was promoted by the tax deductibility of construc-
tion costs or mortgage interest. From 1996 to 2006, this has been replaced by a 
direct monetary value. Since then, there has been no nation-wide programme that 
promotes homeownership in Germany. Another reason for the low share of owner-
occupied housing in Germany is its long tradition of a well-developed rental mar-
ket with a comprehensive rent control, thus leading to rather low rental prices. 
When comparing the costs for renting compared to an acquisition of owner-occu-
pied housing, Voigtländer (2014) finds that for nearly three-fourths of German 
counties, renting was superior to buying in 2009.4 Since 2009, there has been a 
strong increase in property prices, particularly in city regions. Sales prices for 
condominiums have increased by 55% between 2009 and 2016 (Kholodilin and 
Michelsen 2017).
Until 1982, the acquisition of owner-occupied property was burdened by a real 
estate transfer tax of 7%. Between 1982 and 2006, a reduced nationwide tax of 3.5% 
was established. Since then, every federal state can set its own tax rates that vary 
2 The reasons for the tax advantage are that the taxed value of owner-occupied housing for wealth 
tax is clearly below market prices, the fact that interests for mortgages and costs for the mainte-
nance of the house can be deducted from taxable income and that capital gains tax rates when a 
house is sold decrease with tenure in most cantons and taxes are postponed if a new property is 
bought.
3 To give an example, between 1961 und 1990, 90% of all new dwellings were built with the aid of 
social housing programmes in Berlin (Holm 2007).
4 Restrictions in the access to mortgages and rather high down-payment requirements and high 
transaction costs play an additional role preventing or dissuading many young households from 
buying a property at the beginning of their careers (Chiuri and Jappelli 2003).
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between 3.5% in Bavaria and 6.5% in Brandenburg. A property tax must be paid by 
owner-occupiers, but the taxable value is—like in Switzerland—clearly below mar-
ket values. There are no other owner-specific taxes.5
In sum, house ownership in Germany and Switzerland shares many similarities: 
low share of homeownership, high (and rising) house prices, a well-developed 
renter market, a restrictive mortgage system and high down-payment requirements. 
The main differences are the high population growth combined with the limited 
land in Switzerland, while population is shrinking in rural areas in Germany but 
growing in cities.
 Data
For Switzerland, we use data of the Swiss Household Panel (SHP) from 2012 that 
include two questions on wealth. A first question asks homeowners to estimate the 
value of their property after deducting mortgages. In a second question, respondents 
are asked to estimate the amount of the remaining wealth. Wealth information is 
available for 4467 households; values for 812 have been imputed. Because of these 
general questions, wealth estimates are approximate. It is therefore important to 
compare data of the SHP with other available data sources, even if true values are 
unknown.
For two reasons, the average levels of net worth are likely to be underestimated 
in the SHP. First, general questions yield typically lower values than when informa-
tion is collected for different wealth components separately. Second, surveys in gen-
eral do not adequately cover the very top of the wealth distribution. Because wealth 
is extremely concentrated, outliers have an enormous impact on the average mea-
sures. According to tax records, 1% of Swiss residents hold 40% of the total wealth 
(Foellmi and Martínez 2017). Because this study focusses on comparisons between 
groups rather than wealth concentration, we are however not interested in the top 
wealth holders.
As an indication for data quality, one can compare the wealth levels in the SHP 
with national accounts. Net worth per capita in the SHP amounts to 200,548 CHF, 
while the respective figure from the national accounts shows an average net worth of 
263,466 CHF per person (Swiss National Bank, net worth corrected for pension 
funds). Wealth in the SHP therefore amounts to 76% of the national accounts.6 Another 
test of the SHP data is a comparison with CH-SILC 2015, which included a relatively 
detailed wealth module. The average net worth per person in SILC 2015 was 254,139 
5 When selling, owner-occupied property taxes on capital gains were only raised if the time period 
between acquisition and sale was less than 10 years.
6 National accounts also present the value of real estate. The value for real estate per capita in the 
SHP is very close to one of the national accounts (101,561 CHF vs. 119,923 CHF). However, 
because the variable in the SHP refers only to primary residence, the two values cannot be per-
fectly compared.
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CHF, which was slightly higher than in the SHP 2012.7 But  considering the general 
wealth increases between 2012 and 2015, the values seem relatively close. Overall, the 
SHP seems well suited to study differences between owners and renter households.
For Germany, we make use of the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). The SOEP 
started in 1984 and expanded to East Germany in 1990. As the SHP, the survey is 
representative for the population and is conducted every year. We also use the sur-
vey year 2012 with more than 10,000 households, where information about ten 
different asset and debt components had been collected.
In the following we analyse data at the household level. Wealth is measured as 
per capita net worth, which is the sum of all assets less the value of debts. Wealth is 
however censored at 0  in Switzerland (no negative values).8 The wealth measure 
does not include occupational pension plans and promised entitlements to public 
retirement payments or household effects.
 Results
 House Ownership, Wealth and Age
We start with descriptive characteristics of the average wealth and wealth inequali-
ty.9 First of all, Table  12.1 shows that Swiss residents are much wealthier than 
German residents. Secondly, owner households are much wealthier than renter 
households (five times in Switzerland, seven times in Germany). Even if owner 
households are a minority (46% in Germany, 37% in Switzerland) they own as 
much as 86% of the total wealth in Germany and 75% in Switzerland. Thirdly, 
Table 12.1 shows the decomposition of wealth inequality for the Squared Coefficient 
of Variation (SCV). Only 3.6% of the inequality in Switzerland and 6.7% in 
Germany are due to differences between groups. Thus, wealth inequality occurs 
mainly within owners and renters. Forth, the SCV and the Gini index by group 
reveal that inequality within renter households is considerably higher than inequal-
ity within owner households. Not the wealth gap between owners and renters but the 
lower inequality within owner households is the main reason that low homeowner-
ship rates are associated with high wealth inequality. An increasing share of home-
owners implies a lower wealth inequality.
We next look at the relationship between age and wealth. Homeownership has 
shown to be most beneficial for wealth accumulation when houses are bought at a 
young age. Households have a longer period to accumulate wealth and to repay mort-
gage debt, respectively. Figure 12.1 predicts the nonlinear relationship between wealth 
and age of the household head (main income earner in Switzerland, reference person 
7 The SILC data are not well suited for an analysis on homeownership because 34% of respondents 
have not indicated the current market value but the taxable or purchase value of the house, which 
are considerably lower. As a consequence, the wealth difference between owners and renters is 
likely to be underestimated in SILC.
8 In SOEP, the share of households with a negative net worth is 7.5%.
9 Weights provided by the SHP have been calibrated to match the official rate of homeowners.
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Fig. 12.1 Age wealth profiles by ownership status 2012. Note: Predicted wealth refers to national 
currencies. Information for owners in Switzerland below 30 years of age is not presented due to a 
small number of observations. Source: SHP, SOEPv32, private households only
Table 12.1 Inequality decomposition by ownership status 2012
Population  
share (%)
Mean net  
worth (CHF/€)
Wealth  
Share (%) SCV Gini
CH
Renter 62.8 83,625 24.8 11.941 0.800
Owner 37.2 429,072 75.2 4.741 0.592




Renter 54.5 24,246 14.2 43.343 0.936
Owner 45.5 168,619 85.8 1.699 0.545
All 100.0 91,450 100.0 4.627 0.747
Within inequality 4.317
Between inequality 0.310
Note: Net worth per capita in 2012, national currencies. Analyses are at the household level. 
Source: SHP, SOEPv32, private households only
in Germany) using linear regression. The figure shows that house owners are wealthier 
than renter households but that the gap widens substantially over the life cycle. While 
the difference between the average wealth of owners and  renters is rather small for 
household heads up to 40 years, it increases quickly thereafter.
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There are different possible explanations for this pattern (see also Alik-Lagrange 
and Schmidt 2015). A first is that young renters also include future property buyers. 
They might either be saving to buy their own property or even possess the necessary 
assets but are waiting for a good opportunity to buy a home. At older ages, there are 
fewer households that prefer owning over renting and can afford buying at the same 
time. While this effect arises mainly through self-selection into homeownership, 
more savings of owner-occupiers are a second explanation for the increasing wealth 
gap between owner and renter households. Thirdly, owner-occupiers, who have 
been owners for a longer time, may have profited more strongly from rising prop-
erty’s values than younger owners. Fourthly, the probability for significant inheri-
tances is higher at higher ages. Wealth differences between renters and owners in 
precursor generations can insofar carry forward. Finally, the differences between 
ages might also be driven by cohort effects. But considering the similarity from 
Germany and Switzerland, it is unlikely that major historical events like the World 
War II and the German reunification are main explanations for the rising wealth gap 
between owners and renters with age in Germany.
Nevertheless, and considering that renting is a viable option in Switzerland and 
Germany, it is surprising that renters hardly accumulate wealth over the life cycle. 
Thus, other forms of self-selection might be relevant to explain the wealth differ-
ence. For example, if hedonists, who prefer current consumption over savings, are 
more prevalent among renters, this selection could explain the lower wealth levels 
of renters.
Another remarkable finding of Fig. 12.1 is the shape of the curve for owners at 
older ages. While the German households start dissaving at around age 65, the aver-
age wealth of owner-occupiers and to a smaller extent of renter households contin-
ues to rise to about 80 years of age in Switzerland. One possible explanation for this 
diverging pattern is the lack of care insurance in Switzerland compared to Germany, 
which encourages wealth accumulation even after retirement to finance care costs.10 
In contrast, intergenerational wealth transmissions might play an important role for 
the observed dissaving effect in Germany (Westermeier et al. 2016).
 Explaining the Ownership Wealth Gap
To better explain the differences between renters and owners, we use decomposition 
methods, which are widely used for other group differences, most frequently for the 
gender–wage gap. The most widely used method is the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposi-
tion. Juhn et al. (1993) expanded this approach beyond the mean to different quan-
tiles of the distribution and suggested decomposition into three components: 
characteristics, coefficients and residuals. More recently, counterfactual distribu-
tions are used to explain the differences between groups (see Fortin et al. 2010 for a 
review on decomposition methods). Here, we adopt the method proposed by 
10 A similar age pattern can be found for the US, where an obligatory nursing care is not imple-
mented either (Grabka et al. 2016).
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Chernozhukov et al. (2013), which uses conditional quantile regression. Estimates 
have been obtained with the Stata command cdeco (for quantiles) and jmpierce (for 
the mean). The conditional wealth distribution of renters is used as the benchmark. 
This nonparametric decomposition method is advantageous because it not only 
focusses on the mean but also does not require assumptions about the underlying 
distribution.
To mitigate the influence of outliers in the wealth distribution, we apply the 
inverse hyperbolic sine transformation (Johnson 1949) of net worth for the condi-
tional distribution. Explanatory variables encompass age, household type, gender, 
permanent income and its square term, educational levels, urban municipality, 
migration background, wealthy parents, bad health, the presence of siblings and 
received inheritances and bequest.
Results in Table 12.2 show that differences in these observable characteristics 
(column 2) explain only a small part of the wealth differences between renters and 
owners. At the mean, different socioeconomic characteristics explain 16% of the 
wealth differences in Switzerland and 32% in Germany, respectively. Looking at 
quantiles, we can see that composition effects become more important if one 
moves up in the wealth distribution. In Switzerland, the different characteristics of 
owners and renters explain 16% of the wealth gap at the 25th percentile and 29% 
at the 90th percentile. In Germany, the composition effect increases from 9% at the 
10th percentile to 67% at the 90th percentile. The higher permanent income of 
Table 12.2 Results of JMP-decomposition of wealth difference by ownership status
Total (for information only: 









Mean 100% (378,529) 16% 84% 0%
P10 100% (49,780) 0% 27% 73%
P25 100% (113,168) 16% 43% 41%
P50 100% (228,329) 12% 90% −2%
P75 100% (405,314) 19% 109% −29%
P90 100% (667,994) 29% 137% −65%
DE
Mean 100% (144,076) 32% 68% 0%
P10 100% (19,057) 9% 22% 70%
P25 100% (50,184) 25% 35% 42%
P50 100% (101,248) 35% 62% 3%
P75 100% (174,490) 42% 89% −30%
P90 100% (290,743) 67% 121% −89%
Source: SHP, SOEPv31, per capita net worth was transformed using the inverse of the hyperbolic 
sine
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owners  compared with renters is the most important driver for the composition 
effect. However, the effects of observed characteristics (price effects in column 3) 
are much more important for wealth differences. For example, being an owner and 
having the exact same characteristics as a renter will lead to a higher net worth in 
both countries. Rising values of properties and more regular savings of house own-
ers compared to renters are possible explanations for this finding. The impact of 
unobserved price and quantities is more relevant at the lower and the upper end of 
the wealth distribution. This indicates that other factors not considered in the 
regression analyses may play a role.
 Summary
This chapter addressed the wealth inequality and wealth differences between owner 
and renter households in Switzerland and Germany. We have found that owner- 
occupiers hold on average five or seven times more per capita net worth than renters. 
Only a small part of wealth inequality can be explained with the wealth gap between 
owners and renters. In addition, wealth inequality is much lower in the group of 
owners. The high wealth inequality among renters is an important explanation for 
wealth inequality in Germany and Switzerland.
If one would like to reduce the high wealth inequality in Switzerland and 
Germany, promoting homeownership is a possible starting point. Results from a 
decomposition analysis show that so-called price effects rather than differences in 
characteristics explain the different wealth levels between owners and renters. There 
are two main explanations why becoming a homeowner is likely to increase wealth 
accumulation. Firstly, the rise in the value of property may lead to a higher net 
worth for owners. Secondly, owners on a mortgage are forced to save on a regular 
basis and thus accumulate wealth faster than usual tenant households (see also 
Grabka and Westermeier 2015). Owners might be more homogenous than renters in 
terms of wealth because rising prices and forced savings due to mortgage repay-
ments affect a large majority of owners in the same way. A central challenge when 
considering ownership promotion programmes is, on the one side, enabling low- 
income households to become homeowners and avoiding a “lock-in phenomenon” 
on the other side, i.e., providing financial aid to affluent persons who would become 
owners anyway. Furthermore, ownership promotion programmes that alleviate the 
access to mortgages can bear the risk of creating a bubble, as has been seen in Spain 
or in the US; thus, well-considered policy reforms must be made.
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Chapter 13
Dynamic Political Attitudes in Partisan 
Context
Jennifer Fitzgerald and Christopher Jorde
What explains changes in political attitudes? We consider the ways in which parti-
san choices relate to attitude change. While most studies of the partisan-attitude 
nexus use attitudes to explain party choices, we flip the script and consider the ways 
that partisan choices shape attitudes over time. The Swiss Household Panel Survey 
(SHP) provides an opportunity to evaluate shifts in individuals’ views on immigra-
tion, government spending and the environment over 16 years. This survey makes it 
possible to establish how stable these views and party choices are from year to year. 
It also allows us to model attitudinal changes to identify their chief predictors. These 
are essential inquiries if we are to understand the ways in which Switzerland has 
changed and remained the same since the turn of the century.
After decades of stability in Swiss electoral politics, recent elections have 
become less predictable. Notably, National Council elections are increasingly 
competitive. Notably, the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) has attracted hundreds of 
thousands of new supporters. Fig. 13.1 displays various parties’ electoral fortunes 
over the last two decades. The full, black line marks the ascent of the SVP across 
elections. The Greens have also grown in popularity, though more modestly. The 
remaining main parties, the Social Democrats, Christian Democrats and the 
Radical Democrats, weakened across these six elections (Swiss Federal Statistical 
Office 2016).
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These aggregate electoral patterns demonstrate that Swiss politics have changed 
significantly in recent years. Yet they do not offer much insight into shifts in peo-
ple’s political views at the individual level. Our objective is to gain a better 
 understanding of how (un)stable key political attitudes are for the Swiss. We also 
unpack the relationship between partisan choices and views on salient political 
issues over time.
 Theoretical Framework
The partisan shifts depicted in Fig. 13.1 may indicate that people’s attitudes are 
changing and that parties’ electoral fortunes are shaped by these changes. For 
instance, it is possible that as anti-immigration attitudes rise in popularity, the SVP 
gains new voters over time as a result. But another interpretation is that increas-
ingly competitive campaigns have attitudinal implications. In other words, it may 
be that parties shape the opinions of their supporters. Per this narrative, the SVP’s 
messaging influences its supporters’ views on immigration. Given the disjuncture 
between the post-war stability and more recent changes in Swiss politics, it is 
important to unpack these dynamics over time. It is imperative for our understand-


















Greens Social Dems Christian Dems Radicals/Liberals* SVP
Fig. 13.1 Swiss parties’ shares of National Council election votes
Source: Swiss Federal Statistical Office 2016
*As of 2011 election, Radicals’ (Free Democrats) share of votes includes Liberals: they merged in 
2009 into FDP.The Liberals
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Political scientists debate the nature of the relationship between parties and atti-
tudes. Classical theories of democracy and political behavior depict a citizen who 
decides which party to vote for based on his or her attitudinal preferences (Downs 
1957; Campbell et al. 1960). This instrumental model of electoral choice puts policy 
preferences in the driving position; a citizen arrives at a party selection based on a 
sense of which party will deliver his or her optimal policies. Yet a contrasting view 
paints an image of electoral politics in which parties, themselves, shape public opin-
ion. According to this psychological account, voters will shift their views in response 
to partisan cues. In order to remain consistent with a chosen party’s platform, voters 
will update their attitudes over time (Lodge and Taber 2000, Miller 2000, Sniderman 
and Levendusky 2007). These two narratives depict very different images of politi-
cal behavior in democratic settings. We leverage the Swiss case to contribute to this 
big-picture debate. Given the high level of dynamism evident in Swiss politics over 
the past decade and a half, it presents an unusually propitious opportunity to test 
these accounts.
We focus on three attitudes in our analysis: views on immigrants, preferences 
for social spending levels, and opinions on environmental protection. We are spe-
cifically interested in understanding particular points of view on these subjects: 
choosing native Swiss advantage over immigrants with respect to opportunities, 
preferring support for decreased federal spending on social programs, and desiring 
more protection of the environment. These opinions relate directly to issues salient 
in recent Swiss elections. They are also central issues for particular parties and so 
they are well suited to testing ideas about the connection between certain attitudes 
and certain partisan preferences. The SVP, for instance, has made issues of immi-
gration a central feature of its political platform (McGann and Kitschelt 2005). The 
Radicals’ ideology is economic liberalism with a preference for diminished gov-
ernment regulation and spending, and the main raison d’être of the Green party is 
to promote environmental protection (see Hug and Schulz 2007; Kriesi and Trechsel 
2008). If parties are indeed shaping attitudes, the SVP, Radicals and Greens should 
be most closely affiliated with shifts toward anti-immigrant, anti-spending and pro- 
environment views, respectively.
With respect to attitude stability across issues, existing work leads us to expect 
that different kinds of attitudes should display different patterns. The most sta-
ble, according to existing research, should be views on immigrants. Studies of 
lifelong stability in attitudes point to the unusually static nature of racial and 
ethnic attitudes, which tend to form and crystallize early in life (Sears and Funk 
1999). As a core value, environmentalism should be the next most stable over 
time at the individual level (Inglehart 1997). The least stable of the three should 
be spending ideas. Economic preferences such as support for government social 
programs, are the most likely to be updated over time (Brooks and Manza 2008). 
But given the high level of electoral volatility that characterized the years of the 
SHP survey, we expect a significant instability for all three issue areas from year 
to year.
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 Data and Methods
In most waves of the survey, the SHP asks individuals about their views on several 
important political issues. These waves are 1999–2009 (annual), 2011 and 2014. 
The relevant questionnaire items read as follows. The initial primer is: “A number 
of political goals are questioned; I would be interested to hear your opinion on some 
of them…”.
Anti-immigrant “Are you in favour of Switzerland offering foreigners the same 
opportunities as those offered to Swiss citizens, or in favour of Switzerland offering 
Swiss citizens better opportunities?” The response options are: in favour of equality 
of opportunities, in favour of better opportunities for Swiss citizens. We code this 1 
if the final option is selected, 0 otherwise.
Anti-spend “Are you in favour of a diminution or in favour of an increase of the 
Confederation social spending?” The response options are: in favour of a diminu-
tion, neither, in favour of an increase. We code this 1 if the first option is selected, 0 
otherwise.
Pro-environment “Are you in favour of Switzerland being more concerned with 
protection of the environment than with economic growth, or in favour of Switzerland 
being more concerned with economic growth than with protection of the environ-
ment?” The response options are: in favour of stronger protection of the environ-
ment, neither, in favour of stronger economic growth. We code this 1 if the first 
option is selected, 0 otherwise.
For each variable, through our coding we isolate one specific response to high-
light while collapsing the other categories. We do this to gain precision in our analy-
sis by examining only one particular stance. The drawback is that we lose information 
on the other side of the spectrum. To be sure that this choice does not influence our 
findings, we replicate each analytical step with variables that reflect the full spec-
trum of response options. The patterns we present below are not substantively 
changed. Importantly, the collapsed, dichotomous coding that we use in the pre-
sented analysis yields conservative estimates of instability because they do not cap-
ture shifts within the “0” category over time. We interpret them with this in mind.
We also examine patterns in party support over time. In each annual wave (1999–
2014) the SHP records party preference through the question, “If there was an elec-
tion for the National Council tomorrow, for which party would you vote?” From this 
item we create a series of dichotomous variables to indicate support for each of the 
five main parties in modern Swiss federal elections. These are (roughly from left to 
right): the Green Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Christian Democratic 
People’s Party, the Radical Party,1 and the Swiss People’s Party.
1 In 2009 the Radical party merged with the smaller Liberal party (technically now FDP-the 
Liberals). The SHP provides separate support for each party even after the merge. We find that 
combining these parties’ followers into one group as of 2009—as opposed to keeping Radicals 
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We also include a number of control variables in our models to offer a more 
detailed and precise analysis. These are Education level, Age and Female. These vari-
ables are derived from literature on attitude change in general and attitudes on immi-
gration, spending and the environment more specifically. For instance, young people 
are more unstable than their elders in their political views (Alwin and Krosnick 1991). 
Women and the highly educated are most likely to hold anti- immigrant views (Fetzer 
2000; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007). Older citizens are less concerned about the 
environment (Inglehart 1997), and women tend to be more supportive of social spend-
ing than men (Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003; Funk and Gathmann 2006). While 
these studies provide guidance, little work examines shifts in these attitudes over 
time; our analysis provides uncommon insight into how these viewpoints develop.
Because we conduct this analysis with an eye toward isolating the impact of 
partisan preferences on attitude shifts, we include a lagged dependent variable in 
each model. To further subject the partisan thesis to a tough test, we include a left- 
right political ideology variable, Ideology. The highest values represent the most 
right-leaning position. These steps set up a high hurdle for partisan effects to appear 
in the results. Finally, we include a dummy variable for each canton to address the 
highly decentralized nature of the Swiss party system (Ladner 2001), and we cluster 
the observations by household number to address the non-independence of observa-
tions inherent in a household survey.2
With respect to our methods, the descriptive correlations we report below are simple 
bivariate phi coefficients (in Stata 11), which are suitable for estimating the ways that 
two bivariate variables relate to each other. The statistical models are logit models that 
include a one-year lag of the dependent variable. This makes it possible to establish the 
factors predicting attitudinal position net their attitudinal position in the previous year. 
Functionally, this captures individuals who adopt the specific attitude of interest during 
the course of a particular year (since the previous wave of the survey). It also captures 
individuals who move away from a particular point of view. These models provide 
insight into the factors that distinguish individuals who hold a particular opinion (about 
immigration, the environment or social spending) from those who do not, net their 
previous year’s choices. They are therefore between-group (or inter-individual) com-
parisons that incorporate a dynamic component from 1 year to the next.
 Descriptive Findings
From year-to-year, these three attitudes show different levels of stability. For this 
step in our analysis we utilize all respondents who answer the relevant questions 
in two consecutive years of the survey. This gives us approximately 50,000 
supporters separate—does not influence the results of statistical models. Therefore, for the sake of 
consistency across waves, we do not include in the statistical analysis support for the much smaller 
Liberal Party or for the combined partisan entity.
2 The results we report below are robust to inclusion of additional covariates. These include: occu-
pation, income, religion and political interest.
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observations.3 The waves represented are 1999 through 2009. Later waves are 
not captured in this step of the analysis because the attitudinal questions become 
less regularly asked in the most recent waves of the survey. The correlation (phi) 
between support for Swiss advantage over immigrants at time t and the same 
variable at time t-1 is .54. The parallel correlation for environmental protection 
is .46; for anti-spending attitudes it is .44. These numbers point to a rather high 
level of instability overall, and in relation to each other they align with the 
expectations drawn from past work on attitudinal stability. Immigration attitudes 
are the most stable over time, environmentalism is the next most stable, and 
economic preferences are the least stable. With respect to individual-level shifts 
from year to year, the Swiss change their minds rather frequently, but they do so 
in predictable ways.
How does this compare to stability or instability in party choice? For our inves-
tigation into partisan preference over time, we use the same respondents (about 
50,000 observations) from the same waves as we did to estimate year-to-year cor-
relations in attitudes. Moving from left to right, the year-to-year correlation is .49 
for the Greens (to refresh the memory, this is the correlation between Greens at time 
t and Greens at time t-1), .66 for the Social Democrats, .59 for the Christian 
Democrats, .59 for the Radicals and .63 for the Swiss People’s Party (see also Kuhn 
2009). These figures reveal more stability in partisan preference as compared to the 
attitudinal stances. The exception is the Green party, which is the least stable parti-
san choice, and it is less stable over time than are immigration attitudes.
Another consideration is whether the prevalence of people changing their minds 
on key issues is increasing. Given the high level of electoral flux in Swiss politics, 
it is important to establish whether instability is rising or declining. For this step, it 
makes sense to examine only those respondents who participated in the survey in all 
sixteen available waves of the survey.4 Fig. 13.2 details the patterns for the three 
attitudes of interest over time using the 1999–2009 waves and those 1580 individu-
als in the full panel. Each dot on the figure represents the phi correlation between a 
particular variable at time t and that same variable at t-1 (for instance Anti-immigrant 
in 2000 and Anti-immigrant in 1999). Over time we see that for each of these issues, 
people’s views are stabilizing across the years of the survey. This relative stability 
in the later 2000s (decade) as compared to the early 2000s continues into the later 
waves of the panel. Though we cannot establish year-to-year correlations for years 
since 2009, we fill in the blanks a bit using the 2011 and 2014 survey waves. For 
Anti-immigrant views the correlation between 2011 and 2009 is .61; between 2014 
and 2011 it is .60. For anti-spending attitudes the correlation between 2011 and 
2009 is .47; between 2014 and 2011 it is .43. And for pro-environmental views the 
correlation between 2011 and 2009 is .53; between 2014 and 2011 it is .51. These 
are the same individuals as those represented in Fig. 13.2, so we can say that atti-
3 Observations throughout this analysis are person-years.
4 If we open this up to include all individuals from all waves who participated in two consecutive 
waves of the survey, the basic longitudinal patterns are the same. Though the level of year-to-year 
stability in general is slightly lower.
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tudes toward immigrants and to a lesser extent the environment in recent years are 
much more stable than they were at the start of the survey.5 The outlier is spending 
attitudes. The year-to-year stability gained in this issue area from 1999 to 2009 
seems to have weakened more recently. If there is one attitude that is still in flux at 
the individual level, it is spending opinions.
 Models
What factors account for attitudinal change over time? In other words, who is most 
likely to shift to a position of anti-immigrant, pro-environment or anti-spending? 
Furthermore, what is the role of partisan preference in promoting adoption of these 
attitudes? Table  13.1 presents six models of partisanship and political attitudes: 
models 1 and 2 focus on the effects of SVP partisanship on anti-immigrant attitudes, 
models 3 and 4 focus on the impact of Green party support on pro-environment 
attitudes, and models 5 and 6 focus on Radicals support and anti-spending attitudes. 
Each model includes canton fixed effects. Odds ratios represent relationships of 
interest: values less than one indicate a negative relationship, greater than one a 
positive relationship. An even 1 indicates no impact at all.
5 Support for each of the major parties in Switzerland also proves to be stabilizing throughout the 
course of the survey. Replicating the descriptive presentation for attitudes displayed above in 
Fig. 13.2, we find that the year-to-year stability at the end of the sixteen waves (2013 X 2014) is 
approximately .10 higher than it was in the earliest waves for three of the parties (1999 X 2000): 
SVP, Christian Democrats and Social Democrats. Stability in support for the Greens and the 
Radicals increased only about half as much as for the other parties. This is for those individuals 
who were in the survey in all waves, just as described for Fig. 13.2. All difference in year-to-year 





























Fig. 13.2 Year-to-year correlations in attitudes
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The first two models estimate the impact of support for the SVP on a desire for 
Swiss advantage over foreigners – net their desire for Swiss advantage over foreign-
ers in the previous year. We find that the odds of shifting from 0 to 1 on this variable 
are nearly doubled for those who support the SVP as compared to those who do not. 
This corroborates an account of attitudinal change that is guided by partisanship. In 
model 2 we also see that Social Democrats and Greens are less likely to adopt anti- 
immigrant attitudes, though substantively the effect is weaker than that of SVP pref-
erence.6 There is no effect of Christian Democrat or Radical partisanship on shifting 
toward an anti-immigrant position. Education keeps people from adopting a prefer-
ence for Swiss; age, female and rightist ideology promote this change.
Models 3 and 4 present the results for pro-environment attitudes. Green party 
supporters are substantially more likely to adopt pro-environment views – the odds 
of moving from a 0 to a 1 double for Green partisans compared to others. Unlike 
6 The reference category for partisanship in models 2, 4 and 6 are supporters of parties not listed in 
the model, those who would prefer a particular candidate instead of a party, those who “don’t 
know” who they would vote for, and those who would not vote if an election were tomorrow.
Table 13.1 Partisanship and political attitudes: Logit models with lagged dependent variables























































































































N 45666 45666 46197 46197 44428 44428
Exponentiated coefficients; t statstics in parentheses, * p<0.05
Fixed effects by canton. Observations clustered by household
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other attitudes, the effect of partisanship is much weaker for the other parties and 
only supporters of the Radicals are slightly less likely to adopt pro-environment 
views. This makes sense given than economic growth is put forth as the opposing 
goal in the survey question about environmental protection. While Social Democratic 
and SVP partisanship are statistically significant, the effects are substantively mini-
mal. Overall, these models point to a strong influence of the Green party on pro- 
environment attitudes. Education, age and rightist ideology make this shift less 
likely; female makes it more likely.
Models 5 and 6 present the results for aversion to social spending by the govern-
ment. These attitudes offer the clearest divide along ideological lines with conserva-
tive party supporters more likely to favor a reduction in social spending and liberal 
parties less likely to favor a reduction in social spending. Nevertheless the expecta-
tion that the Radicals would exert the strongest effect on economic attitudes is not 
borne out – while the odds of Radical partisans favoring a reduction in spending is 
about 35% greater compared to the others, the odds of SVP partisans favoring a 
reduction is about 65% greater.7 This result surprises us. We discuss it in our con-
cluding section below. Green and Social Democrat supporters are much less likely 
to adopt an anti-spending perspective. Rightist ideology increases the odds of shift-
ing to an anti-spending position; being well-educated, older and female reduces the 
odds of this shift.
Interestingly once prior attitudes and partisanship are accounted for the effect of 
ideology is modest in all of the models. For ideology to have an impact similar to 
SVP partisanship on anti-immigrant attitudes an individual would need to become 
substantially more conservative, moving about 3–4 positions on the left-right scale. 
Similarly, for pro-environment attitudes an individual would need to move at least 5 
positions to the left to have an effect comparable to Green partisanship. Even on 
attitudes toward social spending, which arguably maps closest to the left-right scale 
of all the attitudes, the effect of ideology remains modest compared to partisanship. 
This supports the role of political parties in shaping attitudes on specific issues and 
suggests that those attitudes are not simply extensions of an individual’s ideological 
leaning.8
We take one additional step in this analysis. Interaction models enable us to 
establish the age at which people’s attitudes are most shaped by partisanship. This 
is important to examine for two main reasons. First, it serves as a robustness check. 
If in our models we are, indeed, capturing influence by parties, then this effect 
should be strongest for young people. Young citizens are the most malleable; their 
entry into the electoral system takes place during “impressionable years.” As such, 
our narrative stands to be further refined by considering whether this is the case. 
7 Dropping the ideology variable only widens the impact gap between the SVP and Radicals.
8 One might suspect that these models do not capture stable partisanship’s effects; perhaps one 
changes one’s views and then adopts the relevant partisan preference. To be more confident in our 
interpretation of partisan effects on attitudes, we tried a number of different configurations such as 
introducing lagged partisan variables and controlling for supporting the same relevant party in both 
t and t-1. None of these changes resulted in substantively different findings.
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Second, an interest in stability and change should consider not only past trends but 
likely future ones. Examining how Swiss citizens at different ages respond to parti-
san cues can help to predict future patterns in political behavior.
Three lagged dependent variable logit models provide the relevant evidence. 
They parallel models 1, 3, and 5 in Table 13.1 with the addition of an interaction 
between SVP support and Anti-immigrant attitudes, Greens support and Pro- 
environment attitudes and Radicals support and Anti-spend attitudes, respectively. 
We use lincom in Stata to estimate interactive effects. Full models are available 
from authors.
Figure 13.3 presents the identified patterns for party influence on shifts in key 
attitudes across ages. Each interaction coefficient is statistically significant at the 
.05 level. Starting with views on immigrants, we see that the impact of SVP support 
is strongest among those who are young. The odds of shifting to an anti-immigrant 
position are about doubled for SVP supporters who are twenty-five and younger. 
They are increased by 50% among those in their seventies. The same slope is identi-
fied for spending attitudes as they are shaped by support for the Radicals, though the 
effect over all is weaker.9 For the youngest of respondents, the odds of preferring 
less social spending are 50% higher among those who choose the Radicals as com-
pared to those who do not. But at the highest age range this effect is about null and 
is not statistically significant. The outlier in this figure is environmental attitudes. 
The impact of Green party support on a preference for environmental protection 
9 In response to Table 13.1, Model 6’s finding that SVP support is the chief predictor of shifting to 
an anti-spend position, we also tested the interactive effect of SVP and age on spending views. The 















SVP X Anti-immigrant Greens X Pro-environment Radicals X Anti-spend
Fig. 13.3 Interaction effects: impact of partisan choice on attitude at different ages
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actually strengthens across age groups. This implies that environmental opinions 
develop quite differently than do immigration and spending attitudes. We consider 
this below.
 Discussion
Our theoretical point of departure for this chapter was contrasting narratives about 
partisan choice and attitudes. The classic model of electoral behavior in a democ-
racy depicts a partisan choice motivated by policy preferences. A competing view 
posits that parties shape people’s views on key issues. While each plot likely tells 
part of a valid give-and-take story of citizen behavior in democratic systems, we 
pursue a better understanding of how the latter process works. By studying political 
behavior at the individual level in Switzerland, where the electoral system has been 
in relative disarray for over a decade, we gain new insights into the relationships 
between partisanship and attitudes. In this concluding section we summarize our 
findings and consider the extent to which previous research did or did not prepare us 
for various aspects of our results.
We find that there has been a great deal of instability from 1 year to the next in 
people’s views on immigrants, the environment and spending. The disorder of the 
electoral system previewed this finding. But these attitudes vary with respect to how 
stable they have been. Existing research predicted the relative patterns: immigration 
attitudes are the most stable, followed in succession by environmental attitudes and 
then spending preferences. For all three of these issues, attitudes appear to be stabi-
lizing across the years of the survey; most of all for immigration attitudes, least of 
all for spending views.
We also find evidence that partisanship shapes people’s stances on key political 
issues. The most convincing account can be drawn from our findings on immigra-
tion attitudes. Supporting the SVP is strongly associated (more than any other party) 
with a shift to preferring Swiss advantages over opportunities for immigrants. As 
attitudinal change theories would predict, the most influence-able are the young. We 
interpret our models to mean that a person who likes the SVP will adopt key aspects 
of the party program into their own set of policy preferences over time. The rise of 
the SVP, therefore, can be at least partly attributed to the party’s ability to persuade 
voters to agree with them on matters associated with immigration. This is an impor-
tant contribution to our understanding of electoral change in Switzerland, specifi-
cally the rise of the SVP.
The account of shifts in environmental and spending attitudes is less clear-cut. 
For the environment, the Green party plays a chief role, but its influence does not 
operate as attitudinal change theories would predict. Notably, the impact of Green 
party support on a pro-environment stance is strongest among the oldest, as opposed 
to the youngest respondents. Inglehart’s value change thesis posits that environmen-
tal attitudes (among other post-materialist values) are strongest among younger 
generations due to the conditions under which they were raised. Young people’s for 
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the environment, therefore, would pre-date their entrance into the electoral process. 
Elder citizens may be the ones who need persuading, and the Green party picks 
things up from there.
As for opinions on spending, the Radicals have a strong effect on the choice to 
desire less social spending, but the SVP’s effect is—unexpectedly—greater. We sus-
pect that the stronger impact of SVP than Radicals support on anti-spending views 
is a function of SVP rhetoric about government spending on immigrants. Past work 
shows that European publics consider immigrants to be particularly undeserving of 
welfare spending (van Oorschot 2006). This result might also be a function of SVP 
preference for devolved spending at the cantonal and communal levels since the 
survey question specifically asks about confederation spending. Both possible inter-
pretations signal that the issue of spending may have morphed over the years in the 
public dialogue and the public mind.
Overall, our analysis tells a story of significant change but increased stability in 
recent years. Looking ahead, we predict greater tumult in citizen views on public 
spending. We also anticipate that the youngest voters will continue to be influenced 
by the SVP on immigration attitudes. In terms of theory building in political sci-
ence, our findings signal that greater attention to the socializing role of political 
parties will enhance our understanding of democratic citizens’ political behavior.
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Chapter 14
What Explains Increasing Euroscepticism 
in Switzerland? A Longitudinal Analysis
Oriane Sarrasin, Theresa Kuhn, and Bram Lancee
 Switzerland and the European Union
On paper everything—or almost everything—points toward Switzerland being part 
of the European Union (EU). Indeed, this small but wealthy nation is situated at the 
heart of continental Europe, speaks three languages1 of EU members (German, 
French and Italian) and shares strong economic ties with EU members. Nonetheless 
the EU has never won Swiss hearts, or at least enough of them. In 1992 the Swiss 
people voted against joining the European Economic Area (EEA) by a short major-
ity (50.3%) of the voters and a comfortable majority of 18 cantons (Trechsel 2007). 
The country was clearly divided: Most members of the political and economic elite 
were in favour to joining the EEA, leading to an endorsement of 67% in Parliament, 
while the populist right-wing Swiss People’s Party (SVP) led the opposition. Among 
Swiss citizens, those with a tertiary education or with a high income tended to sup-
port the EEA (Kriesi et al. 1993). There were strong regional disparities too, with 
Pro-EEA voters to be found mostly among the Swiss French: all French-speaking 
cantons voted “yes” with approval rates up to 79%, while almost all German- 
speaking cantons and Ticino rejected it (Trechsel 2007).
1 The fourth national language—Rumantsch—is spoken in Switzerland only.
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Reluctance to join the EU has consistently increased since then (see Fig. 14.1, 
based on the data used in the present chapter). In 2001, following an initiative 
launched by a pro-European movement (i.e., the European Movement Switzerland), 
Swiss people clearly voted against (76.8%) opening the negotiations in sight of a 
potential adhesion to the EU. In 2016, a year after Iceland had withdrawn its appli-
cation for membership and just days before the United Kingdom voted in favour of 
a “Brexit”, Switzerland officially withdrew its application, which dated from 1992. 
This was the final step in a gradual decline of the interest of Swiss citizens to be 
part of the EU. Instead of a full membership to the EU, Switzerland has opted for 
an ‘Alleingang’ strategy: staying outside the EU, but maintaining strong economic 
ties with its members. This “middle way” solution takes the form of bilateral 
agreements that are very close to the EEA treaty. For instance, Switzerland is part 
of the Schengen Area, in which the free movement of people is guaranteed. 
However, even these bilateral agreements have been put into question after the 
Swiss people decided to limit the free movement of non-Swiss citizens to 
Switzerland through the so-called “mass immigration” initiative in February 2014 
(Ambühl and Zürcher 2015).
While without any doubt there has been a strong decline in the share of Swiss 
citizens willing to join the EU since the 1990s, there is, to our knowledge, no longi-
tudinal analysis of how changes within individuals affect their attitudes toward the 
EU.  Indeed, while macro factors such as the 2008 economic crisis undoubtedly 
played a role in explaining the overall decline in support for joining the EU among 
Swiss citizens, individual life course changes may also explain why many of them 
withdrew their support for joining the EU at some point in their life. Literature on 
Euroscepticism in Switzerland (Christin and Trechsel 2002; Skinner 2013; Theiler 
2004) has highlighted how, as they do elsewhere (Hooghe and Marks 2005; Hobolt 
and de Vries 2016), economic and political/cultural factors shape Swiss citizens’ 
reactions to the EU. Extending this examination, we hypothesize that changes in 
these factors (e.g., a worsening personal financial situation, political ideologies 
Fig. 14.1 Share of SHP respondents (Swiss citizens, aged minimum 15) who declared being 
unwilling to join the EU, from 1999 to 2014 (missing years are interpolated)
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leaning toward the right) may lead to decline in EU support among Swiss citizens 
that were initially pro-EU. We tested these hypotheses with data from the Swiss 
Household Panel (1999–2014).
 Predicting Unwillingness to Join EU among Swiss Citizens
 Economic Factors
Economic factors certainly play a role in influencing Swiss citizens’ attitudes 
toward the EU. Switzerland is one the wealthiest countries of the European conti-
nent, with its gross domestic product growing every year despite the various finan-
cial crises that have hit its neighbours (Swiss State Secretariat for Economic 
Affairs—SECO, 2016a). For example, Switzerland has a very low unemployment 
rate (3.2% in August 2016; SECO, 2016b). In such a prosperous context, Swiss citi-
zens could fear that the country—and/or themselves directly—may lose by joining 
the EU (Schwok 2010). The fears may be particularly strong among the so-called 
“losers of globalization” (Kriesi et al. 2008). According to Gabel (1998), to under-
stand who is winning or losing from EU membership, it is necessary to assess indi-
viduals’ comparative advantage: Low skilled workers (e.g., with low educational 
attainment, low income or in low status occupations) from high-wage countries 
such as Switzerland face increased competition from workers from member states 
with lower wages, while highly skilled citizens of these countries are less affected 
by international competition. In a similar vein, it has been argued that the with-
drawal of economic political borders resulting from EU membership benefits fore-
most to those who are mobile and connected (e.g., who have transnational ties or 
networks; Kuhn 2011). These “winners of globalization” possess the resources to 
cope with their country opening its borders. On the contrary, those depending more 
on local dynamics may fear that too much is at stake if their country joins the EU.
In line with this argument, European citizens who are worried for their personal 
as well as the national financial situations (Gabel 1998; Hooghe and Marks 2005) 
were found to report higher levels of Euroscepticism. Similar results were found in 
the case of European citizens with a lower income (Lubbers and Scheepers 2007). 
In addition, European citizens with fewer transnational ties (e.g., who were less 
likely to have lived abroad or to have socialised with non-nationals) were also found 
to be more Eurosceptic (Kuhn 2011). In Switzerland, the willingness to join the 
EEA in 1992 was found to be stronger among Swiss citizens with high income and 
high educational attainment (Kriesi et  al. 1993). Ten years later, Christin and 
Trechsel (2002) found that Swiss citizens’ level of concern about the economy in 
Switzerland was one of the central factors predicting their reluctance to join the 
EU. Based on this evidence, we hypothesize that low skilled Swiss citizens (e.g., in 
low status occupations or with low educational attainment) are less likely to support 
joining the EU (H1). In addition, Swiss citizens who perceive their personal finan-
cial situation as difficult are more likely to be reluctant to join the EU (H2a). 
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Extending this reasoning, we expect a worsening personal financial situation to be 
accompanied with more negative attitudes toward the EU (H2b).
 Political and Cultural Factors
The bulk of research on Euroscepticism has highlighted that cultural and political 
factors play a crucial role in predicting individuals’ attitudes toward the EU. Indeed, 
public opinion toward the EU is driven by more than purely rational and utilitarian 
considerations (see for instance McLaren 2002). Among the numerous political and 
cultural factors that have been shown to shape individuals’ attitudes toward the EU,2 
we focus here on some political ideologies and attitudes that are likely to play a 
prominent role in the Swiss opposition to the EU.
A first political factor that is expected to drive Swiss citizens’ attitudes toward 
the EU is their political orientation. Most studies on the relationship between politi-
cal left-right ideology and EU attitudes have provided empirical support for the 
so-called “horseshoe model”: Europeans at the left and right fringes of the political 
spectrum are more Eurosceptic than voters of mainstream parties (Aspinwall 2002; 
De Vries and Edwards 2009). While voters on left end are critical of the neo-liberal 
nature of European economic integration, right-wing Eurosceptics are motivated by 
the fear that European integration undermines the cultural integrity of their nation 
(Van Elsas et al. 2016).
By way of contrast the Swiss EU-opposition has been mostly led by right-wing 
parties, especially the radical right and populist Swiss People’s Party (Schweizerische 
Volkspartei—SVP; Mazzoleni 2016). Constantly on the rise from the 1980s to the 
early 2010s, the SVP is now the strongest party in Switzerland with more than a 
quarter of the seats at the Federal Assembly (Swiss Parliament 2016). To a lesser 
extent, the center-right party Freisinnig-Demokratische Partei (FDP) also opposes 
EU membership but is generally open to bilateral agreements with the EU (Skinner 
2013). Contrary to other non-EU members (e.g., Norway), Swiss left-wing political 
parties tend to support an adhesion to the EU (Skinner 2013). Because of this right- 
left divide when it comes to the EU among Swiss political parties, we expect Swiss 
citizens who subscribe to right-wing ideologies to oppose joining the EU to a greater 
2 Political and cultural factors other than those under consideration here (e.g., national identity, and 
fears of losing specific Swiss institutions such as neutrality or direct democracy) were shown to 
shape Swiss citizens’ reluctance to join the EU (see Schwok 2010). Since no question about these 
specific points was asked in the SHP, they cannot be investigated in the present chapter. Regarding 
national identity, people who exclusively identify with their own country are more likely to be 
Eurosceptic than individuals who identify (also) as European (Citrin and Sides 2004; Hooghe and 
Marks 2004) In Switzerland, attachment to the nation is especially high in the German-speaking 
region (Green et al. 2011), where the strongest opposition to the EU is also found (Theiler 2004). 
Attitudes toward joining the EU are also more negative in the Italian-speaking region than in the 
French-speaking region. For this reason and since there is no measure of national identity in the 
SHP, we account for the linguistic region in our analyses.
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extent than Swiss citizens with left-wing political ideologies (H3a). In addition, 
having one’s political orientation moving toward the right should be accompanied 
with more negative attitudes toward the EU (H3b).
Related to claims at the heart of SVP argumentation, a second political factor 
that likely plays a role is people’s subjective feeling of lack of political influence. 
Like many other populist parties, SVP often argues that the voice of Swiss citizens 
are not sufficiently heard by the government and authorities, and that citizens should 
decide for themselves. Consequently, Switzerland should bypass international regu-
lations. An example is the on-going campaign on “Swiss self-determination”, an 
SVP initiative to make Swiss law prime over international laws and rules (SVP 
2016). We thus expect that Swiss citizens who feel that they have no political influ-
ence are more likely to oppose joining the EU (H4a). Furthermore, increasing feel-
ings of lack of political influence should result in a stronger reluctance to join the 
EU (H4b).
 Data
The nature of our hypotheses—predicting differences between individuals and 
within individuals, requires panel data. We therefore analyzed data from the Swiss 
Household Panel (1999–2014), the only longitudinal survey in Switzerland that 
contains questions regarding Swiss citizens’ willingness to join the EU.  We 
restricted our sample to Swiss citizens, aged at least 15 (M = 46.26, SD = 17.61). 
Missing data for the dependent variable were omitted (with the exception of years 
where the EU item was not included, see below). This resulted in 75,565 observa-
tions provided by 14,436 respondents (5.23 observations on average per respon-
dent). There were slightly more female respondents (55.17%). Reflecting the 
linguistic division of Switzerland, the majority of respondents (70.60%) lived in the 
German-speaking region (French-speaking region: 25.77%, Italian-speaking 
region: 3.63%).
 Measures
Dependent variable Swiss citizens’ reluctance to join the EU was measured with 
the following item: “Are you in favour of Switzerland joining the European Union 
or are you in favour of Switzerland staying outside of the European Union?” 
Possible answers were 1 = “in favour of joining the EU”, 2 = “Neither” or 3 = “In 
favour of staying outside the EU.” Because we study unwillingness to join the EU, 
we created a dichotomous variable: 1 = staying outside the EU vs. 0 = else. Note 
that this item was not included in the survey in 2010, 2012 and 2013. For these years 
the missing value was imputed with the value of the previous year. Altogether, the 
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share of respondents who favoured staying outside the EU increased from 35.2% in 
1999 to 78.9%3 in 2014 (see Fig. 14.1).
Independent variables First, a set of variables was used to distinguish between the 
potential winners and losers of globalization. Skills (H1) were measured with 
respondents’ occupational prestige and educational attainment. Occupational pres-
tige was measured with the Cambridge Social Interaction and Stratification Scale 
(CAMSIS), a continuous instrument that relies on social interactions to estimate 
individuals’ social status (for the Swiss version, see Bergman et al. 2002). Possible 
CAMSIS scores range from 0 to 100 (in the present data: from 9.50 to 97.15, 
M = 56.08, SD = 14.32). Education was measured as the highest level of education; 
we reduced a 17-category scale to a 6-category one (see Bergman et  al. 2009): 
Primary education (15.05%), secondary without high school diploma (Matura, in 
Switzerland; 1.31%), secondary with Matura (10.53%), secondary vocational 
(43.98%), tertiary vocational (16.82%) and university (12.32%).
Respondents’ perception of their financial situation (H2) was evaluated with the 
following item: “Overall how satisfied are you with the financial situation of your 
household”. Possible answers range from 0 = not at all satisfied to 10 = completely 
satisfied (M = 7.52, SD = 1.94). We focused on the household’s financial situation 
instead of one’s individual finical position because a considerable share of respon-
dents did not work (e.g., housewives, students, minors). Furthermore, finances are 
most often organised at the household level, rather than at the individual level. In the 
case of respondents who reported being in employment, we also took into account 
their perceived risk of unemployment in the next 12 months (from 0 = no risk at all 
to 10 = a real risk; M = 1.86, SD = 2.37). When it comes to political factors, respon-
dents were first asked where they placed themselves, from 0 = left to 10 = right (H3; 
M = 4.83, SD = 2.12). Their perceived political influence (H4) was measured with 
scale ranging from 0 = no influence to 10 =  a very strong influence (M  =  3.87, 
SD = 2.55).
Control variables Age and gender (1 = male) were included as younger genera-
tions (Down and Wilson 2013) and men (Nelsen and Guth 2000) have been shown 
to be more supportive of European integration. We also considered whether partici-
pants had another citizenship (1 = bi- or tri-national; 10.92%), since those with a 
transnational background tend to be less Eurosceptic (Kuhn 2011). Respondents’ 
labour force status was tapped with the following categorical scale: working full 
time (reference; 35.95%), working part time (23.18%), studying (11.80%), being a 
home carer (9.10%), being retired (16.96%), being unemployed (1.00%), and other 
occupation (2.00%). We then controlled for respondents’ interest in politics, from 
0 = not at all interested to 10 = very interested (M  = 5.69, SD  = 2.71). Finally, 
because there are known marked differences in support for joining the EU across the 
Swiss linguistic regions, we considered where respondents lived: We created two 
dichotomous variables (Swiss German versus and Swiss Italian versus other, with 
Swiss French as a reference category).
3 Please note that all analyses were conducted on unweighted data.
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 Results
Because of the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable we estimated logit 
regressions; odd ratios are displayed in the tables. We first estimated random effects 
(RE) models. RE models use both between-person and within-person variance to 
estimate coefficients. In a second step, we analyse changes within individuals by 
estimating fixed-effects (FE) models. As FE models only estimate within-individual 
changes, one cannot include variables for which there were no changes (such as 
gender or the linguistic region). Finally, because some variables affect only those 
working (i.e., occupational prestige and probability of losing one’s job), we esti-
mated additional RE and FE models including only employed individuals.
 Differences between Respondents
Results are displayed in Table 14.1, left column. Confirming our hypothesis (H1), 
Swiss citizens with higher educational attainment (with a Matura or a tertiary degree 
compared to those with primary education only) were less likely to be Eurosceptic. 
Note that respondents with secondary education (without Matura) and secondary 
vocational education did not differ from those with primary education only. In addi-
tion and as hypothesized (H2a), respondents who reported not being satisfied with 
the state of their household finances were less likely to support joining the EU. When 
it comes to political and cultural factors, as expected (H3a), self-reported right-wing 
ideologies were related to a higher probably to reject the EU. Contrary to our expec-
tations (H4a), the more respondents felt that they had a political influence, the more 
they opposed the EU.
In line with previous literature on Euroscepticism, male and older respondents 
reported being less willing to join the EU. Students and retired people were more 
likely to oppose EU membership than citizens working full time, while home carers 
were less likely. The less interest in politics they expressed, the more respondents 
were likely to oppose joining the EU. Finally, respondents living in the German- and 
Italian-speaking regions were more likely to oppose joining the EU than those liv-
ing in the French-speaking region.
Results of additional analyses performed with respondents in (full or part time) 
employment are displayed in the right column of Table  14.1. As hypothesized 
(H1), a higher socsial status was related to a lower probability to oppose joining 
the EU. Though in the expected direction, the probability to be unemployed within 
the next 12 months was only marginally significantly related to attitudes toward 
the EU (H3a).
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 Changes within Respondents
Results are displayed in Table  14.2, left column. Only a few within-individual 
changes yielded a significant impact on attitudes toward the EU. Contrary to our 
expectations, changes in economic factors were not accompanied with a change in 
attitudes toward the EU (H2b). When it comes to political factors, increasingly 
right-wing political attitudes (H2b) were significantly related to a higher probability 
to oppose joining the EU (H3b). By way of contrast, changes in feelings of political 
influence had no impact (H4b). When it comes to the control variables, reaching 
Table 14.1 Logisitic RE regression predicting unwillingness to join the EU (whole sample and 
sample restricted to respondents in employment), odd ratios
Whole sample In employment
OR (SE) OR (SE)
Age 1.05*** (0.00) 1.09*** (0.00)
Male 1.41*** (0.10) 1.53*** (0.16)
Dual citizenship 1.24* (0.11) 1.14 (0.15)
Education (ref. = primary)
Secondary w/o Matura 0.75 (0.18) 0.35* (0.15)
Secondary with Matury 0.60*** (0.06) 0.31*** (0.07)
Secondary vocational 1.03 (0.09) 0.56** (0.11)
Tertiary vocational 1.22† (0.13) 0.76 (0.16)
University 0.71** (0.08) 0.42*** (0.10)
Labour status (ref. = full time)
Part time 0.92 (0.06) 0.97 (0.07)
Studying 1.84*** (0.16)
Home carer 0.66*** (0.06)
Retired 1.28** (0.10)
Unemployed 1.27 (0.19)
Other occupation 1.05 (0.15)
Satis. With hh finances 0.95*** (0.01) 0.98† (0.01)
Unemployment risk 1.02† (0.01)
CAMSIS 0.97*** (0.00)
Political orientation 1.35*** (0.01) 1.43*** (0.02)
Political interest 0.87*** (0.01) 0.84*** (0.01)
Political influence 1.03*** (0.01) 1.03** (0.01)
Linguistic region (ref. = French)
German-speaking 6.56*** 0.53 8.70*** 1.00
Italian speaking 5.43*** 0.98 9.17*** 2.50
Constant 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.02
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; two-sided tests
Source: SHP 1999–2014
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retirement and a decreasing interest in politics were related to more negative atti-
tudes toward the EU.  Finally, additional analyses performed on respondents in 
employment (Table  14.2, right column) show that, contrary to our expectations 
(H1b and H2b), neither a lower social status nor an increased probability to be 
unemployed are related to a higher probability to oppose joining the EU.
 Conclusion
The analyses we performed on the SHP data (1999–2014) provided results in line 
with previous literature on Euroscepticism: Both economic and political factors 
matter in shaping Swiss citizens’ attitudes toward the EU. On the one side, the so- 
called losers of globalization—that is, those who are less likely to benefit from an 
adhesion to the EU (e.g., individuals with low skills)—were found to be more likely 
Table 14.2 Logisitic FE regression predicting unwillingness to join the EU (whole sample and 
sample restricted to respondents in employment), odd ratios
Whole sample In employment
OR (SE) OR (SE)
Age 1.38*** 0.01 1.41*** 0.01
Education (ref. = primary)
Secondary w/o Matura 1.18 0.49 0.46 0.45
Secondary with Matury 0.95 0.13 4.56† 3.96
Secondary vocational 0.84 0.13 2.18 1.78
Tertiary vocational 0.88 0.17 3.10 2.56
University 1.09 0.24 3.40 2.97
Labour status (ref. = full time)
Part time 0.95 0.08 1.03 0.11
Studying 0.95 0.12
Home carer 0.91 0.12
Retired 1.35* 0.16
Unemployed 1.00 0.19
Other occupation 0.98 0.19
Satis. with hh finances 1.02 0.01 1.02 0.02
Unemployment risk 0.99 0.01
CAMSIS 0.99 0.01
Political orientation 1.10*** 0.01 1.10** 0.02
Political interest 0.95*** 0.01 0.94*** 0.02
Political influence 0.99 0.01 1.01 0.01
*** p < 001; ** p < 01; * p < 05; † p < 10; two-sided tests
Source: SHP 1999–2014
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to oppose joining the EU. On the other side, individuals who report right-wing polit-
ical ideologies reported a stronger opposition than those with left-wing ideologies.
Analyzing changes within individuals—which is rarely done when investigating 
attitudes toward the EU—sheds further light on the respective weight of economic 
and political factors. Moving toward the right side of the political spectrum was 
related to an increased probability to oppose joining the EU. This illustrates the 
relationship, in Switzerland, between radical right or populist ideologies and the 
willingness to shut (or remain close) Switzerland’s boundaries. In contrast, changes 
in individual’s life course were largely unrelated to changes in attitudes toward the 
EU.  While economic factors explain variation between individual’s attitudes 
towards joining the EU, transitions within individuals could not be related to 
changes in attitudes. This suggests that the bulk of the overall decline in joining the 
EU among Swiss citizens may be due to macro-factors (e.g., economic crises). It 
might also be that joining the EU is not seen as impacting individuals’ life, hence 
the lack of effect from changes in personal financial situation. Overall, this is in line 
with the argument that apparent divide between the losers and winners of globaliza-
tion may be more cultural than utilitarian. For instance, when it comes to attitudes 
toward immigration in Switzerland, it has been found that most of the differences 
between lowly and highly educated are in place before young people start education 
(Lancee and Sarrasin 2015). Thus, the impact of education—often attributed to the 
acquisition of skills–is likely to be explained by the social origins of individuals. A 
similar mechanism may be at play with regard to attitudes toward the EU.
To sum up, it seems highly unlikely that Swiss citizens will decide to join the EU 
at any time in the future. Furthermore, the more they will move to the right of the 
political spectrum, the more they will move away from the EU. For this reason, 
future research on the topic should concentrate on attitudes toward the bilateral 
agreements, such as investigated in the SHP in 2012 and 2015. This is all the more 
relevant since Swiss citizens’ decisions—such as limiting immigration to 
Switzerland—may call into question these agreements.
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Chapter 15
Economic Context and Attitudes towards 
the Welfare State: The Relationship 




Preferences regarding the welfare state and redistributive policies have attracted much 
scholarly attention in the past decades (Lupu and Pontusson 2011; Svallfors 2012). 
One of the main reasons is that these preferences are expected to influence individuals’ 
electoral choices and thus impact public policy. Therefore, they are seen as crucial for 
understanding cross-country differences or temporal evolution in the shape or size of 
welfare states in democracies (Meltzer and Richard 1981; Svallfors 1997). Individual 
preferences are also expected to be shaped by a potentially changing context. Changing 
levels of inequality or changing levels of unemployment rates for instance should in 
theory influence the size and composition of groups potentially benefitting from or 
contributing to the welfare state and thus shape the incentive of favouring certain type 
of policy (Meltzer and Richard 1981; Rehm 2009). However, most of the studies on 
the topic have analysed the influence of the context across countries rather than over 
time and those that look at the evolution of attitudes towards the welfare state within 
specific countries have focused mainly on Anglo-Saxon countries. These studies tend 
to show a rather limited impact of a changing context on preferences, even in times of 
a dramatic change of economic conditions such as the recent Great Recession (Brooks 
and Manza 2013; Margalit 2013; Soroka and Wlezien 2014).1
1 See however Rosset and Pontusson (2014) who document a trend for an increased demand for 
redistribution among middle income groups in those western European countries that were most 
severely hit by the crisis.
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Although economic conditions have not changed in Switzerland as much as in 
many other European countries during the Great Recession (Ball 2014; OECD 
2013a, b), this case is relevant for the study of the evolution of public opinion 
regarding the welfare state. Indeed, Swiss direct democratic institutions allow 
civil society actors to put new topics on the agenda (popular initiative) or to 
oppose decisions taken by representatives by organising popular votes on spe-
cific bills. This means that citizens regularly vote on specific policies and that 
public opinion is thus likely to be particularly influential. Another interesting 
factor is the rise, over the last two decades, of a right-wing populist party, the 
Swiss People’s Party (SVP), which has almost tripled its vote share since the 
early 1990’s and moved the position of Swiss representative bodies more towards 
the right of the political spectrum. While this could itself be a sign of a shift of 
Swiss public opinion away from the welfare state, the situation might be more 
ambiguous because this electoral shift is concomitant with an increased impor-
tance of non-economic issues in Swiss electoral politics, with notably issues 
such as immigration or European integration becoming more salient (Bornschier 
2015). Given that citizens’ preferences on those cultural issues do not correlate 
with their stances on economic issues (Rosset et al. 2016) and the rise of impor-
tance of the former set of issues, it cannot be assumed that economic preferences 
of the Swiss are directly reflected in their electoral choice. It is therefore particu-
larly interesting to explore how Swiss public opinion has evolved on issues 
related to social policy since the turn of the millennium.
For the period from 1999 to 2014, the Swiss household panel (SHP) provides 
individual level data on preferences with regard to several dimensions of the welfare 
state and include measures of risk perception which is relatively rare for generalist 
surveys. Making use of this data, the goal of this chapter is, on the one hand, to 
describe the evolution of political attitudes towards the welfare state of Swiss resi-
dents over the 1999–2014 period and, on the other hand, to test some of the theories 
explaining opinion formation at the individual level.
Our analyses show that overall levels of public support for social policy have not 
dramatically changed. There has been, however, a shift in the nature of policies that 
attract more support and meaning that the level of support for social spending and 
for more progressive taxation is quite different in 2014 as it used to be 15 years 
earlier. On the one hand there has been an increase in the share of Swiss residents 
calling for higher taxes on high incomes, but on the other hand, a decrease in sup-
port for social spending. The decrease in support for social spending seems at odds 
with the fact that an increasing proportion of Swiss feel at risk of losing their job. 
We explain this apparent contradiction to our finding that individual preferences are 
relatively weakly affected by changing economic conditions.
We focus on attitudes towards unemployment benefits to show that whereas 
objective levels of risk are associated with preferences towards unemployment ben-
efits, the relationship between one’s risk profile and preferences is mainly a result of 
structural factors such as education or economic status. The role of deeply rooted 
social structures for the preferences regarding unemployment benefits suggests that 
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changes in economic conditions and unemployment rates in particular are likely to 
only partially translate into citizen’s preferences.
The chapter is structured as follows: the next section discusses the literature on 
the welfare state and on the Swiss political context. We then turn to an analysis of 
overall trends in support for levels of taxation for the rich and social spending and 
relate these trends to changes in the level of perceived economic insecurity. The next 
section is devoted to an individual-level analysis that focuses on the relationship 
between objective economic conditions to policy preferences by addressing the link 
between objective and perceived risk and then perceived risk and preferences for 
redistribution. The remainder of the chapter discusses the results and concludes.
 Preferences for the Welfare State and the Role 
of the Economic Context
Attitudes towards the welfare state have been extensively studied using various 
sources of survey data. While early research has mainly focused on general support 
for the welfare state (or redistribution) and on the role of individuals’ economic 
status in explaining their preferences, recent studies have brought several refine-
ments. First, it appears that preferences towards the welfare state cannot be sum-
marized simply in terms of support or opposition towards the welfare state but that 
they vary in relation to different dimensions of the welfare state. Being in favour of 
a specific social policy - say unemployment benefit – does not mean that individuals 
will also endorse other facets of the welfare state such as for instance health insur-
ance or pensions. In addition to support for specific areas of the welfare state, the 
public seems to have quite contrasted views on two different but complementary 
aspects of social policies. These can be primarily understood on the one hand as 
ways of taking economic means “from the rich” or, on the other hand, as ways of 
“giving them to the poor” (Cavaillé and Trump 2015). Support for each of these 
aspects of the welfare state can be explained by different individual characteristics 
and the study of social policy attitudes needs to take both of these facets into 
account. Second, it appears that even if self-interest plays a role in the formation of 
preferences with regard to social policy, the definition of this self-interest is multi-
faceted also. To put it simply, individuals do not simply differ in terms of their 
income levels, but also in terms of for instance the risk of losing their job, the type 
of private insurance they would get would they lose their jobs and so on. Consequently 
all those characteristics are to be taken into account in order to understand individu-
als’ rationale to support the welfare state. Whereas previously the political economy 
literature based its theories on class and income (Esping Andersen 1990; Korpi 
1983; Meltzer and Richard 1981) to explain welfare state support, a more recent 
focus, developed as a counterargument to the first literature, has been on economic 
risk (Cusack et al. 2008; Iversen and Soskice 2001).
15 Economic Context and Attitudes towards the Welfare State: The Relationship…
218
The global financial crisis has made this line of work particularly relevant. At its 
wake, there is more unemployment, temporary and involuntary part-time work, and 
financial insecurity (OECD 2013a). However, economic insecurity is not a new con-
cern. As shown by Hacker et al. (2013) for the US, economic insecurity has seen a 
steady rise starting from the mid-1980s, affecting practically all population groups. 
Many authors have also commented on the modern labour market bringing increased 
employment instability and growing job insecurity (Anderson and Pontusson 2007; 
Dekker 2010). It can also be argued that the welfare state has always been most 
effective in insuring against risk and that this has been its main objective all along, 
rather than redistribution (Esping-Andersen 1999). Though lower-income individu-
als tend to also have a higher risk of becoming unemployed, this correlation depends 
on the country and the policy domain, and there is a substantial amount of individu-
als that are cross-pressured (Rehm et al. 2012). Thus income alone cannot satisfac-
torily resume both the redistributive and insurance aspect of the welfare state.
These changes in the labour-market have also affected Switzerland where the 
combined share of individuals who are unemployed or precariously employed (tem-
porarily and involuntary part-time) amounted to about 15% already before the 
financial crisis of 2007–8, which is not much lower than the OECD average at the 
time (Rueda 2012). While intuitively it seems that high level of insecurity should be 
associated with a higher demand for an insurance against economic risk and thus 
demand for social policy, this cannot be taken for granted because of labour market 
dualization. Some groups (labour market insiders) remain largely unaffected by 
unemployment risk and might see high levels of insecurity chiefly through the prism 
of increased social expenses and others, even if they face high level of insecurity, 
might fall outside of the scope of the traditional instruments of the welfare state and 
therefore not be particularly supportive of social policies which they see as particu-
larly benefitting the insiders.
The question therefore remains open as to whether employment insecurity is 
associated with higher demand for social protection. There are indeed a two require-
ments for structural changes in the labour market to impact demand for social pol-
icy. First, it is only if the public actually perceives a higher risk that objective risk 
can matter for public opinion. Second, this perceived risk needs to translate into 
policy preferences, which means that individuals update their demand for social 
policy based on their assessment of risk. The latter implies individual preferences 
are very flexible.
 Ever More Mittelstand? Preferences that Reflect an Anti-Rich 
and Anti-Poor Sentiment
In order to analyse citizens’ perception of their economic risk and their preferences 
for social policy we focus on three different questions asked in the Swiss Household 
Panel which have been included in the survey since 1999 annually until 2009 and 
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from then on in an interval of 2 or 3 years. The three questions relate to citizen’s 
perception of unemployment risk ("How do you evaluate the risk of becoming per-
sonally unemployed in the next 12 months?" on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means 
“no risk at all” and 10 stands for “a real risk”), their preferences with regard to 
higher taxation of the rich ("Are you in favour of an increase or in favour of a 
decrease of the tax on high incomes?" With the three answer categories being: „in 
favour of an increase”, “in favour of a decrease" and "neither") , and increased 
spending for social security ("Are you in favour of a diminution or in favour of an 
increase of the Confederation social spending?” With again three answer catego-
ries). These variables have been recoded in order to obtain the share of respondents 
who do feel at least some degree of unemployment risk (i.e. have not answered 0 on 
the scale), and those who favour increased taxation for the rich and increased social 
spending respectively.2
Figure 15.1 shows the development of opinions over time. A striking observation 
is the concomitant rise of perceived unemployment risk with the decreasing trend of 
support for social spending. In the three first years about 45% of respondents felt 
they were to some extent threatened by unemployment and around the same share 
favoured increased social spending. Since 2001, the two lines follow opposed trends 
and in the post-financial crisis period the gap between the share of respondents 
2 In these analyses data from all three SHP samples and cross-sectional weights are used. Note that 
when restricting the analysis only to respondents who participated in the SHP since 1999 and mak-
ing use of longitudinal weights similar trends appear suggesting that shifts in the opinions of the 
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Fig. 15.1 Perceived unemployment risk and attitudes towards redistribution and social security 
over the 1999–2014 period, based on data from the Swiss Household Panel
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 feeling threatened and those who support increased social protection has amounted 
to around 20% points. Not only has the perception of risk increased with around 6 in 
10 Swiss residents not feeling completely safe about their jobs, but the share of 
respondents favouring increased social spending has dropped below 40% since 
2009.
Interestingly, the level of support for increased taxation of the rich has remained 
rather stable over the same period or even slightly increased from already very high 
levels in 1999. The high-point of this shift coincides with the aftermath of the finan-
cial crisis. In 2009, almost 80% of SHP respondents favoured increasing taxes for 
the rich. While the share has slightly decreased afterwards it appears that the general 
trend in relation to redistribution is a rising one. To borrow Cavaillé and Trump’s 
(2015) terminology "redistribution from the rich" enjoys high and potentially even 
increasing levels of support while support for "redistribution to the poor" has 
declined since the end of millennium from already relatively low levels. How to 
interpret these trends?
The high level of support for increased taxation for the rich might show the 
inequality-averse preferences of the Swiss. But these opinions seem to be particu-
larly oriented against reducing the post-tax income gap at the top of the income 
distribution rather than increasing state intervention in favour of those located 
towards the lower end of the income distribution. This trend is surprising given the 
overall increase of perceived job insecurity and thus the potential for having to 
resort to the welfare state. Of course one potential explanation could be that indi-
viduals do not feel sufficiently threatened by economic risk to favour increased state 
intervention from which they will unlikely benefit, but this observed paradoxical 
trend between overall level of perceived risk and preferences for social protection 
calls for a closer analysis of the causal chain linking economic conditions to indi-
vidual preferences. To what extent does the objective economic situation of an indi-
vidual impact his or her perception of that situation? And to what extent does this 
perceived situation impact their policy preferences? Studying this relationship is 
precisely the goal of the next section which proposes an individual-level analysis of 
attitudes towards unemployment benefits specifically.
 Individual-Level Analysis: The Link between Objective 
Unemployment Risk, Perceived Risk and Demand for Social 
Protection
In order to analyse the micro-foundations of the link between objective risk of 
unemployment, the perception of this risk and finally demand for more protection 
in the specific domain of unemployment benefit, we rely on SHP data from the 
year 2011 which includes all variables of interest and for which unemployment 
figures across occupations were available. We focus on objective risk as defined by 
the level of unemployment in one’s occupation - a common measure of objective 
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unemployment risk using data from the Federal Statistical Office. Given our focus 
on unemployment risk, we restrict the sample to the active population who are the 
only ones who might be directly impacted.
Our analysis relies on two distinct steps. In a first step, we assess whether the 
Occupational Unemployment Rate is indeed associated with the perception of 
unemployment risk. In a second step we analyse the link between occupational 
unemployment rate and policy preferences regarding unemployment policies. More 
precisely, we are interested in assessing to what extent this link is mediated by one’s 
perception of risk and to what extent mediated by other factors – in particular educa-
tion and income – that might also affect the relationship.
Our empirical strategy implies having two dependent variables corresponding to 
the two stages of the analyses. The first one is perceived unemployment risk which 
has been measured using the same question as the one presented above3.
The dependent variable in our second set of models is respondent’s preferences 
with regard to unemployment benefits. Here, we use a specific question on whether 
spending for unemployment benefits should be increased, decreased or kept at its 
current level4. As is often done in studies on redistributive policies we recode this 
3-category variable into a dummy variable distinguishing between those who favour 
an increase in unemployment benefit spending (coded 1) and those who either sup-
port a cut or favour a status quo (both coded 0), the latter de facto corresponding to 
an opposition of an increase in unemployment benefits.
The focus independent variable in both analyses is the Occupational 
Unemployment Rate (OUR). This has been created using data from the Swiss 
Labour Force Survey conducted in 2011 which includes about 30′000 individuals 
and allows computing average unemployment rates per occupation. We have com-
puted these measures for each of the ISCO-2 digit occupations documented in the 
survey and matched these OUR measures with individuals based on their occupa-
tion. This measure corresponds very closely to what unemployment occupational 
risk has been operationalized in the literature so far (see Rehm 2009).
Our models further include a series of control variables that can be classified into 
two main categories: sociodemographic variables and individual characteristics that 
are associated with the economic self-interest of respondents. Among variables that 
belong to this second subset, we include the yearly net income at the individual 
level. We also include a variable measuring relative skill specificity. For this vari-
able, we used data that is made available by Torben Iversen on his website and 
provides skill specificity measures that have been computed based on the ISSP sur-
veys. This variable measures how specific one’s skills are and should therefore 
3 To recall: “How do you evaluate the risk of becoming personally unemployed in the next 
12 months?” on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means no risk at all and 10 stands for a real risk.
4 Note that we measure here whether respondents are in favour of increasing spending on unem-
ployment benefits specifically in contrast to the more general question presented in the previous 
section. The exact wording of the question used in the individual-level analysis is the following: 
“The government spends money in different sectors. Could you please tell me, for the following 
sectors, if you wish the government would spend more, less or the same amount? “
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 capture how difficult it is for a person to find a job that makes use of these specific 
skills in case of job loss (see Cusack et al. 2006; Iversen and Soskice 2001). Whether 
one has a temporary or long term working contract, thus whether a person is a 
labour market outsider or insider (see Rueda 2007), is measured with a dummy vari-
able (0 = unlimited contract; 1 = temporary contract). We further include a control 
variable that measures previous unemployment experience (coded 1 for all those 
who reported having been unemployed in the past and zero otherwise). Furthermore, 
we also control for the number of earners in a household by distinguishing between 
individuals who are the only wage earners in their household (coded 0) and those 
who live with at least one other wage earner (coded 1). The underlying idea is that 
the consequences of unemployment on one’s financial situation are tougher if that 
person is the only wage earner in the household.
The sociodemographic control variables includes age (measured as a metric vari-
able), gender (0 = man; 1 = woman), education (a three category variable in which 
the reference category is no or only compulsory education; the other two categories 
being “above compulsory” and “tertiary” education). We also add a dummy variable 
for region which controls for all the observed and unobserved regional characteris-
tics of the 7 Swiss regions as defined by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (cor-
responding to the NUTS-2 level). In some of the models we further include a 
variable measuring social class. For this we use Oesch’s class scheme which 
includes 8 different categories: Self-employed professionals and large employers, 
small business owners, (associate) managers and administrators, office clerks, tech-
nical professionals and technicians, production workers, socio-cultural (semi-)pro-
fessionals and service workers. According to its author, this class scheme captures 
social stratification in modern societies, taking also account of the deindustrializa-
tion, the welfare state expansion, and the increased participation of women in the 
labor market. The focus is not only on hierarchical divisions but also on horizontal 
cleavages to reflect better the heterogeneity of today’s middle class (Oesch 2006).
As the two dependent variables in our models have different measurement levels, 
we use an OLS regression to model perceived unemployment risk (which is mea-
sured with a11 point scale) and a logistic regression for the model in which prefer-
ences for unemployment benefits represent the dependent variable coded as a 
dummy. In addition to these analyses, we perform a product of coefficients test for 
the second set of models. This enables us to estimate how much of the relationship 
is mediated by perceived unemployment risk and how much by the socioeconomic 
factors we focus on: education and income. This test is similar to the Sobel test 
(Baron and Kenny 1986; Sobel 1982), used to determine mediation effects.5
5 Note, however, two important differences in our approach. First, as our dependent variable is 
dichotomous, it is necessary to standardize the coefficients before doing the calculations (for more 
details, see MacKinnon and Dwyer 1993). We use a user written Stata command called binary_
mediation to achieve this. Second, we use bootstrapping to calculate standard errors and signifi-
cance levels, which are not given by the binary_mediation command. This has also been proven to 
be a superior approach, especially when not working with very large samples (Preacher and Hayes 
2008).
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In Table 15.1, we find in the first model with only the four objective variables 
related to the theories on risk: OUR, skill specificity, contract type (insider/outsider 
status), and income that all except the last are highly significant predictors of per-
ceived unemployment risk with the relationships working in the expected direction. 
The relationships remain, and become significant for income, when controlling for 
basic sociodemographics in model 2, social class in model 3, and past unemploy-
ment and number of earners in model 4. This seems to show that these objective 
measures, and namely OUR, do capture something that people are aware of and can 
be used as a way of measuring the insecurity one feels at her or his workplace. 
Table 15.1 OLS regression models predicting perception of unemployment risk
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Occup. Unemp. 
Rate
0.299*** 0.281*** 0.238*** 0.233***
Skill specificity 0.338*** 0.369*** 0.421*** 0.396***
Contract type Fixed −1.157*** −1.432*** −1.541*** −1.521***
Net income 
(10′000 s)
−0.015 −0.049*** −0.064*** −0.058***
Past unemployment Yes 0.628***
Number of earners >1 −0.221**
Region (GE Lake) Middleland −0.715*** −0.728*** −0.646***
North-west −0.745*** −0.725*** −0.653***
Zurich −0.200 −0.209 −0.135
East −0.871*** −0.863*** −0.744***
Central −0.763*** −0.795*** −0.717***
Ticino −0.265 −0.329 −0.324
Gender Female 0.0389 0.0782 0.0713
Age 0.0282*** 0.0300*** 0.0307***










Office clerks −0.325 −0.175







Service workers −0.309 −0.154
Constant 3.173*** 2.972*** 3.263*** 3.374***
N 2112 2112 2112 2105
R-squared 0.069 0.106 0.116 0.124
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
15 Economic Context and Attitudes towards the Welfare State: The Relationship…
224
Depending on the model, the difference in perception of risk between workers in an 
occupation with the lowest and highest rates of unemployment is of between 1.4 and 
1.8 points on an 11-point scale, a similar effect of that of having a temporary versus 
fixed contract. It should be pointed out that the R-squared, especially in the model 
with only the objective measures, is very low, indicating that there is much else 
determining one’s perceived risk.
As expected, having been unemployed in the past increases worries among indi-
viduals, possibly making unemployment possibilities seem more real for. Not being 
the only earner in the household does also diminish somewhat the perceived risk, as 
expected.
There are relatively strong regional effects, which seem to reflect at least in part 
the fact that unemployment tends to be higher in French and Italian speaking 
regions, as well as in the canton of Zurich in the German speaking part of Switzerland. 
Older individuals also show a tendency towards a higher perceived risk, but no gen-
der differences arise. Surprisingly, class, at least as operationalized here with the 
eight classes of Oesch (2006) has practically no effect, which goes against our sus-
picion that the OUR might confound somewhat with class differences.
In the second step, we ran four models predicting individual preferences for 
increasing unemployment spending (see Table 15.2). We find that in the first model 
with OUR and basic sociodemographic controls, the effect of the first on prefer-
ences is highly significant, as predicted by the theory. In the second model, we add 
risk perception. If OUR was completely mediated by the perceived risk, which 
seemed already unlikely given our first set of models, we would expect the effect of 
Table 15.2 Logistic regression models predicting being in favour of increased unemployment 
spending
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
OUR 0.115*** 0.0935*** 0.0591 0.0462
Risk perception 0.105*** 0.0855***
Income (10′000 s) −0.087*** −0.080***
Education (low) Middle −0.418*** −0.398***
High −0.401** −0.371*
Region (GE Lake) Middleland −0.463*** −0.398*** −0.500*** −0.443***
North-west −0.826*** −0.770*** −0.908*** −0.866***
Zurich −0.779*** −0.765*** −0.806*** −0.802***
East −0.829*** −0.763*** −0.942*** −0.886***
Central −0.799*** −0.732*** −0.796*** −0.744***
Ticino 0.621** 0.616** 0.769*** 0.770***
Gender Female 0.302*** 0.293*** 0.0342 0.0525
Age 0.0214*** 0.0199*** 0.0314*** 0.0293***
Constant −2.353*** −2.616*** −1.207*** −1.498***
N 2680 2680 2506 2506
Pseudo R-squared 0.04 0.049 0.06 0.065
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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OUR to become non-significant. This does not happen, which tells us that both 
measure in part different things and influence individual preferences by different 
mechanisms.
In Model 3, we test our hypothesis of the effect of OUR on preferences being 
mediated by income and education, and find strong support. OUR becomes 
 completely non-significant (p = 0.122) when these two variables are added, thus 
hinting at a strong mediation effect. Both education and income are highly signifi-
cant at predicting one’s preferences regarding unemployment spending. Risk per-
ception in turn remains significant with these variables added. Interesting again is 
the strong effect of regions, showing that expectations towards the welfare state are 
heterogeneous within Switzerland.
So as to better understand the mediation effects, we present in addition the results 
of a product of coefficients tests (Baron and Kenny 1986; MacKinnon and Dwyer 
1993). In this test, five regression models are run, the resulting coefficients are stan-
dardized and, based on the latter, the effects of the different paths are calculated. 
The regressions comprise the five variables of interest: preferences regarding unem-
ployment spending, OUR, perceived unemployment risk, education, and income. 
The variables are coded as in the models above. In all five models, we control for 
age, sex, and region. In Fig. 15.2, we show the resulting unstandardized effects of 
the three paths of interest. We use bootstrapping to calculate standard errors and the 
significance of the paths. Table 15.3 shows the rest of the results, namely the propor-
tion of the total effect that is mediated by each of the three variables and the total 
direct and indirect effects.
Fig. 15.2 Product of coefficients test: non-standardized direct and indirect effects. *** p < 0.01, 
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
15 Economic Context and Attitudes towards the Welfare State: The Relationship…
226
As expected by the theory, we find that perceived risk significantly mediates the 
relationship between OUR and preferences (p < .01). However, this only represents 
about 14% of the total effect between OUR and preferences, which is relatively low 
compared to what we should find were this the main explanation for this effect. The 
size of the mediation effect by income is the same as that of risk perception but is 
not significant. Education in turn mediates the effect of OUR on preferences by 18% 
and is highly significant (p  <  .01). Income is highly significant and mediates as 
much as the two others combined, 32%. The combined effect of both sociodemo-
graphic variables is 0.042, more than three times that of risk perception. In total, 
they explain 50% of the total effect between OUR and preferences. A proportion of 
64% of the total effect is mediated, the remaining direct effect being non- significant. 
This means that the two explanations proposed are likely to account for most of the 
relationship and no crucial component has been omitted from this analysis.
Our results indicate that individuals’ perception of unemployment risk is to some 
extent linked to the unemployment rate in their occupation and that this link in part 
explains the relationship between the latter and policy preferences. However, we 
find that a more important explanation is related to the socioeconomic characteris-
tics of individuals in a given occupation. We argue that this is because unemploy-
ment tends to be higher among individuals with low income and education levels. 
Thus occupations with higher unemployment rates tend to also to group together 
individuals with similar sociodemographic background. This means that belonging 
to a group more affected by unemployment will make the individual more inclined 
to support policies that help the unemployed, not so much out of self-interested 
calculations, but rather through a higher awareness of the issue, identification with 
those affected, and shared norms or solidarity (Svallfors 2006).
 Conclusion
Preferences for social policy are expected to be influenced by a changing economic 
context. Individuals whose economic conditions or prospects evolve are generally 
expected to change their preferences because what they have to gain or lose from the 
welfare state also evolves over time. In line with this reasoning, times of increased 
economic insecurity should also lead to increased support for social policies because 
the odds of benefiting from them increases for the majority of the population. 
Table 15.3 Product of 
coefficients test: proportion 
of total effect mediated and 
total effects
Proportion of total effect mediated: risk perception 0.141
Proportion of total effect mediated: Education 0.180
Proportion of total effect mediated: Income 0.321
Proportion of total effect mediated: All 0.642
Total indirect effect 0.055***
Total effect 0.086***
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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However, in the 1999–2014 period studied here, there is in Switzerland a paradoxi-
cal trend of an increased perception of economic risk, but a stable or even declining 
level of support for social spending, although levels of support for redistribution 
from taxing the rich more have remained relatively high.
In themselves these macro-level evolutions of public opinion are interesting as 
they show that there are different and independent components of support towards 
the welfare state (see e.g. Cavaillé and Trump 2015) and that Swiss residents 
have perceived a change in the level of unemployment insecurity. However, they 
also call for a closer examination of the link, at the individual level, between 
objective and subjective levels of risk subjective and social policy preferences 
which is at the heart of most theories linking economic conditions with public 
preferences.
The Occupational Unemployment Rate represents one of the main measures for 
assessing one’s objective risk of unemployment. While previous studies have con-
sistently shown a strong correlation between this indicator and individuals’ prefer-
ences with regard to the welfare state, the mechanisms that would explain this 
association have rarely been tested. Yet, we argue, understanding these mechanisms 
is crucial for appreciating how, within a country or an occupation, changes in the 
level of unemployment might affect policy preferences. Is the relationship between 
occupational unemployment rates and preferences mediated via risk perception, in 
which case we could expect an increased level of unemployment to affect percep-
tion of risk and ultimately policy preferences? Or is it linked to the fact that the level 
of unemployment in one’s occupation is itself associated with other more stable 
individual characteristics that will remain unaffected by shifts in macro-level unem-
ployment in which case little change in public opinion can be expected even at times 
of rapid changes in levels of unemployment risk?
Based on data from the Swiss Household Panel survey, our individual-level anal-
ysis provides a nuanced answer to these pressing questions in the context of rising 
unemployment in Europe. On the one hand, it seems that individuals’ perceived risk 
is to some extent determined by their objective level of risk of being unemployed 
(measured by Occupational Unemployment Rate), which provides evidence for the 
relevance of objective risk measures in the formation of social policy preferences. 
On the other hand, we find that a larger part of the association between occupational 
unemployment rate and policy preferences runs via education and income, charac-
teristics that are relatively stable across time. As a result, our findings tend to chal-
lenge the view that changes in the level of unemployment rate would affect public 
opinion regarding social policies in general and unemployment benefits in particu-
lar. The recent rise in unemployment across industrialised countries greatly affects 
individuals’ risk of losing their job. This rise might however not be followed by a 
rise in demand for more unemployment benefits due to the fact that deeply rooted 
social cleavages seem to account for much of the relationship between subjective 
evaluations of risk and social policy preferences.
While the findings presented show the relevance of studying the mechanisms that 
link objective measures of risk with policy preferences, they remain limited in scope 
and call for further analytical sophistication. By studying a single country, we are 
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able to overcome some of the methodological limitations of previous studies, but at 
the same time restrict the generalizability of our results. Are the patterns we identify 
specific to a country with low levels of unemployment? Are they linked to the 
 specific context of a rise of anxiety following the crisis that hit industrialized and 
particularly European countries after 2007? To answer these questions, more case 
studies conducted across a variety of nations and especially over time would cer-
tainly helpful. But this endeavour is limited by data availability, as few surveys 
include subjective measures of risk. In addition, the relevance of the research ques-
tion that is addressed in this article clearly pertains to dynamic changes in the 
macro-economic context. However, our cross-sectional analysis does not allow to 
directly study the link between changes in the macro- (country) or meso- (occupa-
tion) levels of unemployment with policy preferences. Future research on that topic 
should ideally make use of longitudinal data at the individual-level in order to anal-
yse how shifts in context affect individuals. Future waves of the SHP including 
individuals’ perceptions of economic risk and their preferences with regard to 
unemployment benefits should allow for such analyses.
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Chapter 16
Does Commitment Change Worldviews?
Gian-Andrea Monsch and Florence Passy
In this chapter, we examine whether commitment affects participants’ worldviews. 
Worldviews, or meanings,1 are defined as thinking-feeling tools individuals use to 
make sense of their social and political environment (Mead 1934; Weber 1978). In 
the present study, participants are those individuals who join an environmental 
protection organization, a charitable organization, or a union. Evidence in the lit-
erature on biographical consequences of activism is supportive (e.g., Passy and 
Monsch forthcoming; Giugni 2004): Individuals who join an organization syn-
chronize their worldviews with the cultural scripts that circulate in the community. 
For example, Blee (2016) shows that women who join far-right organizations 
experience a critical transformation indebted to a radical shift in their interper-
sonal network. As one of her interviewee’s states: “I made new friends and started 
to become obsessed with race….I thought about race 24/7” (p.9). Commitment 
therefore affects people’s meanings. Yet, a conflicting argument exists in the lit-
erature, one that stresses a reverse causality, that is to say, specific worldviews are 
required to belong to the so-called mobilization potential eventually leading the 
individual to engage in joint action (e.g., Cotgrove and Duff 1980; Gamson et al. 
1982; Kriesi 1989; Klandermans 1997). With this logic in mind, individuals solely 
join political or civic organizations if their meanings correspond. Commitment, 
then, does not change worldviews. Our present contribution aims to shed light on 
this debate by analyzing the effects of joining a political or civic organization on 
worldviews over time.
1 In this contribution, we use the terms “worldviews” and “meanings” interchangeably.
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According to McAdam (2009: 69) “cognitive liberation is sometimes a product 
rather than a cause of protest.” Accordingly, we suggest that the story behind the 
relation between worldviews and joint action is more nuanced than has previously 
been stated. Commitment can have a variety of influences on activists’ meanings 
because commitment experiences are particular. For example, we know that life 
course effects of movement participation in terms of employment, marriage, and 
childbirth patterns are usually stronger for women than for men (e.g., Van Dyke 
et al. 2000; Viterna 2013). Yet do we also find group specific variation in terms of 
effects on worldviews? We advance that there is a plurality of effects on the mean-
ings of people who take on a commitment. Some perceive the world as members 
who sustain the commitment do. Others become members of a political or civic 
organization without the necessary cognitive tools. For the latter, we assume that 
synchronization of worldviews will occur once they join a specific organization.
Three questions structure our contribution. First, does commitment generally 
change the worldviews of new members? Second, does commitment have a group- 
specific effect, especially when it comes to members who join an organization with 
dissimilar meanings? Finally, are these effects durable? Before we answer these 
questions, it is necessary to offer a short overview of the literature on participation 
in social movements.
 Worldviews of New Members: Before and after Commitment
The study of members’ worldviews and the relation to commitment is fraught by 
divisions. Scholars focus either on causes to join an organization, or on effects of 
participation, rather than treating commitment as what it actually is: a continuum. 
Individuals who join activism belong to a specific group: The so-called movement 
potential (Klandermans 1997). Alongside structural factors (biographical availabil-
ity and social networks), such individuals are internally predisposed toward partici-
pation. Indeed, their worldviews lead them to worry about specific social problems 
or to harness an awareness of certain political conflicts. Joiners possess a specific 
social anchorage and are equipped with particular values (e.g., Cotgrove and Duff 
1980; Gamson et  al. 1982; Kriesi 1989; Klandermans 1997; Passy and Giugni 
2001). For example, activists within the post-industrial movement commonly 
belong to the new-middle class, are highly educated, and are part of the post World 
War generations. In addition, they share post-materialist values, are left wing ori-
ented and highly progressive (e.g., Kriesi 1989; Passy and Monsch 2016). While the 
literature on the matter highlights the characteristics of a movement’s potential, it 
fails to answer the two following questions: First, what happens to joiners with 
similar worldviews as those who are already committed? Second, what about peo-
ple recruited outside the mobilization potential? We have elsewhere shown that the 
latter is a fairly common phenomenon (Passy and Monsch 2016). Unionists, for 
instance, often begin their commitment in the wake of a conflictual experience at 
work and lack the worldviews a typical union member would have. Another 
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example is the widespread practice of street-recruitment, which attracts new mem-
bers outside the traditional movement potential. Does commitment affect the world-
views of this group of people? And if it does have an impact, is it a durable one?
Studies investigating individuals after they have committed have revealed that 
activism has multiple and durable impacts on an individuals’ life (e.g., McAdam 
1988, 1989; Sherkat and Blocker 1997; Giugni and Grasso 2016). In addition to 
altering activists’ social networks and influencing activists’ practices, such as ori-
enting personal choices and adopting new lifestyles, commitment shapes activists’ 
worldviews and identity (e.g., Taylor 1989; Beckwith 2016; Whittier 2016). In a 
study on pro-life activists, Munson (2009) demonstrates that beliefs regarding abor-
tion rarely impel individuals to get involved. By joining pro-life groups, however, 
activists went through a socializing process during which participant’s views 
became more robust and consistent about abortion, while some converted from pro- 
choice to pro-life beliefs. Scholarship in social movement and volunteering studies 
emphasizes that commitment has substantial and durable effects on volunteers’ 
worldviews and lives (Wilson and Musick 2000; Wilson 2012). While these findings 
are remarkably consistent across studies (McAdam 1989), many of them are beset 
by methodological problems (Giugni 2004). Among these, causality is without con-
test the most harmful. Many studies rely on retrospective data and lack a control 
group. This problem is not specific to social movement studies as scholars investi-
gating biographical outcomes of volunteerism face the same drawback (Wilson and 
Musick 2000; Wilson 2012). In addition, most studies focus on high levels of com-
mitment and are restricted to a specific type of activists: The New-left contention.
Thanks to the panel design adopted by the Swiss Household Panel (SHP) data, 
we are able to overcome these shortcomings. First, we take time into consideration 
and analyze what happens before and after individuals join a civic or political orga-
nization. Second, as the SHP is a general population survey, we are in a position to 
compare members with non-members. With longitudinal data and a control-group 
we are able to make a causal argument on the consequences of collective action on 
people’s worldviews. Finally, our data set includes both highly committed members 
as well as the large majority of passive members who support a cause financially.
 Malleable Understandings of Common Good and Politics
We define worldviews,2 or meanings, as a thinking-feeling tool that allows individu-
als to perceive reality and the world around them, to make sense of their social and 
political environment, and set their intentionality to act (Jasper 2014, Searle 2004). 
2 Worldviews are neither values nor attitudes. Values are “enduring beliefs” (Rokeach 1973) 
whereas we know that an individuals’ mind changes (see work on mind plasticity, e.g. Macrae and 
Bodenhausen 2000). Attitudes are orientations towards a positive or negative assessment of some-
thing or someone specific. Here, we consider broader worldviews that help individuals make sense 
of their social and political environment.
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Opting for this terminology situates us in the interpretative tradition in sociology 
(e.g., Mead 1934; Berger and Luckmann 1967; Goffman 1967; Blumer 1969 among 
many others). Weber (1978), one of the main proponents in this field, conceives of 
human beings in terms of ‘voracious meaning makers’. Hence, worldviews lie at the 
center of individuals’ life: They enable them to perceive social realities, to make 
sense of them, and to act in their social environment. But meanings are social enti-
ties too. Cognitive processes are socially constructed, which means that worldviews 
are shared within the social sites an individual evolves in (e.g. commitment com-
munity, family, workplace, nation). They are constructed through social interactions 
(e.g., Mead 1934; Blumer 1969; Collins 2004; Fligstein and McAdam 2012): 
Through talks and disputes, individuals practice cultural scripts which circulate in 
the social sites they partake in (Mische 2008; Polletta 2008), and this practice shapes 
their worldviews and orients their action.3 Correspondingly, moving from one social 
site to another affects individuals’ meanings (Zerubavel 1997; Eliasoph and 
Lichterman 2003). With this definition in mind, we expect that joining a political or 
civic organization has an impact on members’ worldviews.
However, activists join and experience their commitment differently. Therefore, 
we expect variation among members regarding the effect of commitment on world-
views. As we saw in the previous section, some joiners already share their world-
views with members of a given organization. For these individuals, we suppose 
stability, i.e. joining commitment will not drastically change their meanings. Others 
engage with dissimilar views compared to those present among members. They 
encounter a host of new cultural scripts which can be practiced through talks and 
disputes with fellow members, as well as within informal networks. Commitment is 
hence expected to affect their worldviews. It remains to be known if changes are 
durable, as the literature suggests.
In addition, individuals have many worldviews though not all of these are 
affected by political and civic commitment. We focus on two particular dimensions: 
Worldviews about common good and politics because they are the ends and means 
of the joint action taking place within the organizations considered here: Members 
of organizations of environmental protection use a contentious action repertoire 
(means) that aims to protect the environment (end). Volunteers of charitable organi-
zations provide support to deprived people (end), and by helping the poor directly, 
seek to supplement state intervention (means). Unionists, finally, use institutional 
and contentious politics (means) to protect worker’s rights (end).
Activists are supposed to act on a specific understanding of common good. Those 
goods are specific, as they should objectively improve people’s well-being and be 
shared by all community members (Aristotle 1988; Murphy 2005). Who are the 
beneficiaries of the common good? Is it society as a whole or restricted to specific 
3 While we stress the social construction of worldviews, we nonetheless endorse an agentic concep-
tion, with room for idiosyncrasy and an individual capable to resist. Individuals are involved in 
various social sites and face different and often conflicting worldviews that they have to integrate 
in their self. This integration and use of their cognitive resources is made with agency (see Swidler 
1986; Fligstein and McAdam 2012).
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groups? And are members concerned by many common goods or only by the one 
they commit to? Six indicators allow us to evaluate this dimension: General trust, 
women’s penalization, measures for women, changes for foreigners, environmental 
protection, and wealth redistribution.4
The second dimension is their understanding of politics, which is how people 
perceive and think about actors in the political arena. Are state actors accountable 
for the common good and should they intervene to enlarge and secure it? Do indi-
viduals legitimize state actors and their performances? And what is the role of a citi-
zen in democracy? Should a citizen be interested in, and vigilant about, political 
processes and decisions? Should a citizen value the importance of taking part in 
participatory politics? We rely on seven indicators to evaluate this dimension: 
Opinions on the amount of social expenses, general satisfaction with democracy, 
trust in the Federal Government, political interest, and the intention to boycott, dem-
onstrate, and strike.5
Unfortunately, survey data in general is limited in scope regarding the analyzable 
nuances of people’s worldviews. This is especially visible when one wants to 
enquire into worldviews provided by a general population survey, as the SHP is 
mandated to cover a broad range of subjects. As a consequence, some indicators are 
proxies at best, or are loosely related to our concept. For example, political interest 
provides only a rough measure for political vigilance. While someone probably has 
to have some interest in politics in order to be vigilant, one can easily imagine that 
4 For general trust, respondents were asked whether they would say that most people can be trusted 
or if you can’t be too careful in dealing with people, where 0 means “Can’t be too careful” and 10 
means “Most people can be trusted.” Women’s penalization was measured with this item: “Do you 
have the feeling that in Switzerland women are penalized more than men in certain areas”, where 
0 means “not at all penalized” and 10 “strongly penalized”? For measures for women, we used the 
following question: “Are you in favor of Switzerland taking more steps to ensure the promotion of 
women”, where 0 means “not at all in favor” and 10 “totally in favor”? Respondent’s opinions 
about changes for foreigners is evaluated with the following: “Are you in favor of Switzerland 
offering foreigners the same opportunities as those offered to Swiss citizens, or in favor of 
Switzerland offering Swiss citizens better opportunities?” Respondents could be either favorable 
to equal opportunities, to better opportunities, or neither. Regarding Opinion about environmental 
protection, respondents were asked whether they are favorable to Switzerland being more con-
cerned with environmental protection than with economic growth, and vice-versa. Again, respon-
dents could either be in favor of environmental protection, economic growth, or neither. The 
question for wealth redistribution, finally, evaluates whether the respondent is in favor of an 
increase or decrease in the taxes on high income, or neither.
5 For their opinion on social expenses, respondents were asked whether they are in favor of a dimi-
nution, in favor of an increase of the Confederation social spending or neither of the two. 
Satisfaction with democracy was measured with this item: “Overall, how satisfied are you with the 
way in which democracy works in our country”, if 0 means “not at all satisfied” and 10 “com-
pletely satisfied.” Trust in the Federal Government is based on this question: “How much confi-
dence do you have in the Federal Government” if 0 means “no confidence” and 10 means “full 
confidence.” Political interest is measured with the following question: “Generally, how interested 
are you in politics, if 0 means “not at all interested” and 10 “very interested”? To evaluate the inten-
tion to boycott, demonstrate and strike, respondents were asked with three items: “If 0 means never 
and 10 certainly, tell me to what extent, in the future, you are prepared to take part in a boycott/
demonstration/strike.”
16 Does Commitment Change Worldviews?
236
someone is politically interested without being vigilant. As a consequence, the 
validity of our measures is somewhat limited, making it hard to evaluate the under-
lying theoretical dimensions. We nonetheless consider the ensemble of attitudinal 
indicators analyzed a reasonable representation of a worldview. Therefore, the 
SHP’s panel design largely outweighs this drawback, offering a rather unique 
opportunity to explore the worldviews of members over time.
 How to Analyze Changes in Worldviews?
Our analyses investigate worldviews of all the individuals included in the original 
sample who responded regularly over 11 years (1999 to 2009).6 1999 is the starting 
date of the panel and 2009 is the last year when questions on membership were 
asked annually. From 2009 onwards, the membership questions were put into a rota-
tive module and are now only measured once every 3 years. Membership is obvi-
ously crucial for the analyses conducted here as it allows us to attribute respondents 
to the group of members who sustain commitment, new joiners, and non-members 
respectively.7 It was tempting to add the years 2011 and 2014 where the information 
on membership exists. However, this would have required us making assumptions 
about individuals’ commitment in 2010, 2012, and 2013. To increase the robustness 
of the findings, we decided to dismiss this time period from our sample.
We then decided to look only at membership for the years 2003, 2004, and 
2005 in order to observe the same group over time. This decision excludes people 
who join or leave in other years but brings along two key advantages. First, the 
worldviews of every joiner can be observed over a substantial amount of time: Four 
years before and after commitment takes place.8 Second, an identical group of join-
ers is observed over time, thereby eliminating any inter-individual differences from 
the analyses. These tend to erase intra-individual variation, which makes the proce-
dure a valuable one. In terms of age, we include a large age range in our working 
sample so as to provide respondents with the opportunity for membership unre-
stricted by age or mobility. In the first year of inquiry (1999) we took individuals 
from 15 years to 80 years of age for the last year of observation (2009).9
6 “Regularly” means that an individual has to take part in every wave where a specific question was 
asked. However, as not all indicators were measured over the whole timespan, the sample size 
slightly varies between indicators.
7 For membership, respondents are asked the following question: “I will now read out a list of 
associations and organizations. Could you tell me for each of them whether you are an active 
member, a passive member or not a member?”
8 Due to data availability, this is not always possible. “Intention to demonstrate”, for example, is 
only available between 1999 and 2008. Hence, for this particular indicator, we provide data for 
4 years before but only 3 years after an individual has become a member.
9 All these decisions are the product of an iterative process during which we tested several possible 
constructions of the membership variable and ran analyses with and without weights. Overall, the 
results are very similar and we are confident with the result presented here.
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The analyses presented below merge members of environmental organizations, 
charitable organizations, and unions.10 In addition, we decided to combine active 
and passive membership because the number of active members is too small to be 
analyzed separately. Moreover, we have elsewhere shown that commitment affects 
worldviews of both active and passive members (Passy and Monsch 2016). Whereas 
active members enjoy opportunities to practice community specific cultural scripts 
in their interactions with other members, empirical evidence shows that passive 
members rely on people in their interpersonal network (friends and relatives) who 
are favorable or committed to the community in question (see also McAdam 1988; 
Klandermans 1997). We hence take full advantage of the potential of the SHP panel 
design. This allows us to observe the same individuals yearly over a long period, 
both before and after they become members. In addition, as the SHP is a general 
population survey, it naturally entails a control group of non-members. These char-
acteristics make these data well suited to study biographical consequences.
 Specific Worldviews of Members
Before turning to the effects of commitment on worldviews, we need to clarify three 
points. How important is political and civic commitment as a phenomenon in 
Switzerland? Is it common for new members to maintain their commitment? And do 
members hold specific worldviews which depart from non-members? First, com-
mitment is clearly an important and widespread phenomenon in Switzerland. 
According to the SHP data, more than 40% of all respondents are members of Green 
contention, unions, or a charitable organization.11 Commitment in Switzerland is 
hence a widespread phenomenon including about half of the national population. 
Given the fact that we do not possess indicators on other types of activism, such as 
LGBT, human rights, migrants’ rights, peace groups, etc., the evidence inevitably 
underestimates the range and extent of commitment in the country. Another element 
is the rather stable feature of commitment over time. From 1999 to 2009 the num-
bers do not change and are quite impressive. What is stressed is that investigating 
political and social participation, and consequences of commitment on worldviews, 
is not merely a rhetorical question, especially given the large number of individuals 
involved. Second, we ask whether members, who have just joined a collective 
endeavor, are inclined to maintain their commitment. After all, if worldviews are 
affected by commitment, the effect must occur once activists enjoy social interac-
tions and practice cultural scripts within the given community.12 We observe such 
10 We do this for three main reasons; first, limited constraints. Second, it allows us to obtain reason-
able numbers to analyze subgroups, especially for the group of joiners who possess other under-
standings. Third, the results are very similar when members of these groups were analyzed 
separately.
11 We tested this factor for the years 1999, 2004 and 2009.
12 About 80% of members under study are passive members who support their respective organiza-
tion financially. We have shown that passive members are also involved in social interactions and 
practice the cultural scripts available in their commitment communities (Passy and Monsch 2016). 
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sustained commitment in the SHP data: Around 80% of all individuals who were 
committed in 1999 sustain their involvement over time (30% sustain commitment 
between 2 and 4 years and 50% more than 5 years). Sustained exposure to social 
interactions within these communities thus offers opportunities to influence mem-
bers’ worldviews at the very least.
Finally, worldviews of members’ depart from those of non-activists. As shown in 
Table  16.1, members who sustain participation clearly hold specific meanings 
when it comes to their understanding of common good and politics.13 Let us discuss 
this aspect in more detail. Members’ understanding of common good clearly dif-
fers from that of non-members. On average, they trust others, perceive women as 
more penalized than men, and are prone to encourage women promotion more. 
These worldviews significantly depart from those of non-members (see Eta and 
Chi- squared coefficients). Additionally, members think foreigners should benefit 
from the same opportunities than Swiss citizens, environmental protection should 
be a priority, and taxes for higher income earners should be increased to enable a 
better distribution of common good. These questions concern members more than 
non-members.
Members’ understandings of politics are also specific, especially regarding their 
political interest and intention to boycott, to demonstrate, and to strike. Meanwhile, 
differences for their opinions concerning increases in the state’s social expenses, 
their overall satisfaction with democracy, as well as their trust in the Federal 
Government are statistically significant, but only by a small margin. It is surprising 
to note that members are more satisfied with democratic procedures and are more 
inclined to trust politicians. Indeed, we could have expected a more critical stance 
resulting in less satisfaction and trust because state de-legitimization is considered 
to constitute an important factor for protest participation (Piven and Cloward 1977). 
Three elements help clarify this result. First, the Swiss population generally dis-
plays a high level of political trust compared to populations of other European coun-
tries (Bauer et al. 2013). Second, many types of organizations are included in the 
member category, entailing that individuals could be members of a typical protest 
actor or not. For example, the union community is quite fragmented in Switzerland 
when it comes to sectorial (public vs. private) and ideological (left wing vs. 
Christian) lines (Kriesi and Trechsel 2008). In turn, this influences the action reper-
toire deployed and the subsequent conception of politics. Finally, the two indicators 
used to assess Swiss democracy and its political institutions are rather general. 
While it is necessary to take these exceptions into account, the overall picture 
remains clear: Members possess a specific understanding of politics.
However, less is known about the time-span necessary for activists to synchronize their world-
views with their peers. It seems reasonable to expect variation with respect to the participant’s level 
of commitment and the political challenge their mobilization involves. For individuals lightly com-
mitted to a mobilization of low level of political challenge, we expect that the process takes longer 
than for active members involved in challenging contentions.
13 People in this category were members of either an organization of environmental protection, 
charity, or union during 2003, 2004, and 2005.
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Throughout the discussion of Table 16.1, we have shown that members possess a 
distinct understanding of common good and politics when contrasted with non- 
members. They have a more inclusive vision of society, are more concerned by 
different common goods, legitimize state actors more, and have a more vigilant and 
participatory conception of citizenship. As other variables (e.g. education, social 
class) were not assessed, this is merely correlational evidence which highlights the 
differences between members and non-members.
Table 16.1 Comparison between worldviews of members and non-members
UNDERSTANDINGS OF COMMON GOOD
Members Non-members
Means Means Eta





























































































Note: *p  <  0.05 **p  <  0.01 ***p  <  0.001. Eta for interval scaled variables and χ2 for dummies. 
Source: Swiss household panel
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 Multiple Effects of Commitment: Stable and Malleable 
Worldviews
Members possess specific worldviews. But when do these meanings become spe-
cific? Table  16.2 allows us to investigate whether and under which conditions 
worldviews of members change. The table is organized in the following manner: 
The bold vertical line in the middle marks the moment respondents became mem-
bers. In relation to this moment, the columns before and after the bold vertical line 
outline the 4 years prior (t-4, t-3, t-2, t-1) and after (t + 1, t + 2, t + 3, t + 4) these 
individuals began participation. In addition, at the right end of Table 16.2 we have 
added a column where t-tests between the indicators 1 year before people started 
commitment (t-1) and 1 year after this event happened (t + 1) are reported. This is 
so in order to evaluate whether members’ worldviews changed. Like in Table 16.1, 
the rows go through the indicators of joiners’ understandings of common good and 
politics with the exception that each indicator is listed twice: Once for all joiners 
and once for new members with other worldviews.14 Accordingly, discussion of the 
results centers first on all joiners, then turns to the sub-group with other meanings.
What happens to worldviews of joiners? Do they change after they join their 
respective organization? And if changes occur, are they durable? Overall, we 
observe a high degree of stability for individuals who enter into participation: Their 
worldviews do not change. Their understanding of common good and of politics 
remains the same before and after joining a given organization. However, two 
exceptions contradict this general pattern of stable worldviews: Trust in others and 
political interest. Both the level of trust and interest in politics increases once indi-
viduals join an organization. The literature on volunteerism shows similar results 
(Eggert and Giugni 2010 for political interest; Sivesind et al. 2013 for social trust). 
Our result therefore backs these findings. Indeed, commitment affects social trust 
and political interest in a positive manner.15 Social trust and political interest set 
aside, the worldviews of activists do not change. This implies that social interac-
tions which occur after individuals enter activism do not necessarily influence their 
worldviews. As we see when comparing the results with those reported in Table 16.1, 
joiners are already close to members before they start participation, and these par-
ticular understandings remain stable over time. Hence, scholarship that stresses that 
activist groups recruit newcomers in their mobilization potential is right: Their 
worldviews overlap substantially with those of members already committed.16
14 We defined benchmarks for new members with other worldviews in relation to the results for the 
member category in Table 16.1 (see the greater-than signs in Table 16.2). For the interval-scaled 
indicators, the basis for this decision was the means of members who sustain participation. For 
nominal-scaled indicators, we have excluded the respective modal value of faithful members.
15 Measures for women and taxes on high income also show significant changes (see t-test in 
Table 16.2). However, these difference remain small and tend to vanish over time (see t + 2, t + 3 
and t + 4).
16 Additional analyses show that members also predominately belong to the movement potential in 
terms of their social characteristics (age, social class, and education).
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However, the picture changes once we consider joiners with other worldviews 
than those who sustain commitment. For this group, we observe a significant change 
once membership has begun. A synchronization process is clearly at work, be it for 
their understandings of common good, or regarding their understandings of politics. 
While very few indicators were significant when all joiners are considered together, 
most of them are affected by commitment for joiners with other worldviews. And 
these changes are not merely visible a year after membership has occurred (t + 1), 
but remain stable over time, and do not regress to the level before the organization 
was joined. As for the dimension of common good, five out of six indicators show a 
significant change once members with other understandings commence their com-
mitment. While still significant, the question regarding the level of women’s penal-
ization departs from this general picture. Joiners with other worldviews than those 
shared by members of environmental protection groups, charitable organizations, 
and unions, only increase slightly in their perception that women are disadvantaged. 
By contrast, they become more favorable to taking measures for the promotion of 
women. Joiners’ with other worldviews see their understandings of politics equally 
affected by commitment. This group becomes more inclined towards an increase in 
state social expenses, more interested in politics, and shows a higher protest inten-
tion on average. However, satisfaction with democracy, as well as trust in the Federal 
Government, diverges from this general trend. While satisfaction with democracy 
grows slowly over time (t + 2, t + 3 and t + 4), trust in the Federal Government is not 
affected by commitment.
 Multiple Effects on Members’ Worldviews
This chapter provides evidence for two arguments. On the one hand, many individu-
als join a political or civic organization with similar worldviews to those held by 
members of the organization. In that regard, the low numbers for the group of join-
ers with other understandings is a result in its own right, as only few joiners belong 
to this group. This group’s worldviews is only marginally affected by commitment. 
On the other hand, commitment has a durable effect on the worldviews of individu-
als who join a commitment with other understandings. Unfortunately, we are lim-
ited by very general indicators, as well as by small numbers, when we want to 
compare subgroups. Further research will be required to investigate the worldviews 
of members over time.
Throughout this chapter, we argued that commitment changes people’s world-
views. The results indicate that commitment has a differential effect on the under-
standings of common good and politics of individuals who become members of an 
environmental protection organization, a charitable organization, or a union. The 
majority of joiners engage with meanings close to those of members who sustain 
commitment, a result that sustains the argument put forth by movement potential 
scholars, who claim that, individuals need to hold particular worldviews in order to 
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join an organization. However, a non-negligible part of joiners become members 
with other worldviews of common good and politics, and this group is clearly 
affected in the way we suggested: Their worldviews are synchronized and these 
changes are durable. Thus, stability and changes are not mutually exclusive when it 
comes to the effects of political and civic participation.
Our major aim consists in taking a first step towards the study of variations 
among socialization patterns and pointing out that mental consequences are group 
specific. In terms of future research, we should analyze the various effects of com-
mitment according to different groups. We would hence further our knowledge 
regarding the conditions under which commitment has an effect on members’ 
worldviews, concerning the gendered experience in union activism, for example 
(Van Dyke et al. 2000). Longitudinal data would be indispensable if we were to 
undertake such a study. The SHP data has proven valuable in this respect. However, 
assessing the meanings of members with the sole use of indicators destined to sur-
vey a general population has its limits. In the future, an additional task will hence be 
to develop more refined measurements, which could take the form of a panel study 
dedicated to analyzing the effects of political commitment, to complement this fas-
cinating dataset. Going down this path will increase our understanding of the role 
played by political and civic commitment for participant’s worldviews in particular, 
and allow us to examine the effects on their life course more generally.
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 Conclusion
This book brings together diverse studies based on longitudinal data from the Swiss 
Household Panel. Following a large sample of households over a period of almost 
two decades allows us to give a detailed picture of how life courses have evolved 
over time. At the same time, such data can also paint a picture of Swiss society over 
the last two decades. This book illustrates these two types of social dynamics, the 
changes in individual lives and those at the societal level grouped around three 
themes: health, wellbeing and life satisfaction; resources, work and living condi-
tions; and politics and attitudes. This chapter brings together the main conclusions 
from the studies in this book.
 Health, Wellbeing and Life Satisfaction
The contributions on health, wellbeing and life satisfaction mainly focus on changes 
and events over the life course. Lillard contributes a chapter on smoking that incor-
porates change on both the macro- and micro-level by showing the smoking behav-
iour of different cohorts of men and women in Switzerland over the life course. He 
finds that the smoking behaviour of Swiss men and women resembles, to a certain 
extent, that found in other countries. He shows that older cohorts smoke more than 
younger ones and that men smoke more than women do, although women behave 
more like men in younger cohorts. For the younger cohorts, smoking peaks in the 
early twenties and decreases from the late twenties onward. Peak smoking rates 
occurred at older ages in the oldest cohorts. For all cohorts and over time, smoking 
prevalence has generally been decreasing in connection with factors such as adver-
tising bans, the prohibition from smoking in enclosed public areas and at the work-
place, and increased taxes on tobacco.
The study by Lucchini and Della Bella assesses the relationship between body 
mass index (BMI) and health satisfaction, both between and within individuals. 
They show that men and especially women with a BMI different from normal 
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weight had significantly lower levels of satisfaction with their health, with the stron-
gest effects being for obesity and severe obesity. Looking at intra-individual 
changes, any change from normal-weight BMI to either underweight or overweight 
decreases satisfaction with health among women but not among men. The fact that 
women suffer more in terms of satisfaction with their health if they are obese sug-
gests that differences in health satisfaction not only are related to physical health but 
may also reflect that women face more weight-related stigma than men do. 
According to recent statistics, obesity rates in Switzerland are low in comparison to 
in other OECD countries but have been increasing in the last 15 years. Stigmatization 
may play a more important role in a society where obesity is relatively rare.
Three chapters relate life events in the family domain to life satisfaction, health 
and wellbeing. The chapter by Wernli and Zella relates changes in life satisfaction 
to a number of transitions in the family life course. They find that union formation, 
the transition to marriage and the birth of children all make people more satisfied 
with their life in general. They find downward trends for divorce and widowhood. 
An important finding of their study is that changes in life satisfaction are often tem-
porary, and the timing and duration sometimes vary for men and women. For exam-
ple, whereas women show stronger increases following the transition to marriage, 
they also seem to suffer more prior to and during a relationship’s dissolution. Men, 
on the other hand, become less satisfied with their lives after a break-up, and their 
unhappiness lasts longer compared with women.
The chapter by Ryser and Le Goff and that of Hewitt, Voorpostel and Turrell 
zoom in on the dynamics surrounding single family transitions. Ryser and Le Goff 
assess what happens to different aspects of wellbeing and attitudes about the family 
when cohabiting couples marry. Previous studies have shown that cohabiting indi-
viduals tend to hold less traditional family values and also show higher levels of 
depressive symptoms and less happiness. In their study, Ryser and Le Goff assess 
the extent to which couples that decide to get married are already different prior to 
this transition, suggesting a process of selectivity, and whether we can observe a 
change in wellbeing and attitudes as cohabiting couples marry. They show that 
cohabiting couples hardly show any variation in wellbeing when they become mar-
ried, supporting the idea of selection. Yet, they also show that although there is little 
variation in the overall population, the transition to marriage seems to affect some 
groups more than others: differences in life satisfaction by gender and educational 
attainment prior to marriage disappeared following the transition.
Hewitt, Voorpostel and Turrell also compare cohabitation and marriage but focus 
on relationship dissolution. Their main question is whether relationship dissolution 
affects mental and physical health to the same extent if the couple is married as it 
does when they are cohabiting. Comparing Australia and Switzerland, they find no 
strong short-term effect on physical health but show that separation from marriage 
results in a greater decline in mental health than separation from cohabitation, with 
only marginal differences between the countries. In line with the findings from 
Wernli and Zella, they show that on average, individuals return to their prior levels 
of mental health after a few years.
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These three chapters demonstrate a clear link between mental health and wellbe-
ing, and events and transitions in the family domain in the lives of the Swiss resident 
population in the last two decades. Rather than simply observing trends in marriage, 
fertility, childbirth and wellbeing, the chapters show how wellbeing and health 
change in the process of experiencing these events at the individual level, often sug-
gesting that family events affect wellbeing but predominantly showing that higher 
or lower levels of wellbeing tend to be only temporary.
The last chapter in this section shifts the focus to the relationship between immi-
gration and health. Potarca and Bernardi examine whether there is evidence of a 
“healthy immigrant effect” in Switzerland, in which migrants report better health 
than natives do. Although this “epidemiological paradox” is found in several other 
countries, they find the opposite to be the case in Switzerland: migrants have poorer 
health compared with Swiss natives, even after adjusting for differences in socio- 
economic status. They also show that legal status has a significant influence on 
health disparities between Swiss natives and immigrants. Swiss who are naturalized 
in later life and non-Swiss show poorer health compared to Swiss natives and those 
who became Swiss at a young age. By incorporating retrospective information on 
the timing of naturalization, they demonstrate that a comparison at a single time 
point between Swiss and non-Swiss is not enough to better understand the relation 
between migration and health: the timing of naturalization matters.
 Resources, Work and Living Conditions
The second part of the book combines six chapters that either address how life 
course events and trajectories affect various outcomes related to socio-economic 
resources, work and living conditions or take more of a macro-perspective and show 
how cohorts have changed over time.
Masia, Budowski and Tillmann link health to poverty outcomes. The longitudi-
nal nature of the SHP data allows them to show how health deterioration of a house-
hold’s breadwinner increases the risk that the household will enter into poverty and 
precariousness. Not only do they show that health affects precariousness, indicating 
a causal relationship between the two, but they also show how the health of the 
household breadwinner affects the situation of all household members, hence mov-
ing beyond the individual level.
The chapter by Gazareth, Iglesias, Crettaz and Suter and the one by Bühlmann 
both look at life course trajectories to draw conclusions on how Swiss society has 
changed, in terms of determinants of material deprivation (Gazareth et al.) and in 
terms of job insecurity and instability (Bühlmann). Gazareth and colleagues show 
that the majority of households can be characterized by stably non-deprived trajec-
tories over time. Households that experience material deprivation tend to fluctuate 
in and out of deprivation. Trajectories of durable deprivation are scarce. They con-
clude further that the classical determinants of social inequality, such as social class, 
play a larger role than life course transitions. Bühlmann focuses on the increasing 
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levels of precarious employment in the last decades. He first shows that in 
Switzerland, only a minority held a permanent position and did not perceive their 
job as insecure in 2010. He then examines the dynamics of vulnerability in the years 
leading up to 2010. In this period, exclusion from the labour market and precarious 
employment increased, partly because of changes in social policies. His analysis of 
the SHP data shows six types of trajectories: stable and secure, stable but insecure 
(the largest group), increasing insecurity, turbulent entries, out of the work force, 
and paths to exclusion. In line with the macro-trends, he finds that especially the 
younger generation has experienced turbulent entries into the labour market. Paths 
to exclusion are more common among lower-educated older individuals. This study 
shows how individual trajectories produce macro-outcomes and how some groups 
are more at risk of trajectories to vulnerability than others.
Zangger and colleagues put the school-to-work transition into context by incor-
porating the timing of different cohorts entering the labour market and linking this 
to levels of modernity of Swiss society (by which they mean the combination of 
educational expansion, the size of the labour force, changes in the occupational 
structures, and the increase in qualification requirements). They find that timing 
matters: there is a positive association with the level of modernity at the time of 
one’s graduation on the likelihood of entering the labour market. Younger cohorts 
are more likely to enter the labour market upon graduation. The authors did not find 
an increasing risk of entering the lowest status group over time. Education and 
social background remain important, emphasizing the persistent social inequality in 
entering at the top or bottom of the status distribution across cohorts.
The final two chapters in this section deal with wealth. Until recently, wealth in 
Switzerland has received little research attention, mostly because of a lack of avail-
able data. With the inclusion of questions on wealth in the SHP in 2012, it has 
become possible to gain more insight into household wealth in Switzerland. As 
other household panels have also included measures of wealth, we can compare 
Switzerland to other nations. Ravazzini and Kuhn compare saving behaviour and 
wealth in Switzerland, Germany and Australia and assess the role of children in the 
household. They find for all three countries that older children are the most expen-
sive, limiting families’ ability to save. Younger children limit the ability to save in 
Germany and, even more so, in Switzerland. This may result from the stronger 
reduction in labour supply as women leave the labour market upon having children. 
Analysing the data on wealth, the authors find that in the long run, children only 
have weak negative consequences on wealth accumulation. The second chapter on 
wealth, by Kuhn and Grabka, looks at the relationship between homeownership and 
wealth in Germany and Switzerland. In both countries, owners are wealthier than 
renters are because they save more in paying off their mortgage and because prop-
erty prices have increased. The authors also find that overall wealth inequality is 
high in both countries and that wealth inequality is larger among renters than among 
owners. These analyses complement the chapters on household welfare and mate-




The third part of this volume deals with political parties and (political) attitudes. 
The first three chapters combine a macro-level change over time with individual- 
level dynamics. They show that attitudes in Switzerland have changed over time. 
Between 1999 and 2014, the Swiss have become increasingly anti-immigrant, anti- 
social spending, sceptical about joining the European Union and concerned with 
protecting the environment. The contributions then assess intra-individual patterns 
of change to try to explain these trends.
Fitzgerald and Jorde assess the extent to which individual partisan preferences 
shape attitudes about immigration, social spending and the environment. Rather 
than following the classic model of electoral behaviour that assumes policy prefer-
ences shape political party choice, they turn this upside down and use longitudinal 
data from the SHP to show that partisanship also drives changes in political atti-
tudes. They first show that anti-immigration, anti-spending and pro-environment 
attitudes show significant intra-individual variation, although they have become 
more stable over time. Linking changes in attitudes to partisanship, the authors find 
that partisanship shapes people’s stances on key political issues. Supporting the 
Swiss People’s Party (SVP) is associated with a shift to supporting opportunities for 
Swiss citizens over those for immigrants. The authors argue that the rise of the SVP 
can be at least partly attributed to the party’s ability to convince voters on matters 
associated with immigration. For preferences regarding environmental policies, 
support for the Green Party is a major driver. Finally, opinions on social spending 
are driven by a preference for the Radicals or, even more strongly, by a preference 
for the SVP. The authors link this to the SVP’s rhetoric on government spending on 
immigrants.
Sarrasin, Kuhn and Lancee focus on Euroscepticism. The increasingly critical 
attitude that the Swiss hold towards the EU implies that at least part of the popula-
tion has changed their opinion over time. After showing that citizens with a higher 
socio-economic status are more likely to support joining the EU and those holding 
right-wing values are less likely to, the authors move on to explain what drives indi-
vidual changes in attitudes. Their study shows that a move towards the right side of 
the political spectrum increases the likelihood of opposing joining the EU. In con-
trast, whereas economic values explain attitudes towards the EU, changes in indi-
vidual life courses largely unrelated to changes in attitudes. This suggests that 
mostly macro-factors, such as economic crises, are driving the overall decline in 
support for joining the EU.
The chapter by Pekari, Rosset and Schmid addresses attitudes towards the wel-
fare state, in particular the support for social spending and for higher taxation of the 
rich. In the period 1999––2014, there was an increased perception of job insecurity, 
which we already saw in the chapter by Bühlmann, and simultaneously a slightly 
declining level of support for social spending. This appears to be a contradiction. 
Policy preferences are expected to reflect a changing economic context, where 
increasing risks of unemployment would suggest more support for social spending, 
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such as on unemployment benefits. Fitzgerald and Jorde provided a possible expla-
nation for this trend by linking decreasing support for social spending to the SVP’s 
narrative of government spending on immigrants. Pekari and colleagues go in a 
different direction and examine this paradox by assessing the relationship at the 
individual level. They find that the perceived risk of unemployment, which is linked 
to policy preferences, is related to the actual risk of becoming unemployed (as mea-
sured by the Occupational Unemployment Rate). Yet, they find that education and 
income, which are rather stable over time, are stronger determinants of social policy 
preferences. The authors conclude that social cleavages, rather than subjective eval-
uations of risk, drive social policy preferences, which provides a further explanation 
of why increasing levels of subjective job insecurity can develop in parallel with 
decreasing support for social spending.
Finally, Monsch and Passy analyse the relations between political and civic com-
mitment and change in worldviews over time. The main question of the chapter is 
whether and under which conditions becoming a member (of an environmental pro-
tection organization, a charitable organization or a union) changes a person’s world-
views, which they measure by looking at general trust as well as attitudes on gender 
equality, immigration, environmental protection, social spending, politics and activ-
ism. The authors show that the worldviews of joiners in general do not change after 
joining a given organization. However, in line with the literature on volunteerism, 
general trust and interest in politics increase after joining an organization. This sug-
gests that the worldviews of joiners overlap with those of members who are already 
committed. The picture appears different regarding joiners with worldviews that are 
different from those of committed members. In this case, the authors argue, a syn-
chronization process is at work as a significant change occurs once membership has 
begun. Overall, the authors show that political and civic participation is associated 
with both stability and change in worldviews.
 Concluding Remarks
The collection of studies in this volume demonstrates, on the one hand, that indi-
vidual life courses shape outcomes in various domains at the individual and house-
hold level. The experience of certain life events may produce a number of changes, 
ranging from life satisfaction to wealth accumulation. On the other hand, several 
studies in this book demonstrate that persistent social inequalities and social cleav-
ages exist in Switzerland for many outcomes. In particular, classical determinants of 
social inequality such as social class play an important role in terms of trajectories 
of material deprivation and vulnerability in the labour market. Education and social 
origin still matter regarding school-to-work transitions, and wealth inequality 
remains high in Switzerland. These social and socio-economic cleavages continue 
to shape political attitudes, particularly with regard to the EU and the welfare state. 
Persistent social inequalities especially put those groups at risk who have limited 
resources and face increasing instability in their life course.
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All in all, the contributions collected in this volume are proof of the wealth of the 
SHP data for empirical analyses using different theoretical and methodological 
approaches. Due to the quality of its data, the Swiss Household Panel is a first-class 
source for scientific work. It is widely being used by Swiss and international 
researchers, resulting in a plethora of high-quality scholarly publications. It thus 
achieves the main purpose of a research infrastructure and is successfully in its 
twentieth consecutive year  – and hopefully for many future interview waves to 
come.
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